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ABSTRACT. 
The research presented in the thesis is a'case-study of a 
'socially-directed' technology policy, formulated and 
implemented by the Greater London Council (GLC) whilst in 
office, between 1981 and 1986. The GLC attempted to make a 
direct link between technological innovation and social 
needs by creating the facilities, in the form of five 
'Technology Networks'. for user involvement in 
socially-useful product design and development. 
The research is important for an exploration of technology 
issues. First, it represents an attempt to influence the 
politics of technological development. Second. it addresses 
issues of the content of technology and the social 
organisation of the innovation process. 
The Technology Networks comprised the focal points of the 
research. The objectives were the identification of the 
factors, both locally and nationally, which affected the 
policy implementation process. For the GLC, the national 
economic and political context proved crucial to policy 
developments: it resulted in their abolition in 1986. The 
Technology Networks remained in operation, but were 
increasingly plagued by funding difficulties. 
Findings from the study suggest that the access of a 
different range of social groups of users and producers to 
the early stages of the innovation process. may be a 
valuable exercise in itself. but is problematic as a base 
for an alternative technology policy. Other major 
constraints on the development of socially-useful 
technologies are manufacturing and market opportunities. 
The conclusions are concerned to explore the potential of a 
local authority as an agent of technological change, in 
terms of their role in design and technology education and 
the creation of an alternative technological hegemony. 
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INTRODUCTION. 
There are startling contradictions: -between what,. technology 
--could-provide and what technology actually does provide. 
Mike Cooley, a leading-member of -the .. Lucas, Shop - Stewards 
--= Combine"Committee and . latterly,, 
the Director of-the 
Technology Division of the Greater London Enterprise' Board 
il3LEB), 
. put . this. most succinctly, 
when he wrote: 
' 
... we. have a" , level of technological -sophistication, , such 
-that -we--can-des ian -ands produce " Concorde. --yet -in the -same 'I=society- 
we . cannot provide enough. heating- systems to protect-- 
- old-age pensioners from-hypothermia' (Cooley 1985 p. 19). - 
This is one example among many others. "-It, highlights the 
uneven-relationship between technology-and social and 
-- political. processes. 
Technological innovation plays .a "key" role "in" the process of 
" social "and.. political change.. Research . on""the ""relationship 
"" between'-technology and society has included' social critiques-- 
-. of"the-impacts of-technological change both on society- 
-and-the natural environment. More detailed analyses have been- 
.. made "of . its . impacts on " the . labour . process. work organisation 
and gender divisions. Political analyses of the 
relat-ionship: between"power and . technology have focused-on 
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such technological issues as the nuclear". power-industry-and. 
the social control. of technology (Elliott and-Elliott 1976, 
Collingridge. 1980). All of this work contributes- to - an,. -. -.. 
-. ">. understanding . of .. the social, - political- " and economic causes 
and -implications of. technological. change. "" It. 
draws ... 
. -"-attention. "to. its-direct relationship to 
the way that society 
works and the forms at social. change that.. "are-. envisaged-, for. ". 
It. --.., One example Is ., the association of_ 
information 
technology . (IT). with. the creation-, of. a,. post-industrial'""or. -. "_ 
-, knowledge--based society 
(Bell 1974). 
The plethora. -of literature. -in the 
field of, -technology _ 
studies has served to explode certain myths.. The notion 
that technological change equals material progress, and the 
.., proposition that technological development-is-autonomous and 
unilinear " and. somehow . outside.. of.. societal-.. control .. =... At, the .. 
... Qaa e ... time, ..: technolo&V studies. have focused . -on. -the risks . 
.... involved in. -certain. "foras of technological. development... "r, 
... " 4Mesthene sums up the role of, technology in. -the . following - 
statements. '. It has both positive . and.. negative. effects, . and 
it=usually has the two at"the. same time and in-virtue of 
each--other'-(1970 p. 26); 
A . "key , question which. emerSes from debates on the 
relationship-- between technology and,. society is why we-have 
the-technologies that we do, or . why certain 
technologies- are 
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. developed. whilst. others are not. Attention-to this problem 
requires " an- . analysis of the societal 
factors that -influence 
the direction of technological- developmen. t,.., and an. analysis -.. 
of, the -technology itself. 
The research . presented In this .. thesi-s . is. a. case-study. of "an 
-. "-. atteept -by. a local authority to -influence. - the.. direction of 
technological- change. with.. the.. formulation, and- implementation..:,. 
r.. of. "an. '. alternative! technology-. policy , based- on - social .. need 
. and " the participation.. of users and.: producers. 4n: "the- product-. - 
. -design. and development process. -. The research is significant 
-as an" exploration of- technology .. 
issues : for two-reasons..., 
First.. the attempt by the Greater London-Council (GLC) to 
influence the rate and direction.. of"technological change was.. 
"a practical attempt to directly address"the politics of 
technological-development. Second, the participation of. . 
. "- producers. and-users in the product design-and-development 
process was. an attempt. to address.. the. nature. of the 
--technology itself.. The analysis of wan attempt to address 
the nature _of technology. is . in contrast.. to many- theoretical. . 
-, " studies. of " technological change. that . tend-, -to -take - the 
-technology as-given and treat it. as a: black-box"(Rosenberg.,. 
-. 1982). . -This implies. a -technological.. determinist -perspective 
whereby., the technology itself is 
. neutral; " . 
it--. is then only.. . 
---the,. application... use and. impacts that are the important 
considerations to address.. The notable exceptions to this 
are -discussed in Chapter Two. 
4. 
The reason-for the choice of. this research. -project was as, a" 
"" " : follow-up. to research already. completed by- the Technology 
" Policy Group-at-The Open-University on the. Lucas, Plan 
(see 
... Wainwright and Elliott 1982). Some of the key-personnel at 
Lucas Industries involved in the-. Alternative Plan-moved. -to 
" . the "-GLC". when the Labour group took-control of the council 
following-. the- 1981 local. government elections.,, -- 
The aims or the research weres 
1) td explore., how a local authority... the GLC. attempted : to 
" -develop -"awprogramme . for' the design and development of 
socially-useful products. -. 
" ". 2) " to". identify the. factors, both locally and-. nationally, 
that- affected the formulation. and implementation-of-the 
. -! alternativer technology policy. 
3) to locate a micro or localised. study. of technological.. 
-change.. in""a. more abstract theoretical framework of 
innovation studies. 
The research is'-in the form of a case-study of the"GLC"' 
..,, technology policy.. . As. such it-focuses on observable events 
"in"a particular setting. The research findings=-are -.,. 
"" , locally. based. and.. suggest . certain . factors -that- need--to . be 
taken-into-account for-the implementation of. in - 
-'alternative'. technology policy. Howeverv the-research- 
Project attempts more-than the-illumination of 'local. - :: - 
'authority practices on. technology policy. -The-situation-of 
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the findings in-relation to the more abstact"concepts of.. 
--innovation and-the '. social . shaping of technology'. 
(MacKenzie 
, and Wajcman.. "1985)increases their significance. -It in 
considered : legitimate. to. locate the findings-of this one 
case-study and discuss it. in_terms, of. macro-level.;. concepts... 
Por example,. there is a direct relation. between local 
authority . technology. policy... and. questions"of, innovation and ... 
power. - not"the. least in-the most.. effective exercise of, 
power, the prevention of the very. existence. of". alternatives.. 
(Luker 1974, MacKenzie 1987). 
The" theoretical ,. part- of. the., project. is.. presented " in -Chapters...., 
One : and Two. 
Chapter-One looks at .. the-innovation process.. and places., it .. in :. 
the-context of-a capitalist-market economy. .. The analysis-of 
technological innovation from an. , economic-perspective, rests.. 
., on. a"". purposive . study of innovation and its. relation . "to 
-competitiveness; -technology is, defined. as innovation"in"": 
terms-of-the 'knowledge of techniques' that enhance 
competitive. performance... This. view. presents-a picture of:., 
..... the". design. and. development, of products. that is--closely-tied 
to notions. of, commercial-success, . market-share-. and-,, " 
.. ".. -profitability..... A discussion -of -. technology-and- social---. needs " 
locates innovation, at -the -centre " of. social--, life. " It.. is . 
" -. -important-""to. "take -this. approach to. innovation .. because-much. . 
or-the literature treats. technological. chante. in-an-"abetract-- 
waywand =in-so Joins removes technology-from the. verv_real 
E 
problems associated with technological change. 
Chapter -Two discusses the - social, and political -influences 
that are -embedded. in technological -artefacts.. -The ". 
identification of the social processes. that-affect 
technological design'and. development. highlightspossible 
. points of intervention for the practical implementation of. a 
technology Policy. The . 
idea of. socially.. useful production ... 
attempts to make. -closer links between designers-and-users 
and -perceived social need. T-hese" ideas-. "are. -rather. -. slippery, 
." for. "example.. products can be found to be socially-useful " 
because. they. sell- on the market, . ". people,, would #not":. buy, them,,.. 
.. "-. otherwise.. 
Social-use, when applied. to. %the *GLC, approach, - 
refers to products. and processes aimed. at-the. public sector:. 
., provision 
of goods and services. To this. -end-the GLC 
created the facilities, in the form of-.. the 'technology.. 
networks', for producers and users to participate-in the 
product design/development process. - -- 
However the design and development of productsýdoestnot 
occur in a vacuum. The factors. which.. closely ý affect --the s.. 
- -, innovation. -process are . explored . in `.. relation to. the GLC 
initiative. 
. Chapter- Three sets the case-study, "-in --the 
... national economic. and. political context. It draws attention 
to the hostile 
-political climate-. nationally.: (for. example*. "... 
--the".. tension and conflict between. "the"Conservative"sovernment 
-7 
and the Labour-controlled GLC). and the limitations on 
-resources for a local authority-attempting a policy 
initiative of this nature. 
". " Once the setting- for the-. case-study.. has -been described, the. 
""---next , task is-. the. -explanation of the research- method. - The 
methodological " approach; the case-study, - for " the research 
is... 
, discussed in-Chapter Four. The case-study as a research 
method allowed a flexibility to collect data from-a"variety 
, of sources,. and. was deemed the most appropriate method for 
'. the study of a policy initiative that was unfolding at the- 
time of the research; between October 1982 and March 1986 
when the-GLC. was abolished. 
". ""Chapter, F. Jve sets"the. GLO policy in the context of its own 
Political- structure, and -identifies the-historical -strands of. "... 
". thou¢ht. that influenced the ! alternative'-policy formation. 
The main -points- of the OLC Industry and. -Employment policy -. 
are described. Local socialism,, the Labour Party Programme 
of 1973, workers'- plans, community/popular-planning and the- 
-notion-or pre-figurative politics are discussed in an effort. 
to demonstrate the historical continuity--and"diversity of-, 
.. the ideas-which red the GLC practical experiment. 
CA 
Chapter Six presents the` findings, of. the, case-study research 
on the technology networks. It looks at. how the ideas on 
which the 'alternative' technology-policy was based, worked- 
out in practice. 
Chapter Seven offers a-locally based analysis, of . the.. 
research findings. For the development of. alternative 
technologies-the problems and constraints of. manufacture and 
-markets need to be :. addresseds this is ,, both - an" economic -and a 
political problem. The access of a different range of- 
social. groups of users and. producers to the early stages-of 
the innovation process can affect product design. a"valuable 
. exercise in itself, but the problem remains. of"where"and how 
these technologies can be developed and marketed. 
In. -Chapter-Eight there is an attempt to understand why 
alternative -strategies.. remain only rhetorical or . 
experimental. The political. commitment to change, does-not 
necessarily lead to different. routes of. technological.... 
-development - the. missing ingredient is power (Noble"1983a, 
1983b). 
The analysis of technological. change. reaches an ,. impasse -in- . - 
informing practical action. There is a tendency to get 
9 
stuck. in. the circular argument , that. the ability to"shape "" 
-technology is .. power-dependent and so . changing society 
is 
necessary-to change technology: but society. cannot be 
" -changed without. changing technology-and-so on (see Bruce and 
Mole-1987). 
In, -Chapter_. Nine-. the conclusions, are -presented- and an -attempt. ".,. 
, is made.. to"salvage. alternative strategies for technology 
from. this impasse and offer some indicators for a local 
-authority 'alternative' technology : policy. In the form.: of 
design and technology . education and . the. creation-of an- 
-alternative technological hegemony. In. addition, areas of 
further: research are identified. 
%0 
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- CHAPTER ONE: THE INNOVATION PROCESS. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The structure of advanced 
industrialised societies is 
closely related to the state of technological knowledge and 
development. This is illustrated, for example, by work 
patterns, communications and the consumption of products and 
services. At the core of technological development 
is the 
innovation process or the way in which new products and 
processes are designed, developed and adopted 
in society. 
This chapter looks at the innovation process. The main 
literature in the field is reviewed with the purpose of 
exploring how technological innovation occurs. The concepts 
of 'technology-push' and 'demand-pull' are introduced. -and a 
synthesis of their arguments is used to construct an 
'interactionist' model of the innovation process.. The 
concept of 'technolosical-paradigmt is applied as an 
explanatory tool to consider the influence of government-and., 
other factors on the selection. and direction of 
technological developments. The underlying purpose is to 
focus. on the relationship between technology and 'needs'. 
and question why certain technologies. are"developed and 
others are not. 
l1 
1.2 DEFINITIONS. 
The first step. is to-define what is meant by-technology. A 
wide spectrum or definitions may be found in the literature 
ranging from technology, narrowly defined as apparatus-or= 
machine hardware and software, to definitions that are much 
wider and include factors auch-as knowledge, skill, - 
organisation"and. social and culturalsystems, (Winner 1977. 
Layton 1974). 
In an article concerned with-& more precise conception'and. 
definition of technology, Kline (1985) points to four usages 
of the concept: - 
Usage 1: technology as hardware (or artefacts); non-natural 
objects of all kinds manufactured by people. 
Usage 2:. as a socio-technical' system. of manufacture: "all the 
elements. needed to manufacture a particular' kind of 
hardware, the complete working system including - its' inputs; 
people, machinery,, resources, processes". and legal, economic, 
political and physical environment. 
'-Usage 3: " the information, skills, processes and procedures 
for accomplishing tasks, a-possible denotation as knowledge, 
technique, know-how or methodology in the-usual sense of 
these terms. 
Usage 4: "a socio-technical system of use; a system-using 
combinations of hardware, people (and usually other 
elements) to accomplish tasks that humans cannot perform 
--unaided by such systems (pp 215-218). 
lCL 
In this thesis, the concern is to explore technology in its 
.. desian/development context and, in 
its. context or use. 
Clearly, the definition of technology. needs to be able-to 
include the-. complexity of forces-that influence the 
innovation process. Thus technology is. defined as-a 
- wide-rangins system; the context in which. artefacts are 
designed, developed and used, and the knowledge and . 
expertise. required to maintain the technological system 
(Layton 1974), together with the societal and institutional. 
processes of government, the market and so on that shape 
technological development. For example, the car makes sense. 
as-an-artefact only if supported by. a-transport system, a 
network of. roads. and maintenance facilities.. - As a 
technology it has wide-ranging impacts, including 
implications for urban planning. -the nature of cities and so 
on. 
As an area of study, technological innovation has been 
dominated by economic analyses. The first three usages of 
the concept of-technology identified. -by Kline have been. " 
dealt with by this economic perspective. However there has 
been relatively little. attention. paid to the context of use. 
Coombs... Saviotti. and Walsh (1987) support this-point when 
they -note . that; 
'.. for analytical purposes, innovation studies exhibit an 
autonomy of scientific and technological practices from, 
their social context', they argue that. this . 
'aids -an= 
-understanding of technological innovation as a process in 
its own right and helps to relate innovation to social and - 
13 
-political factors-that affect its development'(p. 6) 
The danger inherent in this separation of technological., 
practice from its social context is that-technology as a 
concept becomes more narrowly defined as technological 
practice. The social context of technology has been more 
effectively dealt with in sociological analyses-of, 
technology. In order to explore technology from both 
perspectives. this chapter is concerned with technological 
innovation in the general framework of economic analyses. 
Chapter Two looks at technology from a sociological 
perspective. 
Technological innovation refers to the process of creation, 
..: evolution, development and implementation of technological 
artefacts. The innovation process involves a series of 
stages typically, though not necessarilyrin this sequence, 
ranging. from the-"idea or invention throigh product design. - 
development, production, market adoption and diffusion. 
Certain theorists use the term 'technological innovation' to 
define this whole process. -Roy (1986) refers to the 
definition adopted by the Organisation for. Economic - 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in the 'Frascati. Manual' 
(a document issued as a proposed standard for measuring 
scientific and technical activities). Here, technological 
innovation is described ass 
'the-tranafarmation of an idea into-at now or improved 
saleable product o/ operational process in industry or 
commerce' (Roy 1986 p. 2). 
tq 
In this view, innovation is a process by which new products 
and processes are conceived, developed and launched. 
In more purely economic approaches. to the study of 
innovation this definition is modified and invention is 
distinguished from innovation. Mansfield writes; 'an 
invention,. when applied for the first time, is called an 
innovation (1968 P-83). In this definition, innovation, 
refers to the first introduction onto the market or into use 
of a new product or process. This distinction was. also. made 
by. the economist; Joseph Schumpeter, he regarded 'invention, 
the discovery of a new tool-or technique, as. the initial 
event. -and innovation; the implementation of the new-tool or 
technique as the the final event' (cited in-Kelly and. 
Kranzberg 1978 p. 2). 
The distinction between invention and innovation is useful 
because it points to the difference between the discovery of 
new products and processes and their eventual application. 
Indeed, only aproportion of all inventions ever reach the 
point of commercial or social use and many inventions do not. 
become innovations at all. 
The process-of converting an invention into an innovation 
involves. a number. of. Phases. A separation between the terms 
'science', 
. 
'technology' and 'technique'-is often used in the 
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literature to identify different points in the innovation 
process. Emmanuel (1982) defines these terms; 
'Science refers to. the discovery of pure scientific 
knowledge that-in not immediately applicable. while 
-technology refers to the application of knowledge to a 
particular problem. Technique is the actual production and 
diffusion of this knowledge in the form of commodities'. 
In this way. technology is defined as knowledge and 
technique as processes. For example. medical technology 
refers-to the overall development and improvement of medical 
techniques - pacemakers, kidney machines and so on. 
In the-economic literature on innovation and the management 
of innovation the factors relating to the commercial success 
of products, processes-and the innovating firm; research and 
development (R and D) capacity, management strategies, 
marketing techniques and macro-economic factors within the 
economy as a whole, comprise the units of analysis. The 
emphasis is on the process of technological development 
rather than the technology itself. 
Another distinction apparent in the literature is that made 
between -'radical' and 
'incremental' innovations. 'Radical' 
innovations refer to products and processes that result from, 
advances in knowledge, for example, the motor car or the 
electric light bulb. 'Incremental' innovations refer to the 
continual process of improvement of techniques. For 
example, since the invention of the motor car-there have, 
X6 
been substantial changes and improvements which clearly 
differentiate the modern Ford Escort from the Model T Ford. 
The distinction between radical and incremental innovations 
is not clear-cut and. many innovations are difficult to 
categorise in---this way.. The -colour television, for example, 
resulted from a" series "of incremental chancesi but, has had 
radical effects. Likewise the zip fastener resulted from R 
and D advances in knowledge but could be seen to represent 
an incremental innovation in terms of the development of 
types of fastener (Rybczyns)i 1985). 
1.3 ORIGINS OF THE TECHNOLOGY-PUSH AND DEMAND-PULL DEBATE. 
The precise nature and cause of technological innovation is 
subject to controversy and debate. In the literature two 
main models are used to explain the determinants-and rate of 
technological innovation. These are. respectively. 
-technolocy-Push and demand-pull (Langrish at al. 1972). 
The technology-push perspective looks to advances in science 
and technology as the major determinants of chance in the 
composition of products and processes. In this approach the 
central role of science in producing invention or the 
dependence on previous advances in technology. to stimulate 
inventive activity is emphasised. 
%1 
The demand-pull model of how innovation occurs.. identifies 
needs or-demands as the main influences-on. innovative 
activity. Utterback (1974) states that; 'needs' may be in 
the. form-of market demands, government or-military 
requirements and social needs. Producers attempt to link 
technological effort to the fulfilment or needs. 
The®e theoretical concepts originated in the work of two 
economists, Schumpeter (1934) and Schmookler (1966). -Both 
of whom recognised the importance of technological change to 
economic development, but favoured . different explanations. 
For Schumpeter, work on lone-term economic-development and 
structural change in capitalist societies, resulted in the 
importance of technological supply over the adaptation of 
technology to demand as an explanation for technological 
innovation. 
. For instance, he proposed that-the-introduction 
of radical new ideas by individual entreprenueurs or large 
firms-was the only way to generate new industrial. -sectors. 
Technology was seen-as the major factor for economic growth 
(Schumpeter 1934). In his later work he recognised the 
growing' institutionalisation of-R&D (Schumpeter 1943, 
Freeman at al. 1982). In this way Schumpeter's ideas 
represented a technology-push argument. 
Schmookler, on the other hand han. often been regarded as the 
exponent of a demand-pull theory of innovation (Coombs, 
ýý 
Saviotti and Walsh 1987). In the first half of this century 
Schmookler studied investment. stocks, employment and 
inventive activity in several industrial sectors in the USA. 
He concluded that fluctuations in investment could not be 
adequately explained by inventive activity, in fact, quite 
the reverse, an increase in inventive activity was a 
response to increasing-demand (Schmookler. 1966).. Although 
the-main focus of his research tended-to be on demand 
factors. SýJuookler did not argue that demand forces were the 
only-determinants of innovative activity. He used the 
metaphor of the"two. blades of a pair of scissors to 
represent invention and demand as. two interacting forces 
(Coombs, Saviotti and Walsh 1987). 
The theoretical debates about. the origins of innovation have 
developed against this background... During the 1960's. and 
1970's empirical-investigations-of. innovations sought to 
reveal the major factors influencing innovative activity. 
The-aim was to identify the importance or technological 
innovation to economic growth. - 
Studies of"technological innovations tend to, be"quite 
diverse, some concentrate on incremental innovations (Myers 
and Marquis 1969, Utterback 1974, Von. Hippel-1976, Mansfield 
1977). Others are based on investi¢ations. of radical. 
'innovations . 
(TRACES 1968, Freeman 1974, NSF-1975). The 
units of analysis also vary. for example, weapons, systems in 
ýa 
HINDSIGHT (Sherwin and Isenson 1967). innovations in TRACES 
(1968), firms in Carter and Williams-(1957) and Langrish et 
al. (1972). and industries In Myers and Marquis (1969) and 
Project SAPPHO (SPRU 1971). (For a review of innovation 
studies see Rothwell 1977. Coombs. Saviotti and Walsh 1987). 
Methodological differences and definitions are also evident 
in these studies. The identification of stages in the 
innovation process were often based on a linear sequential 
model (See Figure 1). Critics argued that that was an 
oversimplification of innovative activity (Langrish et al. 
"1972). There. were. alao differences between the time period 
for investigation of innovations. =. Mowery and Rosenberg 
(1979)"argued that this heterogeneity precluded the 
. comparability of findings. 
However. they conceded that 
certain indicators suggested that demand (or need) was the 
most important determinant of the innovation process. 
In general, studies of innovative activity indicate that an 
understanding of user needs. good communication and - 
effective collaboration-tend to be associated with the 
commercial success of. innovations (Rothwell 1977. Rothwell 
and Walsh 1979). Despite this, Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 
argue that given the wide definitions of 'need' and 'demand! 
, factors present in the studies, (for further discussion see 
1.5). the evidence is too ambiguous to suggest that-demand 
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is the major factor or determinant of innovative activity. 
Langrish et al. (1972) support this view with the argument 
that it is only through the arbitrary selection of a point 
at the beginning of the innovation process that it is 
possible to categorise innovations as a result of market 
demand or technological opportunity. 
1.4 TECHNOLOGY-PUSH. 
Empirical studies of' technological innovation face 
difficulties with relating innovation to purely 
technology-push or purely demand-pull models. The 
relationship between science. and technology was found'to be 
interactive. ` Technology could not be explained as the 
result of the. application of scientific knowledge alone. ' 
Rosenberg (1982) points to instances where technological 
knowledge has preceded scientific knowledge and provided the 
base'-for scientific research. For example. Torricelli's 
demonstration or the weight of air in the atmosphere, an 
important scientific breakthrough. was a result of his 
attempt to design an improved pump. Pasteur's development 
of the science of bacteriology began with his attempt to 
deal with the problems of fermentation and putrefraction in 
the French wine industry. Further, Rosenberg (1982) argues 
agý 
that on occasion the form of' technological development in a 
particular industry can lead to the need for further 
scientific research. He gives the example of the aircraft 
industry where the turbo-jet led to the creation of a new 
supersonic aerodynamics. 
A central question that emerged. -from such studies concerned 
the utility of a linear sequential model of the innovation 
process (see Fig. 1). The linear sequential model-defines 
certain stages in innovative activity beginning with 
research or the recognition of demand and"culminating. with 
the introduction of the product. onto the market. 
Technology-push explanations. of innovative activity which 
rely on this model are unable to account for the time lag 
between invention and innovation, in some cases this can be 
many years if it happens at all. In addition there are time 
lags between pure research and innovation... For example, the 
Bacon fuel cell was first observed in 18$2 by Sir William 
Groves. It was not until the 19609s when huge investments 
were put into the US Space Programme that it was developed 
and produced in order to play a key role in the technology 
used to put the first astronaut on the moon (Guardian 
11.4.86). Haeffner (1973) argues that in its purest form 
technology-push assumes that there is not a-dependence 
between innovative activity and economic and demand-factors. 
Clearly. however, economic and demand factors influence the 
development of technolosies and are indicative of why 
a3 
certain technologies are developed whilst others are. 
In capitalist market economies the technological sphere is 
inflenced by. powerful economic needs and incentives. The 
allocation of scientific resources for research and 
development to a great extent depend on the perceived 
financial rewards to be gained. The increasing 
institutionalisation of R and D in private industrial and 
government financed laboratories. supports the view-that the 
pursuit of -research is largely directed and limited by 
economic costs and benefits (Freeman 1982). 
The technology-push argument for innovative activity 
demonstrates a diversity amongst industrial sectors. In a 
study of a number of innovations in the areas of process 
plant, synthetic materials and. electronics it was found that 
a distinctive feature of these industries was that they were 
research-intensive (Freeman 1982). In addition these areas 
represented the-: three main sectors-of fast growing new 
products. identified by research undertaken during. the_ýf"". 
1960's and 1970's by the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR). and the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU). The conclusions drawn that there were significant 
correlations between research and development efforts and 
innovative output in these sectors appears to support a 
technology-push argument. However, if-the electronics 
industry is taken as an. example"then the importance of 
2-Lý 
economic and institutional factors for innovation-is.. 
evident. 
Freeman (1982) gives a brief history of the electronics 
sector. The origins of the radio industry at the beginning 
of this century were followed around the period of the. _ 
Second World War by three of the most"important-innovations 
in the electronics industry; television, radar and"the 
computer. All of these innovations were largely. influenced 
by advances in fundamental science:. -solid state physics. 
But factors-apart from their technological capability were. - 
important for their development. -.. In" the ý field of radar-and 
computers the close relationship between the scientific 
. community and industrial and military users-was a key factor 
in the innovation process. Wartime military demand spurred 
on many new technical developments which, after. the war, 
were not met by commercial demand for a fairly. long period. 
For example, the growth of the. European. semi-conductor 
Industry was slack in the face of an absence of strong 
market demand. Freeman, Clark and Soete (1982) argue that 
throughout the period of technology-push until commercial, 
innovations got underway.. the combination of government-- 
sponsored. university and industrial research and 
development was crucial for innovation in this industry. 
Clearly, certain industrial sectors. are more closely related 
to scientific and technological research than others. 
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Technology-push explanations are useful for understanding 
radical innovations. Langrish et al. (1972)"argue that the 
radical innovations in the electronics industry may be 
explained more fully by technology-push perspectives rather 
than demand-pull. This is a point supported by Dosi (1982) 
who argues that for demand factors, particularly market 
demand, the technology must already exist. Demand factors 
cannot affect a technology until it has already been 
invented.. Rosenberg (1982) suggests that radical 
innovations= the. major technological breakthroughs, signal 
only-the beginning of a series of"technological developments 
that maw-provide a new. technological framework or 
trajectory, -.. and shape subsequent research and development 
for many years.. However, for an understanding of 
incremental innovations the technology-push argument is not 
sufficient. Once a major breakthrough delineates the 
direction of-further research and technological improvement 
then demand factors are central to the continuation. of. 
innovative activity. 
Empirical research findings suggest indirect relationships 
between. science and innovation. Most innovations are not 
.& 
result of the direct application of. basic scientific 
knowledge (Myers and Marquis 1969, Langrish et al 1972)" 
Rather science acts in conjunction with market demands for 
on-Soins innovative activities. Science assists in the 
resolution of technical problems (Gibbons and-Johnston 1970.. 
Ab 
Rosenberg ~197L). When science does facilitate innovation it 
tends to be rather indirect. Langrish et al (1972) point, to 
-the ways that this can occurs 
'First, curiosity oriented science, practiced" largely in 
academic institutions, provides techniques of investigation. 
Second, it also provides people trained in using these 
techniques as well as in scientific ways of thought in 
general... Third, science enters innovation already 
embodied in technological form. It may be relatively rare 
for a piece of curiosity oriented research'to generate a 
piece of new technology, but once this process has occurred, 
the technology can be used over and-over again and developed 
into more advanced technology' (p.. O). 
The interaction between science and technology, scientist 
and. technologist, is discussed more fully in Chapter Two 
(see Barnes 1982. Hughes 1986).. The conclusion that can be 
drawn here is that science is one of the factors that make 
up thw-innovative environment. _ 
but It-`, is not necessarily the 
main determinant of innovation. The growth of 
institutionalised R&D (Freeman 1982) confirms the 
significance, of scientific and technological researchfor 
innovative activites in certain industrial sectors. ' Demand 
and institutional factors (especially government and 
military support) are important for the transformation of an 
invention into an innovation, and in the support for' 
selected paths of scientific and technological enquiry. For 
example, Information Technology (IT) has-been supported by a 
major government initiative; the Alvey Programme (Alvey' 
1982). 
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I 1.5 DEMAND-PULL. 
So how do demand factors affect the innovation process? 
Pure demand or market-pull models point to the recognition 
, 
of a need as the main stimulus to innovation. Needs may be 
in the form of, market demands. government or military 
requirements and social needs (Utterback 1974). Producers 
link technological efforts to the fulfilment of these needs 
and demands. 
The market is a mechanism whereby suppliers and consumers 
are brought together to facilitate the exchange of goods and 
services. Within capitalist market economies. ""the market 
Presupposes the existence of purchasing resources. Market 
needs are in effect economically backed demands., The" 
economic significance of demands is the key factor in-the 
connection between technological innovation and the market. 
The demand-pull perspective stresses the primacy of-market 
forces in both the capital goods and consumer goods market. 
Demand factors may also be in the form of government markets 
or particular forms of needs. For example. British wartime 
needs spurred the successful development of radar (Freeman 
1982). The influence of government and social needs. on the 
innovation process will be discussed later, first the 
demand-pull theory is discussed more fully and the insights 
that it can produce for the understanding of the innovation 
process are identified. _ 
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Demand. factors as an explanation indicate that it is 
possible to know the direction in which the market is 
. pulling inventive activity before an invention takes place. 
A number. of. empirical studies tended to. support this view 
(Myers and Marquis 1969. Langrish et al. 1972. Rothwell at 
al. 1974. Sherwin and Isenson 1967).. The main conclusions 
drawn from these studies was that factors relating to the 
market were important, particularly the close connection 
between the success of an innovation and the understanding 
of market and user needs. One of the major difficulties 
with these studies is their different definitions of needs 
and demands. Market demand in. Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 
is not-the same as Utterback (1974) conception of needs, 
thus Mowery and Rosenberg have argued that the aggregation 
of these studies into a demand-pull theory of innovation is 
questionable. Market demand refers to the satisfaction of 
certain classes of 'user needs'.. For, example. Myers. and 
Marquis (1969) study . 
innovative activity in the producer 
goods-industry, a sector-which displays a large degree of 
'consumer sovereignity', as compared to the consumer goods. 
-industries. In addition, this Study concentrates on 
'successful' innovations so that it exhibits a selection 
-bias. In their schema demand can refer to either current or 
potential market demand. thus the concept becomes an 
all-encompassing one which loses any precise operational 
definition. Mowery and Rosenberg argue that potential 
""-demand may exist for anything under the sun, and the mere 
ý9 
fact that an innovation finds a market can-scarcely be used 
as evidence. of the undisputed primacy of 'potential 
demand-pull' in explaining innovation (p. 107) 
Theoretical and methodological weaknesses' apart, a major 
shortcoming. of. this perspective is the ability actually }'c 
provide an adequate explanation of the innovation process. 
As an explanation, innovation theory must include various 
types of innovations, both incremental; the technical 
improvements to existing products and processes, and radical 
innovations; -the major technological breakthroughs. There 
are several reasons why demand-factor explanations as the 
major determinant of innovative activity are inadequate. 
First. An relation to the radical category of innovations. 
Potential - needs and . demands- "in this 'area are possibly 
limitless, -it 
is problematic to. conceive. of . how, these 
potential needs and demands trigger-innovative activity at a 
given point in time (Mowery and Rosenberg-1979). A related- 
point is made. by Dosi (1982), he argues that one cannot 
express a need for a product that does"'not already exist$ 
for example, a need for a car could not"be expressed until a 
car had-been invented. In a similar way.. the need for an. 
improved means of transportation. could. have been satisfied 
-by a horse. or a bicycle and so on. Therefore innovative 
activity in terms of major technolosical developments that 
do not'have a direct relationship with'the market remain 
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unexplained. 
Second, the why and when of particular technological 
developments-and not others, together with the timing of 
such developments is unaccounted for., Demand pull 
explanations fail to confront the specific events within the 
innovation process between the recognition of demand by 
producers and the end result; the appearance of anew 
product. Dosi (1982) develops this argument. It would seem 
that-technological possibilities, are already in existence - 
but that they have not previously been exploited. The 
-question ., that arises is why., 
is. this the case? If it can be 
argued that technological innovations are dependent on needs 
and demands-then. the picture that emerges is one of, a 
technology that is extremely versatile and which can be 
guided in any direction at any time. This results in a 
crude conception of. technolomy. as an essentially passive, 
reactive-mechanism; -a 
'freely available. blackbox'(Dosi 1982 1 
P. ia7).. 
Third, Bruce-(1984) in her study-of-the development of fi 
interactive videotex raises the question:. what is the 
mechanism by which needs for new ideas or demands coincide 
with innovators of new ideas? There are no. simp'le 
mechanisms which generate needs or supply ideas. Needs may 
not be articulated and different. groups have different needs 
which may conflict. The supply of ideas depends on the 
-6t 
state of knowledge at particular moments in time and the 
ideas may not correspond with needs. 
Fourth. the existence of needs or demands for.: for example. 
... better. health care (a topical example is the. National Health 
-Service) do not necessarily lead to their satisfaction 
(Rosenbern 1976). 
1.6 INTERACTIONIST MODELS OF INNOVATION. 
To. achieve. a comprehensive picture of. the-innovation 
process. the reliance. on either demand-pull or 
technology-push perspectives discussed above is inadequate. 
The use of both models is more helpful. -, In this way. 
innovative activity is explained by recourse to the role, of 
both technological and market factors in successful 
innovations.. -Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) support this view 
noting that;. 
'Both-the underlying, evolving knowledge base of science and 
-technology-as well as the structure of market demand play 
central roles in innovation-in an interactive fashion-(1979 
p. 105). 
Innovative activity is what Freeman terms a 'coupling' 3" 
process. An". idea 'gels' or 'clicks' somewhere at the 
ever-changing . interfaces. between science, technology and the 
"market. (Freeman-1982 p. 168). -Innovation may be 
choracterised"as a reapdnou to a Ingod' or 'demand'. On"the 
as 
other hand, it may involve existing or new scientific and 
technological knowledge resulting from research activity. 
Experimental development and design, trial production and 
marketing involve a process of matching the technical 
possibilities and the market (Freeman 1982 p. 166). 
The technology-push/demand-pull"debate has revealed the 
innovation process &8a complexity of interacting forces 
that cannot be explained by'recourse to the importance of 
science or user needs4 and demand factors alone. A basic 
uncertainty is present in all attempts to introduce new 
innovations and reliance on only one of these factors alone 
can lead to 'failures'. The most important conclusion from 
. the SAPPHO study 
(SPRU 1971) of the` determinants of success 
and-failure in industrial innovations was that successful 
-innovations 
(innovations were judged-in terms of. commercial- 
. success) were those that. matched. the technology with the 
market,. consumer.. and. -user requirements were understood and 
adequate resources were made-available`-for. research, 
development and. the launch of the innovations. "Whilst this',. 
conclusion may. appear rather obvious, the influence of the. 
"". debate. has led. to further empirical investigation of 
innovative activity in. particular industrial sectors. for` 
example.. the_Science. Policy Research Unit (SPRU) has made 
studies of synthetic materials, chemical and electronics 
. industries 
(Walsh et al 1979, Walsh 1984, Dosi 1981) which 
-Incorporate both theoretical perspectives. Findings from 
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these studies reveal that neither technology-push nor 
demand-pull activities predominate but that each one may be 
paramount and can lead the other at different-stages of 
industrial development. 
Freeman. et al. (1982) suggest that-if generalisations are 
.. required then. it could be argued that. technology-push is 
relatively more important in the early stages of"industrial 
-development, whilst demand-pull assumes more relative 
'importance in the mature stages of the product cycle; 
Abernathy and Utterback (1975) point to the changing 
patterns of innovation relative to the maturity of an 
industry,. they link radical product innovation with 
subsequent incremental product innovation and process 
innovation over the life-cycle of an industry. This 
accounts for the re-adaptation. of products in a similar-way 
to the.. innovation spiral model discussed below. 
The interactive model of the innovation process is dynamic 
and. can account for change both in technological opportunity 
and in-demand factors. The innovation process is, not seen 
.. as static or confined to`particular stages. ' For example. 
Rothwell and Gardiner (see Walker 1986) in a study of the 
Hovercraft industry, found that the adoption or diffusion of 
an-innovation can lead to re-innovation-and re-adaptation of- 
the product or process. 
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A model of the innovation process needs to recognise the 
inter-relationships between different phases or practices 
within the process. In addition, it requires the ability to 
present a dynamic process that is constantly changing 
through interaction with the wider technological environment 
and the market. 
The 'innovation. spiral'(see Figure 2) is a model. of 
innovative activity (see Walker 1986) which recognises its 
dynamic quality. The spiral illustrates an invention and 
development phase which is affected by technology and 
engineering. A diffusion stage which is affected by market 
and demand considerations. And a stage of maturity of an 
innovation which leads to either displacement, adaptation in 
terms of re-design and product stretch or re-invention which 
brings the innovation full circle. The spiral represents an 
-evolutionary model of innovative activity that can account 
for change and for the. affect of outside factors central to 
innovative activity. 
Within this model a key role is given to design and the 
re-design of products and processes. Walker argues that 
design lies between technology-push and market-pull: 
'Design.. then occupies the centre of the innovative process 
because it converts general-ideas and-needs into specific 
objects' (Walker 1986-p34). 
An important point to be made is the relation of design to 
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technological capability; the technology exists and there 
are a number of. ways. that design can use this capacity. .A 
-crucial determinant is the priority given to particular 
criteria; cost-reducing criteria, ease of manufacture, user 
requirements, particular market focus and so on. The design 
of a product or process reflects specific aims. These may 
be economic considerations, political considerations, social 
criteria and-so on. 
The discussion of induced innovation in Coombs. Walsh and 
Saviotti (1987) supports this view. The work of David 
(1975) is cited as indicative of the process whereby 
. learning by doing 
(Arrow 1962) or experience can create a 
more direct link between the origin and diffusion of a given 
technology. It is argued that the choice of a technique, 
initially, will result in a technological learning process 
that leads to the development of similar techniques. 
Rosenberg. t1976) presents an argument. -for a complex 
environment of technological activity whereby the 
inducements to innovation can take the form of a diverse 
range of factors. These may include scarcity of raw 
materials, bottlenecks in technological developments, and 
-political. factors. - He gives the example of efficiency 
requirements in the development. of the textile industry. 
Once innovations had increased . the efficiency of spinning, 
the need to avoid a productivity bottleneck at-the weaving 
stage led-to the introduction of innovations to increase the 
Z-1 
efficiency of weaving. In a further example. Rosenberg 
argues that the nineteenth century, -textile industry in 
Britain'exhibited. a labour-saving bias. Industrialists 
sponsored labour saving innovations in order to avoid 
strikes and to overcome labour's reluctance to accept their 
conditions (cited in Coombs. Saviotti and Walsh 1987). The 
political and social' influences on innovative activity will 
be discussed in Chapter Two. 
The picture which emerges from this discussion of innovation 
is one of a'solution-focused activity. "Innovative activity 
develops in response to various conditions. or to use 
-Rosenbergs. term "bottlenecks' in-technological and 
industrial systems (Rosenberg 1976, see also Hughes 1983 for. 
a discussion of reverse salients as key factors in 
technological development). Here innovative activity arises 
as a result of previous advances in technological 
development. 
This evolutionary model of innovative activity is related 
to innovation at the level of the firm. Rosenberg (1982) 
argued that radical innovations laid-the foundations for. 
technological trajectories (Nelson and Winter 1977). 
Technological trajectories refer. to paths of technological 
development, Complementary technologies and technological 
improvements arise from an evolutionary progression where 
technology builds on existing technology in-an incremental 
S-6 
or step by step manner (see also Ray 1985). This idea. has 
been developed by Dosi (1982) in terms of technological 
Paradigms and technological trajectories. 
A technological paradigm refers to, a 'model' or 'outlook' 
that is brought into existence by a 'radical' innovation. 
For-example.: advancements in solid. state physics influenced 
innovations within the electronics industry. The 
technological trajectory refers to the continuous 
improvements, such as computers within the electronics 
paradigm. For Dosi (1982) the technological paradigm; 
"... is an outlook, a set of procedures,. a definition of the 
relevant problems-and-of the specific knowledge related to 
their solution ... each technological paradigm defines its - 
own-concept of ! progress' (Dosi 1982 p. 148) 
The-concept. of=paradigm is based. on, "Kuhn's 
(1962) theory of 
scientific paradigms. Within Dosi's view the paradigm 
includes certain possible technological. alternatives and 
routes. to future technological developments. For example. 
if nuclear technologies are selected as the model then 
energy. problems are defined by nuclear technological 
solutions. The word selected is the operative one here. 
This-. argument is not to suggest that technology develops of 
its own accord. in an autonomous fashion, on the contrary 
there are always. alternative routes of technological 
development (see MacKenzie 1987). The selection environment 
for 
. 
technological. development will be discussed below and in 
Chapter Two. 
ag 
Dosi"further suggests that. the acceptance-of particular 
technological paradigms can play a powerful prescriptive 
role with regard to the selection of routes of technological 
development. That is. solutions to technological problems 
are provided by specific technologies and: not others. for 
example, to return to the subject of energy the 
technological paths defined by nuclear power mean that other 
energy technologies, such as wind power and solar power are 
excluded. from widespread development.. 
, The. exclusion effect or technological-paradigms is important 
because. of its negative effects-on-technological 
alternatives. Dosi notes; 
'that the efforts and the technological. imagination of 
engineers-and of the organisations they are-in are focused 
in rather precise directions while they are, so to speak, 
-'blind' with respect to other--technoloelcal possibilities 
(Dosi 1982 p. 153). 
Progress. is defined in terms of. the paradigm.. The questions. 
which this-framework of'thinking about' innovativo--activity 
raises are: why did certain technologies emerge instead-of 
others? How are. technological paradigms established? What 
are the factors which act as 'selectors' in the sense of 
identifying certain paths of-development within a larger 
context of possibilities. 
Discussion' of. the innovation process"suggests'that 
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trajectories of development are influenced by economic 
factors; market demand and profitability. together with. the 
technological capability of the enterprise, and political 
and social factors. 
, 
The wider social and. political 
environment influences the selection of technological 
paradigms that act to institute technological trajectories. 
This can be seen in relation to the interaction between 
technical possibility and user needs. This interaction is a 
dynamic process; -user needs and the particular technical 
solutions to these needs are likely to change. Different 
technologies provide the solution to user problems. For 
. -example, the problem'of cooking can 
be met in a number of 
different ways. and with quite different technologies.. The 
crucial factors are the context of use. ' particular user 
requirements. and available resources le. the difference 
. between the'primus stove. the gas cooker and the microwave 
oven. Within one particular trajectory of technical 
.. solution new` innovations can be stimulated by the users 
perception of the inadequacies of the existing-technical., 
solution on offer. The. technical advances arising from user 
needs involve more appropriate ways of doing things (Ray 
1985). 1 
At the level of the firm, innovations embody the 
technological knowledge required to produce the innovation, 
thus for a firm, operating in Ia particular sector and market, 
4-' 
products and processes comprise the cumulation of knowledge 
and perceived-problem-solution factors necessary for their 
continued product development. Producers tend to work 
within existing technological trajectories. This is a point 
- made by Rosenberg (1982) when he notes; 
" Specialist. producers tend to be very good at improving, 
refining and modifying their product. They tend to be weak 
in devising the new innovation that may constitute the 
eventual successor to their product (Rosenberg 1982 p. 129). 
The criteria for the assessment of product and process 
innovations developed by Ray (1985) indicates that to be 
successful innovations need to complement surrounding 
technologies, correspond with user needs, have some 
advantage over competing technologies and be offered at an 
appropriate. price. The evaluation of products and processes 
in these terms offers an explanatory device for successes 
and failures of-innovations. on the market. For example, the 
Sinclair C5 electric-powered car offered"a form of low cost 
transport but did not correspond with other user needs of 
safety and speed. Further, it was not in harmony with 
existing technologies and did not have enough advantages 
over competing technologies. Concorde corresponds with user 
needs for. faster air travel and in this way has some 
advantages over competing technologies but the price 
precludes its use for mass air travel. The implication of 
Ray (1985) criteria for innovations is the tendency for 
- technolosiea to. develop elons exietins tradeatovio in an 
incremental fashion. Product design. re-design and 
tj-: L 
re-adaptation comprise a large part of innovative activity 
once a trajectory has been established. For example. 
re-innovation and adaptation have been key factors within 
the car industry which has a history of improved design 
configurations, engineering specifications and safety 
improvements within a model range. 
The picture or the innovation process which emerges from 
this discussion is one or- a complexity or activities which 
at different times and in different contexts leads to 
innovations. 
1.7 THE SELECTION PROCESS. 
". The"factors which have been identified as important to 
innovation are the match between technological capability 
and market demand. Once the technological capability exists 
then demand will have an 'inducement' effect on surrounding 
" technologies. The-design of the product or process depends 
on user needs, and the political and social factors. which.. 
feed into. the solution requirements or brief for the 
technology. Ray's (1985-) assessment criteria for product, 
innovations suggests that they need to fit into a sort of 
cultural brief or to use Dosi's term an overall 
technological paradigm. A result of which is the powerful 
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exclusion effect for technologies that operate outside of 
this paradigm. 
If the central question of why certain technologies are 
developed whilst others are not is addressed then the above 
scenario has a powerful intuitive appeal. 
The technological environment for innovative activity. is 
influenced by economic and ideological factors that favour 
-certain routes of technological development. ' Investigation 
of the link between innovation and economic growth, which is 
the aim of many of. the empirical ` studies of Innovation, acts 
as a powerful prescriptive argument. More and increasingly 
sophisticated technologies are advanced as the route to 
increased competitiveness in world'markets. 
This economic. view of technology is matched by a more 
general ideological view, in which technology is equated- 
-with human progress. The level-of development-of machines, 
materials and tools employed in. the creation"and"maintenance 
of the. human environment serves as an-indicator of 
technological advance. and. by.. implication of societal 
.. progress, for example, the association of information 
technology with. the Post-Industrial Society which is 
, information or knowledge-based (Bell 1974). 
Having acknowledged'the strong cultural bias towards. 
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technology development, how does this then affect innovative 
activity at the level of the firm. Innovative activity 
operates within the context of uncertainty and risk. Nelson 
and Winter (1974) argue that firms are concerned with 
economic stability so that if markets allow they will use 
the same production techniques for considerable periods of 
time. Change does occur, but this. is likely to be in 
response to 'threats' to their economic and market position. 
This - is . akin to the idea of-induced innovation-put forward 
by Rosenberg (1976) and discussed in the previous section. 
Technological trajectories (Nelson and Winter 1977) are the 
patterns of product and process activity. central to the 
maintenance of an enterprise. The competitive environment 
within which firms operate ensures that within a particular 
industrial sector, these trajectories may be common to the 
majority of firms. Coombs. Saviotti. and Walsh (1987) argue. - 
that this means that each firm will not only. adopt 
technological solutions and approaches, which are goin¢. to- 
remain"stable for short periods of time, but which are also 
similar to those adopted by other firms operating in the 
same technology. " This is the likely situation for mature 
technologies. 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) introduced the concept of- 
dominant design. A variety of designs may be present in the 
initial stages of the industry. "the dominant design emerges.. 
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as-"the. industry matures. In a similar context"Sahal (1981) 
introduced the idea of technological guideposts. and Dosi 
(1982). -uses the concept of-technological paradigms 
to 
illustrate these trajectories. The implication of this work 
is that individual enterprises are constrained in the 
technological options open to them. Changes in market 
demand will tend to result in incremental innovations, 
within the existing technological trajectory, to a 
particular product or process rather than a whole new 
solution. A point'emphasised"by Rosenberg 
, ("1982) in the 
previous section. At certain times, change will occur, this 
is likely when existing technological. regimes and natural 
trajectories are no longer as commercially viable. To 
maintain their position in the industry. firms are induced 
to change to more appropriate regimes and trajectories. 
Coombs. Saviottiýand Walsh (1987) give the example of the' 
Jet engine. It became the dominant technological-regime in 
aircraft when no further improvements in speed appeared 
possible by redesigning the combination of piston engine and 
propellor. 
Natural trajectories may be specific to particular 
industries. Nelson and Winter (1977) also argue that there 
are natural trajectories which are common, to large numbers 
of industries over long periods of time. Mechanisation, the 
exploitation of latent scale economies and. the tendency to. 
an. increasins-uae of. electricity are examples of more 
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general trajectories. The existence of trajectories, 
technological guideposts and so on have not been subject to- 
analytic investigation. However, the arguments have 
intuitive appeal and support the contention that changes in 
demand are rarely the determining factor for a shift of 
technological regime, paradigm or dominant design 
(Coombs, Saviotti and Walsh 1987). The. implication is that 
technology operates in a system whereby the opportunities 
for alternative routes of development are constrained by 
powerful economic and technological factors. 
1.8 GOVERNMENT. 
For all innovations, finance plays a central role. The 
technolosical 'know-how' may exist but until investment is 
considered necessary for continued competitive advantage and 
potential profitability,. then technological potential will 
not be transformed into an actual' product. or process. One 
finding of the empirical studies of. innovation is the 
uncertainty involved in all attempts to innovate.. However,. 
with 'incremental' innovations the risk is. considerablY less 
than with 'radical' innovations... Indeed, as Walker-(1986 
p. 25) says; 
'... -radical innovations-come from-an<attack on, matters of 
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Principle.... incremental innovation and new product designs 
come from the application of engineering practices to design 
details. . Moreover, the first route is-now more likely to be 
funded through government agencies. While the second route 
operates by typical market forces. 
Technological support and technological regulation are the 
. two main functions of government intervention in innovation 
(Johnston and Gummett 1979). The assumption that 
increasingly sophisticated technology results in higher 
economic efficiency and competitive advantage in. 
international markets is a strong motivation for governments 
to support technological innovation. In other areas, 
governments promote goods and services, such as basic 
research, education and military technologies. 
Regulatory activities by governments are designed to allay 
fears about the potentially undesirable social and 
--environmental impacts of technology. 
A further point is made by Coombs. Saviotti and Walsh (1987) 
when. they argue that state intervention in technology has 
both an economic and a political function. Changes in 
technology can affect the balance of power among different 
groups in society and result in the state as mediator. 
Technologies which replace jobs have implications for 
workers and trade unions. Regional inequality can result 
from the unequal diffusion of technologies. State 
intervention in political/technological problems has been 
EA- Y8 
. "matched. bav the growth of pressure groups concerned with the 
political redistribution of decision-making on technological 
"issues such as-the prdtection of the environment; weapons 
proliferation and the diffusion of nuclear power. 
The development of science and technology policy by 
governments involves the selection of areas. 'to support. For 
example, "the choice to support-basic. research-. raises-, - 
questions of how can science and technology be controlled 
and planned most effectively? By what criteria and-in whose 
interests? } Government resources are allocated to certain. 
areas of"-. research, "development and design in response: to 
signals from the market, or from industrialists, or from 
international sources on the perceived potential benefit of 
support for the technology., Technological change is, 
therefore. the result of decision-making atýthe very earliest 
stages of technological development. - 
The underlying rationale for government support-of research 
and development is usually based. implicitly or-explicitlyo 
on . theories relating science and technology to-economic 
growth. - Coombs. Saviotti and Walsh-(1987)-note that in the 
post-war. years. science and technology: policy was justified 
with , reference to science/technology push. theories-of. 
innovation and economic growth. - During the 1960's and 
1970's when demand-pull theories gained ground, spending 
cuts on. R&D were justified by the , results . o! " 
this , research. 
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The technological areas which are generally supported by 
government. may be, as follows: 
a) the scale of capital investment or R&D investment 
required for--'high technology' may deter individual 
enterprises from investment. In these cases,. the government 
may sponsor -R&D, for example, -the British Programme for 
Advanced Information Technology (Alvey 1982);, 
b) governments have also provided funds to support certain 
sectors such-as computers and microelectronics, for example 
the". Microelectronics Applications Programme (Braun 1984); 
c) basic knowledge is likely to be useful to-industrv. in the 
longterm, but through the market. mechanism applied research 
would tend to be favoured (Shonfield 1981); 
d)-there are-many areas-of basic academic research which 
cannot be said"to result in discoveries that , 
lead directly 
to technological; advances. The scientific knowledge 
produced. in these areas . provides. an infrastructure which 
influences what . industrial researchers, engineers and 
inventors do, their methods and the knowledge with which, 
they start: but it is often the case that individual 
industrial investors are not able . to appropriate all the 
benefits of basic research and training activities 
ISO 
(Coomba. Saviotti and. Walsh 1987). 
e) the. defence sector is supported by government. The 
primary considerations are security and prestige rather than 
economic. The-. same considerationsýapply, to. projects thought 
by government to enhance national prestige, such as 
Concorde., National prestige and strategic, considerations 
played an important Partin government support. for Rolls 
Royce in developing the RB211 engine in the early 1970's 
-(Williams at al.. 1982). . 
Otheryexamples point to the decisions-to invest in projects 
that exhibit technological advance and notions of 
progressiveness but are arguably not the most urgent in 
terms of. social needs.. - In Britain around two-thirds or 
total expenditure on medical research is government funded. 
Whilst heart transplants are an important 
scientific/technological advance in surgery, no attempt was 
made to relate the costs of development to the costs of 
other more urgent socio-medical needs (Freeman 1982 p303). 
A topical example is the lack of intensive care facilities 
for chidren receiving heart operations at a hospital in 
Birmingham (Guardian 7.1.88). 
Selection based on powerful political and economic decisions 
has a great effect on the direction of technological 
development, and in so doing closes off some options that 
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become starved of research funds. For example, decisions to 
invest in nuclear power energy options rather than renewable 
energy. sources has left the latter marginalised in the UK. 
In 1984, the share of government R&D funds increased for. 
defence projects and the military and prestige 'big 
technology' sectors; currently microelectronics. Information 
technology and bio-technology. Of the Science and 
Engineering Research Council funds 'Big Science' consumes 
almost double the resources of all the remaining natural 
sciences put together (Martin and Irvine 1984). Moreton 
sums this up with the words; 
'The country is rushing, helter-skelter, into a new 
technological. world of laser beams, electronic beams, 
computer hardware and software, microfoils, fibre optic 
technology and diagnostic reagents' (Moreton 1986 p24O). 
The increase in military R&D acts to diminish amounts of 
expenditure on civilian projects. Britain now spends a 
hither`proportion of its. GDP on military R&D than any other 
Western nation (New Scientist 1985). At the same time it is 
the only Western nation with an absolute decline in R&D, 
performed in manufacturing industry, paid for by industry or 
government (OECD 1985). 
A further area or government intervention is-the control of 
unwanted effects of technological change. Concerns about 
envirönmentel pollution, depletion of scarce resources, 
health and safety at work, noise, product. safety and the 
SZI, 
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invasion of privacy all became-political-as well'. as 
technological , issues and mostýresulted-in theaintroduction 
of regulations-- (see Reppy 1979. `" Kaufman 19811. x McGinty 1979). 
What this discussion revealsý-is, that». governments play a 
powerful role, in technoloatcal. -change. The allocation of 
adequate , resources -to <the.. development -of technologies is. a 
key factor in their subsequent innovation. . 
For governments 
- , economic, ideological=-and. prestige factors-tend, to-dominate 
decision-making on technologica'_. options. = - 
1.9° THE-MARKET. 
Our, discussion, of ,. innovations so far points, to -the . ", 
interaction between., technology., and market-needs, -as 
motivations for improvements... in"the design-of-products and 
continued-innovation. ""It, was""acknowledged. that.: demand must. 
exist with a host of,. other. factors:: if"technolog3cal"change- 
is- to,. occur. ,- 
In a capitalist economy firms-operate"within-the market., 
"---From-the"market. -. the firm-purchases raw materials, labour, 
capital goods, technology and-no-one, and-. to the market It "_ 
selis'-its output in competition with other firms. The 
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market is a mechanism whereby suppliers and consumers are 
.. brought together to facilitate the exchange, of-goods and 
services- In competitive market economies. the market. 
presupposes the existence of, purchasing resources. Market 
needs are in effect economically backed demands. The 
economic. significance of demands is the key factor in the 
connection between technological, innovation and the market. 
So how. does the-market influence innovative activity? In 
simple terms, at a given time the market consists of a range 
of goods which satisfy consumer and user needs. and demands, 
their purchasing patterns . reveal. their desires. and 
preferences. Movements in-demand and price, as a result of 
for example, growing incomes act as indicators to producers 
that certain goods are more in demand. There is a greater 
need for them or a need for improvements in the products. 
Thus it is in. the producers interest to respond. The market 
mechanism is presented as the users, and-consumers-power to 
choose and therefore. to influence the innovation process. 
However, certain factors severely limit this power of 
choice., For example, access to economic. rsources is a 
constraint on sections of the-population. Second, mass 
production techniques cater to majority interests, the needs 
of minority groups tend to be more specialised-and therefore 
more expensive. The market does not reflect the diversity 
of croup interests. 
1ý'% 
'Consumer sovereign:. ty'(Galbraith 1969) is the term used to. 
denote the power of consumer choice, and the subordination 
of the firm-to this choice as reflected on the market. The 
ideal model presents a picture or-the consumer in possession 
of perfect information and able to choose freely between 
goods-for the best price and quality (Freeman 1982). The 
competitive market mechanism ensures that. suppliers adapt 
their output to meet these-needs. 
Criticisms. of this-model focus on-the market as a 
competitive mechanism. The free enterprise system and the 
rule of competition between . essentially. passive firms 
has 
been replaced by the notion of, monopoly capitalism; the term 
used by Marx to describe this stage in-the historical 
development-of capitalism (Galbraith 1969). What this means 
is that the producer, in effect, controls prices and output. 
Gal: braith-(1969) developed the theory of producer. 
sovereign , ty. to characterise the. consumer market as,., 
oligopolistic. and primarily concerned with product 
differentiation and planned obsolescence. He argued that 
the management of consumer demand through advertising 
further limits the power of the consumer. 
In-terms of technical innovation, Freeman (1982)-points to 
two main ways in which-consumer sovereignity is eroded. 
First, the nature of consumer choice in static. Consumers 
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choose between existing goods on offer.. However, in certain 
sectors of technical change these goods will have been the 
result of`decisions to innovate or. apply'R&D-a number-ol- 
years earlier. Thus, consumers do not have the power to 
influence the future. array of goods. It can be argued that 
consumers have an indirect influence in-the sense that firms 
are concerned to anticipate demand in order to make a 
profit. Whilst this may be true, it is also possible to 
argue that, in fact, those who make the decision to innovate 
impose their choices. above those of the consumer. 
Second. the notion'of consumer choice also implies the, 
availability of perfect information about the array of 
goods. ' The increasing technical sophistication-of consumer 
goods; cars. televisions, videos and the whole range of 
electronics equipment now on offer. makes it extremely 
difficult for the consumer to gain access to full and 
accurate technical information which is understandable to 
the lay-person. 
The market is a restricted and socially-conditioned 
mechanism. Technologies reflect cultural conditions, for 
example. goods are linked to beliefs 'about social status and 
personal' achievement. A primary example is the status that 
is linked to a Rolls Royce car. Thus the market cannot 
reflect all aspects of a community's beliefs about social 
ugetulneoa. Rather, market production is an indirect means 
s(b 
of-ensuring the usefulness of a product. Commercial success 
motivates the supplier to make products that will secure 
economic advantage, products are purchased because of their 
use in some way. However, the social-usefulness of the 
products themselves is secondary. For example, it is the 
profitability of producing pharmaceutical drugs. rather than 
the curing of illness which is the prime motivation of the 
drug companies. 
This discussion of consumer choice on the market points to 
the-constraints on individuals without economic power to 
influence the innovation process from the demand side. Of 
crucial importance is the inabilty to influence the future 
array of goods and services. Although markets act as a 
selecting device - it in selection within constraint and 
as Dosi argues; 'generally among a range of products already 
-determined by the broad technology patterns on the 
supply-side' (Doss 1982 p156). 
In the-capital goods market, needs or demands reflect 
economic priorities. For example, the need for efficient 
production. processses for products operating in a 
competitive environment. In the later phases of-a new 
product innovation the emphasis tends to move away from 
product improvements towards a concern with cost reduction 
and productivity gains (Gershuny 1985). The requirements of 
efficiency act as a constraint on choice of production 
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technigues. The needs of management may conflict with the 
needs of labour for improved working conditions. The 
acceptability of new production processes will involve a 
political compromise between these two groups. In the 
present organisation of the innovation process this 
compromise will be reached during the implementation stage 
of the technology rather than during its design and 
-r; development. In-, Chapter Two the possibilities of building 
the 'needs' of different. groups into--technologies during- 
their design and. development will be discussed. For many. - 
groups in"society the ability to influence the innovation 
, process, whether. on the supply-side or the demand-side is 
limited. The recognition of the inadequacy of the market 
. -mechanism to meet social needs prompted several local 
authorities in the UK to introduce technology initiatives 
based on social need and user. involvement in the innovation 
process. 
1.10 TECHNOLOGY AND NEEDS. 
-There. is a contradiction between what technology could 
provide and what technology actually does provide. In terms 
of. social needs this is reflected in such contradictions as, 
for example, in the advanced world there are many who still 
die of renal failure yet heart-transplant surgery is 
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well-developed. In the developing world thousands starve 
while the West spends millions on developing weapons 
systems. It is possible to put astronauts on the moon but 
the provision of movement aids for the handicapped is 
rudimentary (Mole and Elliott 1987). The list, of unmet 
social needs is endless. These technological contradictions 
ultimately stem from an unequal distribution of resources 
. among social groups 
in society. What technology actually 
does provide reflects the interests of groups in society who 
have access to economic and political power. 
Further, critics have argued-that design and-innovation 
reflect the dominant values of the society that gives rise 
to it (Cooley 1984). This has resulted in challenges to the 
neutrality of science and technology as they presently 
socially organised in-our society. In Chapter Two the 
relationship between science and technology and the norms 
and values of its context of development are discussed. The 
implications ' of this argument are relevant here because it 
suggests that people-who are'affected"by technology in-=their 
workplace and their community are unable to influence"its'-` 
conception, design/development and implementation. The 
increasing institutionalisation and` privatisation of-R&D. 
forý`example, effectively excludes a wide range of social 
groups who do not-'have access to expertise or political and 
economic power from participation in the decision-making 
-process on. patterns of technological development. 
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Decision-makins on technological issues is confined to the 
democratic electoral process once every-five years. The 
mechanism whereby users with unmet needs and producers can 
meet does not exist. User needs are channelled through the 
market mechanism, where needs must be translated into 
economically-backed demands if producers are to respond. 
This is. the basis or the argument that technology does not 
reflect social needs. 
Before discussing the relationship between technological 
innovation and needs it is necessary to clarify the concept 
of " needs'.. 
Human need is a complex concept which is impossible to pin 
down theoretically (Gough and Doyal 1985). The debate 
concerning the definition of needs is akin to the 
epistemological debate about the definition and nature of 
'power'. Obviously power is a useful concept and power 
relations exist but there is a methodological difficulty in 
operationalising and measuring dimensions of power (Bruce 
1984). In practical. terms it is recognised that there are 
basic needs for food, clothing, shelter and soon-which are 
essential-for survival. Maslow (1970) developed a need 
hierarchy. He argued that human needs-are-organised in a 
hierarchical ladder of ascendancy. The needs lowest on the 
ladder and hierarchy, such as food, drink, control of 
temperature must be satisified first before-other needs 
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become manifest. Maslow characterises the second rung of 
needs as safety needs. Once an individual feels safe in 
his/her surroundings then-needs for love. affection and 
belongingness emerge. Maslow also includes the needs for 
personal achievement and social recognition. Once all other 
needs are satisfied then the need for seif-actualisation 
requires satisfaction. 
Maslow"s hierarchy or needs is difficult to analyse 
empirically and has had little scientific support. However. 
it does suggest certain insights into needs as a concept. 
First. it is evident that needs exist. Second. the 
identification of-avcriteria of needs satisfaction is a 
difficult undertaking. Third,, -, that needs are relative. 
culturally. -socially, politically and economically. And 
fourth, needs are dynamic and constantly open to change. 
Once the difficulties of conceptualising the'term are 
acknowledged; then the problem faced is the identification 
of what the, term refers to. The term is-intuitively 
convincing. but. is used variously to mean market needs or 
demands and human needs or basic needs. or. wants. The 
difference between these uses is important because 
definitions of need are effected by external factors, for 
example, needs may be manufactured. The development of, 
Artificial Intelligence techniques and expert-sVotem 
-computer software may 
lead to market needs for these 
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systems. An obvious point to be made is that needs exist 
and they can be met in a number of different ways. Food can 
be bought in a supermarket, home-grown, consumed in a 
restaurant. The choice via the market mechanism is between 
existing alternatives on offer and dependent on access to 
purchasing resources. Needs in this sense can be referred 
to as individual needs; 
Another category of needs is social needs. As an aside, it 
must be recognised that categories of needs are not mutually 
exclusive. In a market economy there is an area or public 
provision where needs are met collectively (Braun 1984). 
The provision of goods and services that are socially vital 
but economically inaccessible to large groups of potential 
users include health care. education and the myriad of 
social services. Social needs also include needs that are 
relevant to particular groups of people but which have not 
received priority on the technological agenda for political. 
social and cultural reasons. These groups would include, 
for example, women, the aged, ethnic minorities. the 
disabled and so on. In the context of this research 
project, social needs are those relevant to public sector 
service provision. The difficulties of the application of 
the concept to a public-sector technology policy will be 
discussed in Chapter Two. Here, the concern is to 
investigate the relationship between technological 
innovation and social needs. 
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Dosi (1982) defines needs; 
'.... at one extreme, one may define them"in very general 
anthropological terms (the need to eat, have shelter, 
communicate etc. ) but then they express a total indifference 
to the way they are satisfied and do not have any economic 
relevance; or at the other extreme# needs are expressed in 
relation to the specific means of their satisfaction, but 
then each cannot emerge before the basic invention to which 
it is related (Dori 1982 P. 149) 
The implication of this argument is that one cannot express 
a need far a product that does not already exist, for 
example, one could not express a need. for a car-until cars 
existed as part of a transport system. Taken to-extremes 
this suggests that because the array. of products on offer 
via the market mechanism represents to a greater or lesser 
extent the host of products available then essentially., 
market needs are satisfied. In the context of a discussion 
of the market mechanism needs refer to economically defined 
demands-What this-means is that an individual may have the 
need for a particular specification of wheelchair, but, if 
he/she does not have access to economic resources with which 
to pay. for it then the need will remain unmet. This lends" 
support to the fact that the needs of a variety of sections 
of the community have not been satisfied or have been badly, 
catered for, for example in the area of housing-and health 
care. The conclusion reached is that the existence of 
social needs does not necessarily lead to the production of 
the means to meet those needs. 
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In the previous discussion of technological innovation it 
was found that various economic, political and social 
factors act as a spur to innovative activity. What is 
required is the commitment of resources either by industry 
or government. A commitment that is, usually, based on the 
anticipated economic benefit or the fulfilment of some need. 
whether it be, for example, a market or a military need. 
Within this scenario if a need is expressed by producer or 
-user groups who do not have the economic or political power 
I.,,. to allocate resources to it, then their influence on. the 
innovation process is confined-to political campaigning and 
pressure group activity. For example, the Lucas workers' 
campaign for the implementation of the socially-useful 
products developed as part of the Lucas Plan (see Wainwright 
and Elliott 1982). - 
The allocation of resources to basic research affects the 
route of technological development. From a number of 
technological options available for. any given solution. 
innovation will depend on. selection and priority. The 
concept of 'technological paradigm' (Doss 1982) is useful in 
this context because it denotes an 'outlooks or 'model' 
which guides decision-making. for example, high-technology 
can be said to be the dominant bias in the present 
government's technological agenda (see 1.8). The exclusion 
effect of technological paradigms as developed by Dosi is 
akin to the exercise of power;. the. prevention"of the very 
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existence of alternatives (Lukes 1974). 
Further selection devices for technological paradigms within 
capitalist economies are what Nelson and Winter (1977) term 
'natural trajectories toward mechanisation and exploitation 
of economies of scale'. The current application of 
microelectronics and robotics to production. processes can be 
seen to reflect this trajectory. 
In sum, powerful economic and political factors act as 
selectors of technological paradigms. In this way the 
meneral. direction of technological development is defined. 
The strong influence of a concept of progress delimits the 
technological trajectories within the overall paradigm (Dosi 
1982). Once established the route of' technological 
development can appear to display a momentum of its own 
within the context of the market. The discussion of induced 
innovation is relevant here as it. demonstrates the 
'knock-on' effect of innovations in industrial sectors. 
Patterns of industrial and social conflict also act to 
select innovations. Analysis in this area may be fruitful 
for the discovery of relationships between technological. 
choice and social factors. Noble's (1979) study of 
numerically controlled machine tools shows how automation 
can be chosen over other forms of technological development 
for reasons of management control. This study is discussed 
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more fully in Chapter Two. 
This discussion of the relationship between technological 
innovation and social needs reveals that there is little 
chance for certain sections of the population to influence 
the innovation process. This recognition led to the 
development of a political/technological project by the 
Greater London Council based on socially-useful products 
(Cooley 1984). The commitment to socially-useful products 
and alternative technologies provided a means to first. 
relate technology to social need through products such as 
aids for the disabled and so on. Second to present an 
alternative and prefigurative technological paradigm that 
could illustrate a different role for technology in society. 
Of major importance to this was the ability to influence, 
in. some way, the direction of technological advance and the 
benefits that flow from it. To do this it was necessary to 
produce both a critique of the current shape and aims of 
existing technology together with examples of alternatives 
that could lead to social and technological change. This 
initiative forms the research project. 
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1.11 CONCLUSION. 
Economic-approaches to the study of the innovation process 
are concerned to reveal the factors, "necessary to 
'successful' innovative activity. The criteria used to- 
measure 'successful' innovations are economic indicators of 
profitability-and market share. It-has been argued that 
economic, and-ideological, influences act as the dominant - 
'selection' factors-for the support for innovative activity. 
In contrast to, for example, user needs as the primary 
consideration and measure of-successful innovations.,; Of 
-course the successful match between technological capability 
and user needs channelled through the-market mechanism is 
central if innovations are to be successful commercially. 
Thus, it is not to argue that technology does not reflect 
market needs. -Rather the argument draws attention to the 
technological environment whereby-social. needs. not 
channelled,, through the market into demands, can be 
overlooked. 
The use of. the concept of technolog±cal.. paradigm, (Dosi 
1982), although impressionistic and difficult to analyse .. F° 
emprirically, provides an explanatory. tool. for, understandint 
the nature and, direction of. -technological development. 
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Patterns-of innovation indicate that the paths-of 
-technological development are selected. 
The discussion of 
government intervention highlights the role of political 
processes in the selection. of technological areas to 
support. In Britain this has taken the.. form of particular 
sectors of 'high-technology' development. The allocation of 
resources-to R&D in these industrial sectors is"based on. 
their. perceived economic importance. 
The identification of technical change with economic growth 
acts . a. powerful argument 
in support. of chosen patterns of 
development. Technological.. and. economic. determinism-present 
the-selection. process an 'objective' &nti n4utii*11 isiýhci4 
than political and always the result of. decision-making at 
the very. earliest stages of technological-development. ', 
Perceived-economic (or prestige) Importance is seen as the 
reason why certain technologies emerge instead of others. 
(The social and political factors that affect the emergence 
of. certain technologies instead of others are discussed in 
Chapter Two). 
Technology. -push approaches to, -the explanation of the 
.. innovation process are useful for understanding ! radicals 
innovations.. ". Innovations advance cumulatively along- 
technological trajectories in response to demand factors, 
within overall paradigms of development. Distinctive of 
developments within the innovation process throughout this 
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century are the growth of specialised knowledge and the 
institutionalisation of R&D in industrial and government 
laboratories. The. innovation process is increasingly 
privatised and dominated by scientific and technical experts 
whose vision is focused on selected technological problems- 
and solutions. (Dosi 1982). Langrish et al (1972) note that 
this is the main way that science affects technology,. the 
shared experience and expertise of scientists and 
technologists. Experts become blind to alternative 
technological possibilities. 
In the allocation of resources to basic science, government 
plays a central role. In certain sectors, such as defence. 
government supports research and product development and 
also provides a market. This economic system is akin to 
that advocated by the notion of production for social need 
discussed in Chapter Two as a means of maintaining a direct 
link between technology and needs. The main difference. of 
course, is that defence technologies are replaced by 
alternative socially-useful technologies. 
Market-pull explanations of the innovation process are 
useful for understanding incremental innovations. Radical 
innovations account for only a relatively small part of 
innovative activity. most innovations proceed through a 
life-cycle of some major, but mostly minor improvements. 
Theoretically innovations are influenced by user needs and 
economic demand but also may be 'induced' by a"variety of 
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economic, social and political factors. 
For many sections of the population any influence on the 
innovation process is only indirect. Within the consumer 
goods market selection is among a range of goods already 
determined by broad technology patterns on the supply side. 
Consumers do not have the ability to influence the future 
array of goods, they choose between the existing array of 
goods on offer. In the capital goods market, the 'needs' of 
efficiency and cost reduction of products are reflected by 
automated manufacturing processes. The ability of labour to 
influence the technologiy is ex-post, influence is possible 
at the implementation stage through adjustments to work 
organisation but. the technology itself is already designed. 
and developed, thus influence is within the constraints of 
the hardware.. 
Models of the innovation process are essentlly prescriptive 
and designed to facilitate more innovation. The breakdown 
of models of innovation into stages aids an understanding. of 
the coincidence of crucial factors to innovation. In 
addition models are useful analytic tools; they make it 
Possible to identify the social groups present or absent 
from each. phase of-the innovation process. - The context for 
much. of the. research. on tecl nological. innot ation . is- oriented 
towards the identification of the technical and 
organisational factors relating to commercially. successful 
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product or process innovation. The causal relationship 
between innovation. and economic growth acts as a powerful 
justificatory argument for 'more innovation'-and 
increasingly sophisticated technologies to ensure 
competitiveness in world markets. The adoption of 
competitive. commercial criteria results in the selection of 
specific routes for technological development. This serves 
to exclude and obscure other potential paths of 
technological development. 
The focus on the economic/ideological function of, technology 
and its realisation within products and processes, provides 
a limited explanation of the nature and role of technology 
in society. In this view, the potential social impacts and 
unforeseen side-effects of technological innovations are a 
separate issue, the inevitable costs of*the technological 
project. Yet the social implications-of technological 
change comprise the larger context of technology in society. 
In Chapter Two. sociolocical analyses of technology are 
-discussed. 
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CHAPTER-TWO: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INNOVATION. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION. 
, 
A clear point which emerges from the discussion of the 
innovation process in Chapter One is that technologies are 
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not politically neutral nor is their development wholly 
autonomous. The realisation that factors other than the 
market shape the allocation of scientific and technological 
resources is not new; in 1974 Brooks et al. noted: 
'The capability or governments to introduce new 
socially-oriented technologies. altering traditional lines 
or technological development. is often less restricted by 
objective factors, such as competitiveness on international 
markets than is commonly assumed'(pllO). 
In-this'chapter the question of-why certain technologies 
emerge instead-of others is addressed from a sociological 
perspective. Studies of technology from this perspective 
reflect two conceptual traditions in sociology; the 
sociology of scientific knowledge and the Marxist tradition. 
The former perspective is based on micro-level analyses of 
technology. The Marxist tradition is based on macro-level 
structural analyses of technologies. The aim of work in 
this field is investigation of the relationship between 
-society and technology. In particular, the identification of 
the social factors which shape technological artefacts (for 
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a review of case-studies see MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). 
A review of this literature yields insights into the social 
organisation of the innovation process. the social relations 
embodied in technological artefacts and the possibility of 
alternative solutions to technological problems. The 
practical. application of some of these ideas in the 
technology policy based on social need formulated"by"the 
Greater London Council (GLC) is the subject of the 
case-study presented in the following chapters. 
2.2 DEFINITIONS. 
The sociological perspective widens the definition of 
technology to include the social context within which 
machinery is developed and used. Attention is drawn to: 
1. The design or development context which includes. all the 
decisions, materials, personnel, processes,, and systems 
necessary to create tools and techniques from raw materials. 
2. The user context which includes all the motivations, 
intentions, advantages, and adjustments called into play by 
the use of particular techniques or tools. 
3. The environmental context that describes nonspecific 
physical surroundings in which a technology or tool is 
developed and used. 
ü. The cultural context which includes all the norms, 
values, myths, aspirations. ' laws. and interactions of the 
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society of which the tool or technique is a part (Bush-1983 
p137) 
Of these more is known about the design and development 
context of technology than any of the others. Winner argues 
that the concentration on the design and development context 
of technology results from a 'technological orthodoxy' 
whereby the assumption is made that`'technolocies are 
neutrals they are simply tools that-can be used one way or 
another; the benefit or harm they bring depends on how they 
are used' (Winner 1979 P76). This use/abuse model of 
technology is challenged by Winner and other commentators 
whose work will be reviewed in this chapter. 
The definition of technology to include all of its contexts 
clearly illustrates the interactive nature of technology and 
society. Machines or tools are designed and manufactured by 
people in a social context; the use of machinery by people 
gives it its reason to be - what is a car without a driver, 
aproduction line without an operator. 'Technology is also 
knowledge in the form of the expertise needed for the 
design. use and maintenance of physical artefacts (Layton 
1974). 
Once it has been established that technology is dependent on 
a social context for its development and implementation then 
it becomes possible to ask how the social context affects 
technology. -What sort of influences do social relationships 
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have on the design, development and use of technologies? 
Studies of technological innovation, diffusion and the 
transfer of technology have tended to treat technology as a 
'black box'. A point made by Layton when he noted; 'What is 
needed is an understanding of technology from the inside, 
both as a body of knowledge and as a-social system. Instead 
technology is often treated as a black box whose contents 
and behaviour may be assumed to be common knowledge'. 
(Layton 1977 p198). In recent years research has moved 
towards looking inside the 'black box' (Rosenberg 1982). 
One approach is the emerging 'sociology of technology'. 
Work in this area attempts to reveal the existence of 
alternative technological solutions to technological 
- problems and then explain why certain solutions were chosen 
rather than others. The point is that if it is possible to 
demonstrate that a technological artefact has alternative 
possible routes of development that are equally viable then 
the belief"that. there is an immanent logic of technical 
development is questionable. 
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2.3 THE SCIENCE-TECHNOLOGY RELATIONSHIP. 
The application of ethnomethodological research to 
technology is based on the assumption that science and 
technology are not fundamentally different entities, thus 
they can be treated in equivalent terms. The 
science-technology relationship is seen as interactive and 
it is possible to suggest that political, economic and 
social factors interact in the same way within the 
construction of science and the process of technological 
innovation (see Hughes 1986). This view is supported by 
work on technological innovation which suggests that science 
and technology are interdependent; 
'Science-and--technology have become intermixed. Modern 
technology involves scientists who 'do'. technology and 
technologists who function 'as scientists... (Layton 1977 
p210). 
Or as observed'by Langrish'et. al (1972); 
'First, curiosity oriented science, practiced largely, in 
academic institutions, provides techniques of investigation. 
Second, it 'also provides people trained in using these 
techniques as well as in scientific"ways, of thought in 
general... 1(p. 40). 
The logical extension of the belief that-science is socially 
-constructed to-incorporate the 
idea that technology is also 
socially constructed is over-simplistic ' if' it assumes that 
technology is the application of science. -The- 
science-technoloEw relationship discussed earlier in terms 
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of. 'technology-push' emphasised the inadequacy of this 
approach to technology.. Historical studies of technology 
have clearly illustrated that technology as applied science 
is a misnomer. Science can influence technology in the same 
way that previous advances in technology can affect and 
influence further technological developments. 
If science and technology are seen. as equivalent bodies of 
socially constructed culture, then the, demarcation between 
them is also socially negotiated (Pinch 1986). The 
sociology of scientific,. knowledge approach to technology is 
based on the view. that the. machines, practices and skills of 
technology are suitable for treatment in terms of the active 
construction of, a technical culture. For the purposes of 
sociological analysis. the two areas are equivalent. Pinch 
(1986) notes that this is not to argue that there are no 
differences between them., Technology is amore 
-heterogeneous activity which incorporates a number of 
different groups - engineers, designers. managers-and so on 
thus. there are practical problems for research. 
Fundamentally, however, -the approach is possible-because 
this does not represent any underlying analytical 
distinction. 
The sociology of scientific knowledge is concerned with, the 
epistemological status of scientific knowledge.. Studies 
have concentrated on the construction of scientific 
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knowledge in-the context of the laboratory and in 
investigations of scientific controversies, in an effort to 
explain the definition and legitimacy of scientific claims 
(for an introduction to the literature see Shapin 1982). 
These' ethnomethodological studies of the process of 
construction of scientific knowledge reveal that the 
acceptability of science claims depends on the social 
context of their interpretation rather than particular 
technical or logical criteria. From this perspective, 
scientists are seen as primarily 'social actors' (Callon 
1980) operating in a social context, who use their cultural 
and intellectual assumptions-and location to-Interpret the 
validity of knowledge claims. The aim of these studies is 
an understanding of scientific culture and the practices and 
bodies of knowledge which define that culture. Findings 
suggest that scientific knowledge can be treated as a 
knowledge culture in the same way as the legal system and 
the world of art comprise distinctive knowledge cultures. 
The content of scientific knowledge is shown to be shaped, 
at any given time, by the wider social context. 
The main point is that 'scientific facts' can differ between 
zroups of scientists working in differing social 
environments with differing methodological perspectives. 
Thus, scientific research is not an ! objective' process of 
demystification of the natural world, rather it involves the 
attribution of meaning to physical phenomena. The physical 
world may act as a constraint but it does not determine the 
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outcome of research and scientific conclusions. It is 
necessary to understand the influence of the social and 
political worlds that affect the interpretation of the 
meaning of physical phenomena (For a discussion of these 
studies see Collins 1983. Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay 1982). 
2: 4 MICRO-LEVEL STUDIES OF TECHNOLOGY. 
Empirical studies of. --technology, --influenced by work on the 
sociology of scientific knowledge, have centred on the 
design/development process with historical accounts of 
technological development, work on technological controversy 
and technological testing, and work on-the-application of 
scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1969) to technology. 
Within the sociology of scientific knowledge the principle 
of symmetry is introduced to indicate that there is no 
epistemological distinction' between beliefs that are held-to 
be true and beliefs. that are held to be false (Bloor 1976). 
The symmetrical approach-to the development of technological 
artefacts -is demonstrated by Pinch and Bijker (1984). The 
identification of alternative solutions to'the`design of 
technological artefacts allows analysis of-both 'successes' 
and 'failures' so that the question as to why certain 
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designs are selected and commercially developed whilst 
others are marginalised can be addressed. Without an 
approach which investigates the content of technological 
innovations, the technological artefact appears to go 
through a sequential process of research, development. 
production to usage in an unproblematic way. The 
possibilities of alternative designs and so on remain 
obscured . (Pinch and Bijker 1984). 
In their study of the development of the safety bicycle 
Pinch and Bliker -(1984). found that at each stage of the 
development. process there were a number of-design options 
open. The basic 'Ordinary' or penny-farthing was modified 
to produce a range of extraordinary 'safety ordinaries' such 
as the Xtraordinary'(1878). the Facile (1879) and the Club 
Safety (1885). In general, historical accounts only refer 
to these forms in passing. Bilker (discussed in Pinch 1986) 
argues that this is a product of retrospective 
interpretation. The Safety bicycle was commercially 
successful and linear retrospective accounts discount the 
variations because of this. yet some of these variations 
were produced commercially at the time. Reliance on a 
linear sequential model of innovation obscures the multiple 
paths and options which exist in the development of new 
technologies. Pinch and Bijker (1984) emphasise the 
importance of symmetrical-accounts of technological 
development. They describe the developmental process for 
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technological. artefacts as evolutionary or as a pattern of, 
variation and selection. An attempt is made to present a 
multi-directional model of the innovation process which 
demonstrates that the successful stages in the development 
of an artefact are not the only possible ones (Pinch and 
Bijker 1984 p. 411). Bruce (1984) demonstrates the same 
point with reference to videotex. 
The main question which emerges from these accounts is why. 
if innovation at some point was multi-directional, did some 
forms of artefact survive whilst others did not. To answer 
this question of selection Pinch and Bilker (1984) introduce 
the concept of 'social group'. They state that; 
'a problem is only defined as such, when there is a social 
croup for which it constitutes a problem' (p414). 
The concept of social group is used to define institutions 
and organisations as well as organised or unorganised 
individuals. The key factor is the shared set of meanings 
attached to the specific artefact by members of the group. 
The identification of different social groups involved with 
the design and development process. shows how the 
interpretations of the problems and possible solutions 
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differ among these social groups. The ensuing conflicts, 
and their eventual resolution, are the mechanisms used to, 
explain why the technology emerged in the way that it did. 
For example, differing technical requirements for speed and 
safety may be attributed to pressures from opposing groups 
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which. affect the final solution or design. The 
developmental process is seen as consisting of progressive 
degrees of stabilisation over a period of years - the Safety 
Bicycle came to be seen as the way to design a bicycle after 
a period of nineteen years, during which time other forms of 
bi- and tri-cycles competed for selection. 
The aim of Pinch and Bijker's (1984) 
explain how the technical make-up of 
emerged as the dominant design. Or, 
is selected. -from the various designs 
design and development process. Techi 
be negotiable. 
study was to reveal and 
a physical. artefact 
how one specific form 
present within the 
ilcal Zacts, are found to 
Studies of the content and development of. -technologies 
have 
been matched by studies of technological controversy. 
Technological controversy highlights the community of 
technologists, other actors, -and competing firms who 
influence 'successful' innovations. In-a case-study of the 
post World War Two effort of the French state to promote an 
electric vehicle, _, 
Callon. (1980) uses-the concept-of 'actors' 
interacting and negotiating. around. a variety of social, 
economic and technical factors to explain technical 
development. Actors include the diverse groups of people 
who influence the, development of the technology; 
technologists, scientists, manufacturers, government 
departments and so on. - There are no rigid distinctions 
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between the social, political and technological; rather what 
is important is the assignment of roles in a scenario or 
programme developed by the Electricite de France to fulfill 
its objective of designing an electric vehicle. Actors need 
to interact harmoniously as. a precondition for the 
innovation of the artefact. The scenario 'actor-world' 
necessary for effective innovation is not constant but 
changes and at times breaks down. The case-study points to 
the way that the technical is socially constructed. Callon 
notes that certain innovations display; 
1. considerable variety in the technological options that 
are available, and close links between technical choices and 
socio-political choices. 
2. considerable diversity in points of view put forward by 
the. numerous social groups involved. 
3. an initial-lack of determination or the market demand. 
which is built up at the same time as the equipment designed 
to meet it. 
The study looks at the practices of powerful interest groups 
and their relation to other groups and the state. Powerful 
interest groups emerge as political actors who. -by fighting 
to impose their technical choices effectively define the 
needs to be satisfied, the forms of social organisation to 
promote. and the action to be undertaken. 
Pinch (1986) argues that what is unclear about this approach 
is whether it is actors who define forces as economic, 
natural or social or whether it is the analyst who has some 
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a priori method for determining the various components. 
Despite methodological difficulties studies of technological 
controversy highlight the close relationship between 
technological development and economic and political power. 
Power is'central not only to the selection of technologies 
but also the definition of the technical superiority and 
workability of technologies. 
Within the sociology of scientific knowledge approach to 
studies of technology the emphasis is on workability; how 
technologists and engineers actually go about deciding 
whether or not a technology works and how it'is to be tested 
(Pinch and Bijker 1986 p. 351). Workability is also 
important to studies of the history of technology. 
MacKenzie in a study of ballistic missiles showed how 
technological testing, and the wider social and political 
credibility of that testing were crucial to determining 
facts about missiles - such as whether they work or how 
accurate they-are (MacKenzie 1986). In the study MacKenzie 
points to. political and organisational interests that are 
reflected in the design process of Trident or MX ballistic 
missiles, and further-in the interpretations placed on the 
test results of these missiles. 
The. notion of scientific paradigm (Kuhn 1969) as applied to 
technology was discussed in Chapter One. Its main 
proponents are Johnston (1972)"and Dosi (1982). However, 
application of the concept of paradigm to technology as-an 
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analytic tool has been criticised as overly mechanistic. 
Pinch (1986) notes that its usage in this way fails to take 
into account, that paradigms are not fixed sets of rules, 
rather they refer to the interpretation of rules in 
localised concrete settings. A point supported by MacKenzie 
and Wajcman (1985) when they note that 'the technological 
paradigm is not fixed but acts as a. resource that can be' 
used' (p. 11). Thus, technological paradigms and 
trajectories of. development within them are social 
constructions closely related to the social context in which 
-innovations'-are attempted. The notion of technological 
paradigm interpreted-in this way provides a way,. of 
understanding how traditions and bodies of knowledge and 
practice shared by particular groups can shape technological 
development. Further, -Pinch (1986) argues that it provides 
a way of comparing different developments in different 
technologies at different times. 
In Chapter One the notion of reverse salients within a 
technological system (Hughes 1983) and induced innovation 
(Rosenberg 1976) indicated that innovation proceeded by way 
of a domino effect. Once an innovation had-been introduced 
in a certain part of a technological system then other areas 
would also require innovative activity. ' Work on the- 
implementation of new-technologies looks at the problems 
that companies face in setting technologies to work (Fleck 
1983. Voss 1985). Pinch (1986) sums up with this approach 
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when he notes; 
'tinkering towards success may be the way this process 
proceeds, not because of any fundamental inadequacies in 
machine operation or in management techniques but because a 
key component of technological knowledge is the solution to 
localised problems in an ad hoc way'. 
Whilst it may be'possible to identify methodological and 
conceptual weaknesses in the studies discussed above. The 
criticisms that have been made by commentators (in 
particular, Russell and Williams 1987) have concentrated on 
the inability of these studies to reconcile 'context and 
action'. Russell and Williams question the pluralist view 
of power upheld by such studies. The studies cannot deal 
with the issue of power in the sense of how this structures 
not, only actors perceptions of the technological 
decision-making process and agenda of debate but whether 
technological issues are even seen as something that can be 
actively influenced. This criticism is based on Lukes 
(1974) notion of a three-dimensional view of power. For 
example, in Callon"s (1980) study attention is not paid to 
events before innovative activity which brought the powerful 
interest` groups into the technological arena"in the first 
place. -.. Although disagreements within the-state and between 
the numerous social groups involved in the debate. are 
mentioned, Callon focuses on the direct negotiations between 
these actors, and consequently underplays the ways in which 
ISb 
the massive pre-existing interests or industries and groups 
whose future was closely linked to the petrol driven car, 
such as the motor industry and the oil industry, created the 
terrain on which the subsequent struggle took place. A 
terrain which ensured that the electric car only had 
marginal support (Russell and Williams 1987). 
The-focus in these-studies on observable events needs to be 
matched by macro-analyses that can deal with the structural 
use or power. Events need to be firmly located in their 
economic and political context. Russell and Williams. (1987) 
argue that this would allow key questions to be addressed 
such as; How do dominant technological and policy paradigms 
become-entrenched, whilst others are marginalised. Analysis 
at this level requires attention to the institutional 
context within which innovative activity takes place. For 
example. the differential constraints and resources 
accessible to actors. The composition or actor groups and 
their interests and so on. 
The concentration on the social processes of innovation 
highlights the differing abilities of social groups to 
influence the design, development and adoption of 
technologies, but this requires explanation.. The relation 
between the technological determinist stance and issues and 
debates of power is an important one because without some 
analysis the ability of social groups to influence the 
innovation process is not challenged. The problem of social 
choice exerted by interest groups is not discussed. 
Selection implies a consensus but a'consensus among whom? 
Who decides which variations of artefact constitute the 
choice in the first instance? How is progress or success 
defined (see Russell 1986). 
What these criticisms point to is that-outcomes are not 
infinitely flexible. There is a need to recognise the 
specific constraints and possibilities for change at 
different levels. Russell and Williams (1987) argue that an 
interactive model of the relation between context and action 
is the key to overcoming the separation of. micro and macro 
approaches to understanding technology as a social product. 
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The technology studies discussed in this section draw 
attention to the complexity of events surrounding particular 
technological developments. Findings reveal the multiple 
influences, multidirectional character and the potential 
flexibility of outcomes for technological 
design/development. What is accepted as technically 
determined and what can be seen as socially-constructed 
constraints on choice are questionned. The technical detail 
however does require a thorough grounding in social context 
if the relationship between technology and society is to be 
clearly understood. The conclusion that technologies embody 
social and political relations and how this occurs is 
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important, however, why this occurs is not fully confronted 
in these studies. 
2.5 THE MARXIST APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY. 
The question of why technologies are designed to certain 
specifications and not others has been addressed by Winner 
in än article 'Do Artefacts'Have Politics (reprinted in 
MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985). He argues that technology is 
inherently political; designed consciously or unconsciously 
to open certain social options and close others. In other 
words. technological artefacts embody conscious social, 
choice for-desired-effects. This analysis of technological 
development looks to its utility to reveal certain 
influences that affected the design of the technology. 
Influences that are missed if the technology Is discussed 
only in its design/development context. 
Winner gives the example of the building works of Robert 
Moses. In particular, the bridges over the parkways on Long 
Island, New York. He argues that the bridges were built to 
specifications which precluded the use of buses. An effect- 
of this was to limit the access of racial minorities and 
low-income groups to Jones Beach public-park. These groups 
were predominantly not car owners. and therefore relied on 
public transportation. What this study reveals is that in 
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order to understand the choice of certain forms of 
technology as opposed to others it is necessary to locate 
technology in the user context.. That is. how it operates in 
the real. world which displays an unequal distribution of 
resources and power in society. 
The'Marxist approach to the study of technology is based on 
the' interactions between economy, society and technology. 
Within this perspective, technological change cannot be 
understood by reference to individual inventors or 
particular innovations. Rather it is necessary to examine 
how larger social and economic forces affect the focus of 
technological problems that require solutions. Usher 
Perceives'this as the question: 'how is the stage set to 
suggest the solution of the perceived problem? ' (cited in 
Rosenberg 1982 p. 49). 
The Marxist`analysis-of science and technology has 
concentrated in some depth on the labour process, in 
particular, the nature of capitalist control of the labour 
process. -Much research on the labour process was stimulated 
by the analysis of technology in capitalist society` 
developed by Braverman in 'Labor and Monopoly 
Capital'(1974). The central concepts in this analysis are 
'de-skilling' and 'taylorisation'. These concepts refer to 
the use of scientific management principles. First, to 
dissociate the labour process from-the skills of workers, 
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second, to separate conception from execution, and third. to 
use the resulting monopoly of knowledge to control each step 
of the labour process and its execution. The process of 
'taylorisation` was not seen as resulting from technological 
change, for example, the automation of the production 
process. In this analysis the technology was seen as 
neutral. Taylorisation represented a form of implementation 
of technology that ensured capitalist control. 
The extensive research which followed Braverman's analysis 
found that 'de-skilling' and 'homogenisation' are tendencies 
of the implementation of technology in capitalist societies 
but that. implementation is affected by other factors apart 
from capitalist control 4see Wood 1982). Several studies 
point to worker resistance as an important factor`in the- 
technological transformation of the labour process (Burawoy 
1978, Elbauni et al 1979). Further that the relationship 
between technology and skill requirements is affected by 
local-. conditions and wider economic and political factors 
(Wood 1982). A conclusion which emerges from this work is 
that the straightforward use of technology by capitalists to 
control workers is over simplistic and ignores other 
mediating factors which influence innovation and 
technological change. 
Elbauni et-al. (1979) point to the way that-competition acts 
as a'constraint on the capitalist use, of'technology for the 
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control of workers. In addition, the choice for managers 
when adopting new technologies from the available 
alternatives on offer involves a process of political 
negotiation between management and workers. The choice of 
available technologies also acts as a constraint. Certain 
forms of work organisation are already dictated by the use 
of the technology (see Rose at al 1986). Wilkinson (1983) 
argues that technological choice'and the establishment of 
working practices are negotiable, and not the outcome of a 
system beyond the control of interest groups. He argues 
-that the mode of implementation of technologies and 
subsequent 'debugging' processes offer. opportunities for 
actors to influence the process of technical change and 
innovation in the diffusion and adoption phase of a new 
technology. From this perspective the ability of groups of 
workers to influence the technology is post hoc. 
What is unclear in the labour process analysis of technology 
is the issue of the social shaping of technology. Are 
social relations embedded in technology or do social 
relations affect the application of technology? The 
question as to whether the design/development of machinery 
reflects the-social relations of its conception is left wide 
open. 
Other research in the Marxist tradition has addressed this 
question, In a study of numerically controlled (NC) and 
as 
computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, Noble 
(1979) illustrates the complexity of forces that affect the 
design of this technology. He argues that technologies of 
production, in their design and in the context of use 
reflect management/employee relations and the realities of 
shop-floor struggle between classes. 
The aim of Noble's study was to discover why the technology 
took the form that it did.. . The problem of automating 
contour machining offered two solutions: record playback and 
N/C. According to Noble, the difference between these two 
solutions rested on the amount of control over-workers' 
skill that was offered by the technology. The design of N/C 
machine tools did not simply reflect productivity gains. 
Another factor was the political objectives of employers; 
the. transference of responsibility and control over 
machining techniques from the craft machinist to the 
programmer. Noble examined the development of this 
technology and the suppression of alternatives, such as 
record playback. He uses the case-study. as evidence of a 
managerial control strategy. 
Record playback as a technological option in the 
design/development process obtained task repeatability 
whilst leaving the intelligence of production in the hands 
of the machinist who made the tape. N/C, "in contrast, was a 
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designed to accommodate the, breakdown of 
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machining into numerous separate tasks. Thus, the 
intelligence of production was built into the machinery and 
the skill of the machinist was replaced. 
In the study Noble demonstrates the link between 
technological choice and the predominance of military and 
aerospace sectors in the development. of. the technology. 
During its development N/C received substantial military 
support. Its cost meant that only large. companies. often in 
receipt of government contracts, were able to adopt the 
technology. The ideological factor was also important in 
its adoption; N/C as symbolic of the computer ace. If 
economic considerations had pre-dominated then record 
playback was suitable for most machining needs. whilst not 
involving the huge investment in computing and progranmming 
necessary for N/C. 
The social relations of production also playedaa-key role in 
decisions to develop N/C. Noble gives the example of, 
General Electric. It was one of the first companies to 
adopt record playback, but after a series of strikes during 
the 1940"s, machining was automated using N/C. The reasons 
for the shift in design effort are illustrated by the 
following quote from an engineer involved; 
'Look, with record playback, the control of the machine 
remains with the machinist - control of feeds, speeds, 
number of cuts, output: with N(umerical C(ontrol) there is a 
shift of control to management. Management is no lonser 
dependent upon the operator and can thus optimise the use of 
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their machines. With N/C, control over the process is placed 
firmly in the hands of management - and why shouldn't we 
have it? (Noble 1979 p"34). 
However, the issue of control is not the whole story. 
Despite these attempts at control, management still needed 
experienced machinists to ensure that 'automatic' machines 
worked smoothly and produced components of. good quality. 
Nobles research indicated the complexity of forces that 
influence technological design/development. He showed that 
-automation did not have to proceed in the way that it did 
and that choices other than the purely technical or economic 
affect the design/development of technologies. However, the 
subsequent development of this technology exhibited 
contradictory tendencies that could not be readily explained' 
in terms of interactions between social actors. There was a 
need to consider social and economic forces once or twice 
removed from the technology itself. For example, changes in 
the price and capability of microelectronic technology and 
changes in the composition of users of the machine tool. 
Noble noted that the rapidly falling cost of memory and 
computing power facilitated the development of CNC machine 
tools in which programming equipment was attached to the 
machine tool. This made it technically feasible and. 
possibly economically attractive to institute shop-floor 
programming of machine tools. In effect, this opened up 
opportunities for craft workers to retain or regain control 
"vor programming. He notes that CNC was potentially 
subWersive to the division of labour established under NC 
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machines. Whereas craft workers put up relatively little 
resistance to technician programming of NC machine tools, 
responsibility for programming CNC has been fiercely 
contested between machinists and technicians in many 
engineering factories in the UK (Russell and Williams 1987). 
Over-reliance on the explanation of control in Noble's study 
has been questionned by Wajcman (1986). She argues that it 
is uncertain whether Noble's account deals adequately with 
the possibility that, in the long run, numerical control was 
favoured for cost and profit reasons rather than for control 
over labour as such. Noble acknowledges in his epilogue 
that it is impossible for a firm to know when it has found 
the technique of production that produces maximum profits - 
the measurement of performance is by its very nature 
ambiguous and imprecise. Noble concludes from this that 
economic calculations often seem primarily to be used to 
legitimate decisions already taken, rather than as the 
rational basis for decision-making. However, Wajcman (1986) 
argues that a parallel argument could be made for 
management-'s goal of domination. How do they know which 
technique will, when operational. actually secure their 
control? She concludes that a simplistic domination theory 
of technological chance is-hardly more satisfying than a 
simplistic 'profit maximising' one. 
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In Chapter One the evolutionary nature of much technological 
change was discussed. Rose at al. (1986) argue that 
concentration on the social factors which shape technology 
can marginalise the influence of the technology itself. 
Social factors are not the whole story and as an alternative 
to technological determinist models of the relations between 
technology and work are inadequate. Whilst these 
commentators acknowledge that it is one thing to say that 
technology is not the primary determinant of work 
organisation, they are critical of studies which downgrade 
the influence of technology as a force amongst a complexity 
of other forces; Rose et al. base their arguments on 
findings from a study of the process of change involved in 
the. modernisation of a small sample of local telephone 
exchanges in British"Telecom. Their analysis is based on 
how far the two types of exchange technology were associated 
with specific kinds of maintenance tasks and skills; and how 
far the technology determined forms of work organisation. 
Findings of the study indicated that the tasks and skills 
required to operate and maintain the exchange technology 
were strongly influenced by its form. However the 
distribution of tasks and skills into particular jobs and 
the location of jobs in the occupational structure were less 
-dependent on the technology. They argue that the way that 
jobs were organised was strongly influenced by social 
factors although the choices that were made were both 
enabled and constrained by the nature of the exchange 
technology. 
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Rose et al (1986) propose that within social shaping of 
technology arguments, an analysis of the role played by 
technology as a discrete independent variable should be 
incorporated. They argue that there is a strong case for 
examining the way that technology and social. variables 
interact, at the design stage as well as at the workplace 
level. 
The complexity involved in identifying discrete variables in 
analyses of technology is evident in many studies. They 
indicate that the social factors affecting technological 
development are complex and interactive amongst social 
classes, gender groups. economic and political factors. 
Wilkinson (1983) notes: 
'the design and choice of . 
technology may be seen'as the 
result of socially-derived decisions, and the way in which 
technology is used can be explained in terms of political 
processes. (p. 20) 
Lazonick's (1979) account of the development ot. the 
self-acting mule in the spinning industry shows how adult 
mule-minders in Britain retained their positions of power 
not because of resistance but because employers found the 
hierarchical division of the workforce between minders and 
pi'ecers useful. In this way differential relations, among 
the workforce affected technical development. 
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In a study of the US garment industry Schwartz-Cowan (1979) 
argued that the sewing process had not been automated 
because of the cheapness and availability of immigrant women 
workers. Gender and class relations affect technical 
change. A point reinforced by Cockburn (1981) in a study of 
typesetting technology in Britain. She shows that the 
choice between alternative designs of mechanised typesetting 
was based on the preservation of male domination in the 
composing room. This is indicated by aa statement made by 
the male-dominated union; the London Society of Compositors; 
(by not splitting the typesetting process); 
... the Linotype answers to one of the essential conditions 
of trade unionism, in that it does not depend for its 
success on the employment of boy or girl labour' (Cockburn 
1981 p. 46). 
The deskilling and potentially feminising quality of the 
technology was not achieved because of compromises between 
capital and skilled labour in the. industry. Cockburn argues 
that her-analysis highlights the role. of patriarchy in 
technological design/development. Again, a finding 
uncovered by a concentration on the technology from the 
context of the user. 
The effect of capitalist relations. on technologies was the 
subject of a study of domestic technology (Schwartz-Cowan 
1983). The domination of electric refrigerators over gas 
refrigerators was shown. to result, not from teohniaal 
superiority or consumer preferences but differences in 
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expected economic returns. 
This empirical work suggests that the influence of social 
factors on the shaping and choices of routes of 
technological development are embedded in technologies 
themselves. The identification of alternative possible 
routes of development that were neglected for social, 
political or economic reasons highlight the way that the 
nature of technology is inextricably linked to its social 
context. The key point is that the understanding of the 
effects of social relations on technologies requires not 
only theinvestigation of the design and development-of 
physical artefacts but. also their role in the context of 
use/implementati-on. It is-not suff. jcient to argue that 
technology, is neutral and its application reflects social 
relations, rather the evidence of alternative paths of 
technical development point to the, importance of selection 
and choice of technological design by social and political 
groups with the economic and political power to choose. 
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2.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INNOVATION PROCESS 
To summarise the social shaping of technology argument, 
Johnson writes; '' 
'... the shaping of technology is a social process from 
selection of research projects and market targets. to the 
form of its introduction, degree of adaptation required by 
the economy and society into which it is introduced - and 
ultimately to the values and goals of an industrial society. 
These social processes and ... these interactions are 
responsible for the ways in which technology augments and 
limits human capability' (Johnson 1985 p381). 
The unequal distribution of power and resources in 
capitalist societies ensures a differential access to the' 
innovation process. In Chapter One the selection 
environment for technological development was discussed. 
The studies reviewed in the previous sections indicate that 
technologies embody a multiplicity of forces which, 
consciously or unconsciously, affect its design. Forces 
that include the interests of powerful groups, ' defence'and 
military requirements, political processes between interest 
groups, differential relations among aworkforce, localised 
problems within a technological system. gender and class 
relations, capitalist relations, patriarchy and elements of 
the evolution of the technology itself. All of this work 
points to the close relationship between technology and the 
cultural norms and values of the society which makes it. 
Without doubt, technology represents a problem, 'in 
particular for those groups in society who do not have 
access to the innovation process, apart from in a very 
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indirect way. A point supported by Wynne when he notes 
that; 
... the present social organisation of innovation and 
design is dominated by technical experts oriented towards 
specific priorities' (1983 p. 16). 
The labour process theorists point to the way that workers 
mediate and affect the implementation of technologies. In 
the present organisation of the innovation process this 
influence'is typically post hoc, that is, after technologies 
have already been designed and developed. In Chapter One 
the importance of the interaction between science. 
technology and the market was discussed in terms of 
prerequisites for 'successful' innovations. 
The relationship between innovation activity and user need 
was found to be important. In the economic approach to the 
study of innovations the saleability and therefore 'success' 
of technological innovations depends on how reflective they 
are of the needs of the user. However, the current social 
organisation of the innovation process means that the needs 
of the user do not have a direct input into the innovation 
process - rather needs are fed back to producers through the 
market mechanism. 
The technological environment in capitalist economies is 
geared towards economic growth. Questions such as, whose 
interests will this technology serve? Who will reap the 
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benefits and who will carry the costs of this technology are 
not asked. 
The workability of technological innovations clearly depends 
on the social context of implementation - technology works 
because people operate it, maintain it and so on. The view 
that technology does not reflect needs (see 1.10) was based 
on the appropriateness or otherwise of technologies in the 
user context. For, example,, lead in petrol may not be viable 
in terms of the social costs of pollution. The 
concentration on technological innovations as physical 
artefacts serves to obscure their dependence on the context 
of use (Bush 1983)., 
Wynne (1983) argues that the 'machine' approach to the 
understanding-of-innovation splits technology from 
implementation so that. products and processes are designed 
and developed within the confines of the innovation process. 
Implementation/use is an external factor. One effect of 
this"is that the privatisation of the innovation process and 
its domination by 'technical experts'. involved in-their own 
goals and priorities within the paradigms of. certain problem 
formulations and solutions. The complex realities of the 
implementation stage of the innovation process are neglected 
by 'experts' when choices are made between alternative 
designs and strategies. The privatisation and increasing 
specialisation or the innovation process means that- 
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"experts" (usually male) are increasingly socially isolated 
from the realities of the social system of technology - they 
operate with technical or machine conceptions of technology. 
The needs of women and other groups often remain 
unrecognised, these arguments are developed within feminist 
analyses of technology. Zimmerman notes: 
' From the preliminary conceptualisation to the final 
marketing of a product, most decision-making about 
-technology is done by men who design, usually 
subconsciously, a model of the physical world in which they 
would like to live. using material artefacts which meet the 
needs of the people - men - they best know: The result (is) 
technological development based on particular sets of male 
conditioning, values and roles... ' (Zimmerman 1981 p2). 
In sum, the needs of various socio-economic and 
culturally-defined groups remain unmet by the current 
process of design and innovation. Neglected also by the 
'decision-makers' who make the crucial choices between 
alternative solutions to social/technological problems. (see 
Bruce, Kirkup and Thomas 1984, Bruce 1985). 
Empirical research demonstrates the problems that the social 
isolation of 'experts' from users and the split between 
innovation and implementation/use can give rise to. In the 
area of computing it has been noted that: 
'Systems can be ineffective when they are not well 
understood by people who use them. ` provide inaccurate data, 
demand unusual precision and attention, or are difficult to 
modify when the kinds of information users want changes. 
These difficulties can undermine the utility of the computer 
system even when its users are relatively homogeneous and 
welcome computational assistance' (cited in Wynne 1983 p20) 
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Computing system design concentrates on the technical 
aspects and coding, the user interface is usually the last 
part to be designed, though this is changing as companies 
face increasing competitiveness and user friendliness is 
seen to be a major factor for sales. In a study of computer 
specialists, Weizenbaum (1976) notes that although it may 
appear that they are open to influence by user needs of 
design, often specialists have rather low opinions of users 
and tend to use their own perceptions of user needs when 
designing and developing systems. For many groups of 
workers. user input into computer software packages is 
marginal; administrative workers and librarians complained 
of this at a conference workshop on human centred technology 
held at Aston University in 1986. 
These examples point to the problems for designers and 
innovators of understanding the social realities of the user 
context. The area of computing provides a contemporary 
example but there are many others. The lack of involvement 
by users in design and innovation means that often 
technologists reflect 'needs` as perceived by experts, or 
their own knowledge, rather than the needs of the client or 
the user. There are many examples (see Lawless 1977) where 
the viability of a particular innovation may require 
resources or expertise or particular cultural patterns that 
do not exist. This is apparent in many cases of technology 
transfer from the West to underdeveloped countries, 
tos 
There is an argument here for the encouragement of 
indigenous research and development based in the local 
culture and economy and able to be realistic to the 
resources, possibilities and needs of the local population. 
The case-study of the GLC technology policy presented in the 
following chapters is an attempt to approach technological 
development in this way. 
The social context of-use of technology is an essential part 
of the innovation process. In Chapter One, the model of the 
innovation process illustrated by the 'innovation spiral' 
pointed to the way that re-adaptation comprises an integral 
part of the innovation process. That is. incremental 
innovations of products. and processes are dependent on 
feedback from information gained from-use. 
If technological innovation is seen as a continual learning: -" 
process then 'learning by using'; (Arrow 1962) is as' 
important a component of the innovation process as the 
learning involved in research, design and development-or 
producing new scientific knowledge. In a study, of the 
capital goods sector product-differentiation may be driven 
by learning by using; often the users themselves make 
important modifications that will be part of the 
specifications of later models. The capital goods-sector 
operates an a close relationship between producers and 
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users, where purchasers have a more direct input into design 
specifications. This was the case with clinical analysers 
(Von Hippel and Finkelstein 1978). It has been shown that 
models which have proved more amenable to user modifications 
have ultimately been more successful commercially. In this 
way learning by using creates new information that feeds 
into the design process of new product development, 
eventually resulting. in modifications to the hardware. 
Design flexibility or the production of hardware that can 
cope with future changes and modifications and accommodate 
learning by using appears to be characteristic of high 
technology industries where system complexity is an integral 
part of the product or process (Rosenberg 1982). Computing 
and software design provide a good example where companies 
are reliant on user modification in order to achieve the 
optimal design characteristics of software packages. 
The recognition of the importance of learning by using is 
acknowledgement of the importance of the social system of 
technology for the innovation process. However the capital 
goods market is more I homogeneous and lend itself to learning 
by using. The consumer goods market is heterogeeous and 
highly competitive so that learning by using is less likely. 
It is in this area that there is a need for design and 
development processes to be more open to interaction with 
users. It the innovation process is seen as a continuing 
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cycle of design. development and uses participation by users 
may be acknowledged as an important factor in the continual 
feedback of knowledge that significantly affects the design 
and development stage of product and process development. 
The capital goods market can exhibit a close interaction 
between supplier and user, while the nature of the consumer 
market makes this more difficult. The alternative 
initiatives for innovation discussed in the case-study 
attempt to introduce a technology policy that is based on a 
close relationship between producers and users. 
2.7 SOCIALLY-USEFUL PRODUCTION. 
In his book 'Design for the Real World'. Papanek (1974) 
called for a closer interaction between designers and users 
to ensure the workability of technologies in the real world. 
His argument for the design world put a voice to the 
political themes of participation and participatory 
democracy which emerged from student activism in-the late 
1960s and-early 1970s. 
As a proposition, 'participation' is based on the belief 
that people affected by design decisions should be involved 
in making those decisions. During the 19708 the idea of' 
user participation in"the design process gained around. In 
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product design it was based around the notion of 'design for 
need'; close relations between the designer and user were 
emphasised, particularly in relation to design for the 
disabled (see Langdon and Cross 1984). Another area where 
the concept was influential was within architecture and 
environmental design (Gibson 1986). A conference held in 
Manchester in 1972. on the theme. of design participation, 
and where designers converged to discuss their ideas and 
views on user participation in the design, proeess, was an 
event which demonstrated the interest in the area at that 
time (Cross 1972). - 
The concept of-participation lacks clarity, thus it can be 
used to denote a number of activities that range from'purely 
passive consultation exercises to active self-determination 
by'users (Wulz 1986). This has been particularly evident in 
planning and environmental design when. --following the 
Skeffington Report (1968). local authorities were urged to 
make provisions for participation in town planning. For 
some advocates, user participation refers to actual user 
decision-making power. For others, a transfer of power-is 
not on the agenda; the professional domain remains the same 
and the user is required only to voice an opinion. In 
effect,, participation in these instances refers only to a 
change of procedure within an unchanged balance of power 
(Habraken 1986). Many efforts at public participation were 
primarily centred around attempts to influence the design 
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activities of experts; planners, designers and other 
professionals. 
In terms of product design a substantially more 
participative approach emerged in 1976 with the Lucas Plan; 
an alternative corporate plan designed by groups of skilled 
workers at Lucas Aerospace (see Wainwright and Elliott 
1982). The Plan was for a range of socially-useful products 
to be developed based on the idea of production for social 
need. - The Lucas Plan will be discussed more fully in 
Chapter Five. It is important here-as an example of 
participation in the product design process between 
producers and users on products directly related to social 
needs articulated by the community. Socially-useful 
production is the term used to refer to this form of 
innovation strategy. Mike Cooley; a leading member of the 
Lucas Aerospace Shop Stewards' Combine Committee and 
'latterly Director of the Technology Division at the Greater 
London Enterprise Board (GLEE), defined socially-useful 
products as: 
'.. products that in their design. manufacture and use 
enhance human-skill and ingenuity, conserve energy and raw 
materials and aid human beings rather than control, de-skill 
or maim them. In addition. new forms of technology are 
supported which would provide for human-enhancing and 
liberating means of making socially-useful products - 
human-centred technologies' (Cooley 1984 p51). 
The Lucas Plan demonstrated the possibility of an 
alternative social organisation of the innovation process. 
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A key point was the close connection between producers and 
users. This was achieved by a process of linking the'skills 
and equipment and resources at Lucas Aerospace to social 
needs identified in the community via a form of 'popular 
planning'(see Chapter Five). 
Socially-useful production implies a contrast to production 
for profit. To avoid ambiguity the concept is best reserved 
to cover those products which would not be produced under a 
capitalist market system because they require state 
involvement in research, development, distribution and 
purchase, such as, products relevant to basic service 
provision (Newman 1986). In a welfare economy, social needs 
such as housing, health, education and so on relate to 
collective service provision by both central and local 
government. The nature of the service provision is 
dependent on poliitical priorities and the commitment of 
resources. The. Lucas workers hoped that the (then) Labour 
Government would switch funding resources from defence 
products to 'socially-useful' products. In the event, 
'however, this was not to be. With the Lucas Plan a missing 
ingredient was markets and the finance to follow through 
with the development of products. Given the lack of state 
support, there was a need to match the product proposals 
with market opportunities. Socially-useful products, in the 
form of-medical technologies. transport technologies, aids 
for -the disabled and so on are directly relevant to local 
M 
authority statutory service provision. The local authority 
market appeared to provide an opportunity for 
socially-useful product development. In this way. the GLC 
technology policy discussed in the following chapters may be 
seen as a direct offspring of the Lucas Plan. 
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----For the 'radical' local. authorities, and the GLC in 
particular discussed in the case-study, the notion of.: _, 
alternative plans and production for social need became key 
components of their economic thinking (Benington`1986). The 
point of alternative plans is to present constructive 
alternatives to existing technologies. The commitment to 
socially-useful products provides, first, a means to link 
technology directly to social need through products such as 
aids. for the disabled. And second, presents a picture of an 
alternative and prefigurative technological paradigm; a 
different role for technology in society. The innovation 
process was a key point of intervention in attempts to 
direct technology and the benefits that flow from it toward 
social and political objectives. The approach may be termed 
socially-directed innovation. and as such it was an overtly 
political programme. 
A socially-directed organisation of the innovation process 
recognises the context of use as an integral part of the 
innovation process. The access of a range of social groups 
to the design/development stage of the innovation process; 
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both producers and users was an important pro-requisite. 
The. GLC created the 'technology networks' to provide the 
facilities for this alternative approach to innovation. The 
aim was the use of resources; materials, energy, capital and 
labour, to meet social needs more effectively (see Chapter 
Six). 
The application of the concept of social need to a public 
sector innovation/technology policy is not without its 
problems. Social needs may be defined as the needs of 
groups who do not have access to political and economic 
resources and the power with which to articulate and satisfy 
needs through the market - for example, the needs of women 
for increased child-care provision. Who defines needs, 
whose needs are more important than others are political 
questions. Differentiating between needs and wants, and the 
cultural relativity of needs highlights some of the problems 
of basing an innovation process on the satisfaction of 
social needs. 
A political proaramrne based on the provision of needs 
involves`selection and priority. In the same way, support 
for certain innovations involves selection and priorities. 
Politically and socially directed innovation processes are 
seen as away, of prioritising certain needs, based on a 
broad remit of local authority service provision. Social 
needs that can be identified through popular planning 
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processes and participation by users in the 
design/development of technologies. 
Needs is a teleological concept in that it always assumes 
some end goal or purpose. that is. needs are inextricably 
linked to values. Obviously difficulties arise on how to 
define goals - is it a process of consensus. and among whom. 
or an explicit political programme? The GLC Economic Policy 
Group (EPG) acknowledged that; 
'People have conflicting needs: sometimes because of 
different values and desires. An economic strategy based on 
social need would challenge the inequalities but it would 
seek to express and fulfill different values and desires' 
(Jobs For A Change, GLC 1.983 p29). 
This definition recognises the complexity of a social 
definition of need but the problem still remains of 
selection between needs, how to secure the articulation of 
need and who decides on priorities given the limited 
resources available. 
Further, 
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for social use/need is a difficult area 
to define practically - the social usefulness of a 
technology is context dependent and it is perhaps easier to 
define what is not socially useful rather than what is. In 
terms of alternative technologies 'needs' are meaningful 
when there is some form of concrete possibility of 
realisation. For a programme of socially-directed 
'innovation of alternative technologies problems exist in the 
sense that needs are related to the choices on offer, for 
'1lq' 
i#Mt1t?, radiation and chemotherapy are the choices on offer 
in the cure for cancer. This raises the question of how is 
it possible to secure the articulation of need without a 
range of choices being already available? What are the 
mechanisms for offering alternative technological solutions 
to problems? Once alternative technologies are developed. 
how is, it possible. to offer these to groups who do not have 
the economic resources to pay for them? Market needs are 
assumed to be articulated as economic demand - is there a 
way of meeting needs despite the financial constraints on 
the public sector? These questions, together issues of 
participation in the innovation process are addressed in the 
case-study which follows. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE SETTING OF THE CASE-STUDY. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The discussion of technological innovation and the social 
factors that shape technolo&ical development drew attention 
to the possibility of an alternative approach to technology 
policy. An approach based on public participation in the 
product design/development process and directly linked to 
social need. The research presented is a case-study of such 
an approach formulated and implemented in the-context of a 
local authority; -the, Greater London Council (GLC), whilstic}shab, ur, 
, ý_was in office between 1981 and 1986. " To gain'a deeper 
understanding of policy initiatives, and importantly, policy- 
outcomes, it is necessary to locate them-, in their 
historical; political and economic context. 
Conflict has characterised central and'local government 
relations since 1979 and has revolved around central 
government attempts to control public spending. Thus during 
the 1980's local government has increasingly been at-the 
forefront-of political debate in Britain. - The two main 
factors that have contributed to the increased tension 
between the centre and the locality are as follows. First. 
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the Conservative Government's legislative changes that led 
to, greater-control over local authority spending in the form 
of. rate-capping. and the abolition of the Metropolitan 
authorities, including the GLC, in 1986. Second, the 
renewed interest within-the Labour Party in local government 
as an arena of political struggle and socialist advance. It 
is in the area of local economic development, as variously 
perceived by the Conservative Government and the radical 
Labour controlled authorities, that the breakdown of 
consensus between-the centre-and the locality can be most 
clearly illustrated. -Attempts by the radical local 
authorities to demonstrate the importance of public sector 
institutions and organisations, to"the economy-were in marked 
contrast to-the central thrust of Conservative-government 
policy; the encouragement of a shift away from-municipal 
provision to market provision-(Young 1986). These competing 
views on the future forms of social and economic change 
envisaged for Britain comprised the background to the 
economic, and technological, initiatives of the radical 
local authorities. It was a background of tension and 
conflict in the national political context. 
This chapter sets the case-study in its national economic 
and political context. It looks at the nature of local 
economic development, the radical alternatives, and the 
legislative changes that most seriously affected local 
authorities during the 19809s. The discussion of 
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central/local relations shows that open conflict between 
central and local'government is not new, perhaps the most 
famous examples are Poplar in the 1920's and Clay Cross in 
the early'1970's (Cochrane 1983, Gyford 1985). The aim-of 
the chapter is to illustrate not only what local 
authorities, and the GLC in particular, are doing but also 
why, and how the national' context affects their position as 
agents of technological change. 
The-term 'radical' is used to describe the local authorities 
with a Labour Left maJority'who were concerned to introduce 
public sector-led industry and employment initiatives. It 
is acknowledged that there were many local authorities who 
developed radical policies at the local level, Liverpool 
immediately springs to mind, but in this thesis the term 
refers particularly' to the Greater London Council (GLC), - 
West Midlands County Council (WMCC) and Sheffield City 
Council. 
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3.2 THE LOCAL AUTHORITY. 
Local government or the local authority (I tend to use the 
terms synonymously) in Britain is a political institution 
charged with the provision of local services in the form of 
education, housing, environmental health and so on. The 
functions and boundaries of local government are not fixed 
or laid down in a written constitution, they are negotiated 
through Parliament. Thus local government operates within a 
pre-defined framework erected during the course of 
historical developments (Cochrane 1983). 
Essentially, local authority activity is legislated 
activity; legal, financial and ideological rules, 
regulations and assumptions act to ensure their possession 
of only limited economic and political power. The legality 
termed Ultra Vires further contains activity; a function can 
be performed only if there is a statutory power to do so. 
The existence of a statutory power is often a matter for the 
courts to decide. If it is found that a local authority has 
exceeded its power, the activity will be declared Ultra 
Viren and void or illegal. This point is exemplified by the 
House of Lords ruling that a supplementary rate issued by 
the GLC on London ratepayers; to raise monies for a grant 
subsidy to the London Transport Executive to finance the 
cost of a twenty-five per cent fare reduction, was Ultra 
Vires the provisions of the Transport (London) Act, 1969 
(Rhodes 19811). 
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Local authorities are not only. characterised by legal and 
financial constraints, their political and ideological 
position is equally important in relation to new policy 
departures and change. Political and ideological concerns 
about, legal powers; the traditional means by which local 
authority legal officers restrict new policy. departures.. 
have been reinforced by. the rise in the number of court 
cases instigated by both central and local government in 
recent years. Concern about legal powers, although based on 
legal grounds, includes, an ideological stance. The 
restrictions on local authority independence from central 
government exist but allow a certain amount of-room for 
responsiveness to local economic and social.. conditions. 
Often this room. emerges. as the:, result of the creative 
exploitation of their limited powers. Young (1986) argues 
that this type of exploitation is necessary to the process 
of domain expansion; the extension of"local authority 
activity-into new areas. 
In relation to local economic development the political and 
ideological position of Council . Members. and Officers can be 
seen to have a direct bearing on forms ot"policy 
initiatives. The RoyalýTown Planning Institute Report of 
1980 lists the-following points in relation to the. position 
of-the local authority and its potential in economic 
development activities. 
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a) the general concern of local authorities for the economic 
well-being of their areas as a whole; 
b) the importance of local authorities as employers in their 
own right; 
C) their concern for the employment prospects of future 
populations; 
d) their unique ability to put a local perspective to, 
government industrial and employment policies, and their 
scope for politically modifying the local impact of these, 
policies; 
e) their role as planning authority. both in the preparation 
of statutory and other plans and in the control of 
development; 
f) their ability to respond to major decisions affecting the 
local economy whether made by government or employers; 
a) their ability to monitor the local situation. and measure 
the effectiveness of initiatives taken; 
h)-their ability to create opportunities for investment, 
both by themselves in response to a market Cap or by others; 
1) their existing powers to provide infrastructure for 
industrial development and to assist firms financially (see 
Mawson 1981). 
Despite this unique position held by the local authority. 
realisation of its potential will depend on the political 
and ideological orientation of the individual authority. 
Some commentators relate forms of policy initiative to a 
general theoretical framework on the nature of local 
government. Cochrane (1983) characterises local authorities 
as problem-oriented bodies, thus an issue. only comes to be 
seen as a problem if it is defined as auch by the 
organisational members. Young at al. (1980) develop this 
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point and argue that the people involved in the economic 
development process have the-greatest significance for the 
definition of the problem and the formulation of policy. 
Individual perception and action-is a useful means-of- 
explaining the=different strategies produced by local- 
authorities, it is akin to the idea of a 'product champion' 
in relation to technological innovation. In the discussion 
of the GLC initiative it is noted that the background and 
particular concerns of certain individuals had an enormous 
effect on policy formulation. In addition, the importance 
of the political and. ideolotical orientation of officers 
accounts for the concern. by the GLC to create, new- 
departments staffed by politically sympathetic officers. - If 
officers and-Councillors hold the view that the local 
economy may be open to influence but not direction, then 
policy initiatives will tend to be more conservative. Thus, 
the attraction of industry to an area reflects an interest 
in gain for the locality, perhaps at the expense of a 
neighbouring authority, rather than an analysis of economic 
structures and processes. 
Saunders (1984) locates local government in a consumption 
oriented framework. The productive activities of gas and 
electricity provision were nationalised in the post-war 
period, thus local government policies are consumption 
related, in other words. service-oriented. However, in the 
field of economic activity the conservative response to the 
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identification of. unemployment as a problem does not 
usually lead'to service provision for the unemployed, but 
rather to small firms and other business interests. For, 
Cochrane (1983) it is this very service orientation which. 
actively. leads to the provision of assistance to industry. 
Further, it has created a profession In the form of , 
Industrial Development Officers whose loyalties are with 
business interests rather than the local authority and the 
local population. 
Political and ideological viewpoints result in a spectrum 
of local economic initiatives which either build on or 
Play-down the position of the local authority in the local 
economy. Policy initiatives span the larzely developmental 
and land-oriented approaches that tend to mirror central 
Government initiatives on inner-city and regional policy. to 
firm-oriented and employment-oriented policies. The latter 
are favoured more by the radical local authorities. 
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3.3 LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. 
Local authority activity in the sphere of economic 
development is not new (Camina 1974). In 1907 the Borough 
of West Ham advertised itself as 'the factory centre of the 
South of England' (Cochrane 1983). However, in the post-war 
: period this activity was largely characterised by the 
provision of social infrastructure, such-as education and 
housing, and thus only indirectly concerned with industrial 
-development. Direct involvement in economic development, at 
that time, was not seen as a mainstream activity for local 
government. If it was practiced it was usually confined to 
land-use planning. The limited statutory powers available 
to the local authority for economic activity began to be 
extended in the 1960's and 1970's when a number of Acts of 
Parliament were introduced; the Local Authorities (Land) 
Act, 1963, the Local Government (Financial Provisions) Act. 
1963, and the Local Government Act. 1972 (Camina 1974). The 
provisions made available by these Acts allowed local 
authorities to acquire and authorise the development of 
land, and provide loans and mortgages to private developers 
for infrastructure-construction on development sites. In 
addition. -the 1972 Act (Section 137) allowed a twopenny rate 
to be levied and spent on what the local authority perceived 
as in the interests of the area and the local population 
(Spencer at a]. 1986). Until the late 1970's these powers 
were not widely used. Spencer et al. (1986) argue that this 
was due to the caution of local authority legal officers and 
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the absence of political pressure to develop employment 
policies. At that time large-scale unemployment was not a 
problem. its significance for the local authority only began 
to emerge with the economic recession of the mid-1970'8. 
The experience of economic recession in Britain has 
consisted of rising unemployment# falling living standards, 
and the industrial decline of regional and inner-city areas. 
Economic decline affects and overburdens the provision of 
services by the local authority, this stimulated a concern 
by many to. develop their role in the local economy. The 
reorganisation of local government in 1974 marked a turning 
point. since which time economic` development by. local 
authorities has continued to increase both in numbers of 
policy initiatives and in their diversity (Soddy and Barratt 
1980). The use of Section 137 of the 1972 Local Government 
Act has underpinned a large proportion of the funding for 
local economic activity (Young 1986). 
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The discussion of local economic development illustrates the 
difference between approaches favoured by the radical local 
authorities and the more traditional approaches developed by 
other authorities. The latter are termed developmental 
approaches, and largely comprise policies designed to 
attract private sector investment into the. local area 
through the provision of incentives. in the form of land, 
buildings and financial concessions, such as . rates relief 
and so on. 
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The developmental approach to economic development may be 
characterised by four main forms of policy initiative; land 
and premises, promotional activities, business advice and 
information and finance. 
Land and-premises is the most common form of local authority 
involvement in local economic development. Activities 
include the provision of nursery units for small- 
enterprises, land release and development, some building* 
refurbishment and in some cases. partnership arrangements 
with private developers. For example, a joint public/private- 
development of factory units in the London. Borough of 
Haringey meant that in return for a reduced ground rent for 
private developers the local authority received a percentage 
of rent income and thereby an interest in the survival and 
development of tenant enterprises (Young. Mason and Mills 
1980). In addition to the Local Authorities (Land) Act of 
1963, this form of-activity has been underpinned-by the 
Inner Urban. Areas Act of 1978 (Young 1986) where provision 
was madex. for designated local authorities, particularly in 
-inner-city areas, to declare specific industrial improvement 
areas. In these areas additional central government finance 
was available for land and building development. Studies of 
land-related local economic activity have tended to regard 
the practice favourably. arguing that a level or provision 
bp,. the, local authority is important for attracting industry 
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to an area (Camina 1974, Robinson 1979). 
An increasingly popular form of land development' activity is 
the creation, in conjunction with Universities and 
Polytechnics, of Science Parks. Perhaps the most famous 
example is. Cambridge Science Park. The aim is to provide 
sites and facilities' close to Universities and thereby 
encourage links. between the Universities and 
high-technology tenant enterprises. The initiative is 
designed to facilitate technology transfer between 
Universities and enterprises and reduce the time lag between 
product research and development and innovation. For 
example, the Science Park at Aston University; a joint 
effort between Birmingham City Council and Lloyds'Bank, is 
designed to benefit selected tenant enterprises by a close 
proximity to research departments in pharmacy and 
biochemistry at the University (Guardian 3.5.83). 
The 'Technology Networks' established by the GLC and GLEE 
and discussed in Chapter Six were based on a critique of 
Science Park development as overly directed toward private 
enterprise. The Technology Networks were designed to 
facilitate technology transfer from Universities and 
Polytechnics but with a bias toward local enterpises and the 
local community. 
A second form of local authority economic activity 
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concentrates on the promotion of the locational attributes 
of the local area. Activities vary from the publication of 
information leaflets, media advertising, to overseas trade 
missions. All are concerned to advertise the virtues of an 
area for the settlement of new industry and commerce. One 
example of this type of activity was the business 
exhibition:, Enterprise North-West. held in 1986-to 
demonstrate the diversity of its new enterprises and to set 
out the investment opportunities available to expanding 
businesses. It was described as 'the largest. - most 
important business exhibition ever held in the North of 
England, surpassing even the famous Royal Jubilee Exhibition 
of 1887' (Guardian 5.3.86). Research by the Policy Studies 
Institute (PSI) in 1984 found that almost a quarter of local 
authority respondents active in the area of economic 
development have promotional policies. The employment of 
Economic Development Officers to local authority departments 
often focuses on this promotional role, and the number of 
appointments continues to increase (Boddy 1984). However, 
as the prospect of 'footloose' firms looking to relocate has 
diminished over recent years, many authorities have 
redirected their promotional activities toward the 
attraction of tourism (Young 1986). 
A third-form of local authority economic-activity that is 
widespread is the provision of business advice and 
information. The maintenance of registers of industrial and 
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commercial site availability is common as a means to promote 
efficiency in the land market. Some authorities provide 
advisory services to-small businesses and start-up 
enterprises. activities which have been reinforced by 
organisational innovations on the Officer side in the form 
of Small Firms Advice Units and Centres (Boddy 1984). 
The final general heading for local authority activity is 
finance. The Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978 gave additional 
powers to designated authorities to give financial 
assistance to firms in the form of grants and loans, and to. 
-encourage the establishment of co-operative enterprises 
(Young"1986). Loans, and less commonly grants, largely 
relate to site and premises acquisition, but also on 
occasion to plant, -machinery and operating costs, such as, 
concessions on rates, rents-or interest on. loans (Soddy 
1984). For local authorities not included in the-Inner 
Urban Areas Act, similar activities have used Section 137 
powers and their own rate resources to'provide loans (Mills 
and Young 1986). Thus it is not unusual, to find authorities 
like Southwark with Employment and Industrial Units and 
access-to-. & three. million pound Industrial-Development Fund. 
In its first three-months of operations. this Unit was 
working with twenty enterprises looking for assistance 
(Young. Mason and Mills 1980). 
The activities described reflect the pre-occupation among 
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many local authorities with service provision to private 
industry, seen as the-most effective means of-developing or 
regenerating the-local area. For the radical local 
authorities the use of existing powers for land development, 
building refurbishment, business advice services and 
financial assistance to small enterprises and co-operatives 
was imbued with a community bias. Their concern was to 
direct services to a wider constituency of community and 
workplace groups planning for product development and the 
economic regeneration of their local areas. 
3.4 CRITICISMS OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH. 
First, local authorities that seek to attract industry into 
an area assume a supply of-'footloose' industrial and 
""-commercial-organisations. An assumption which is clearly 
questionable in the current economic climate. One-effect of 
this type of policy is increased competition between local 
authorities for what is available. The end result is often 
the redistribution of existing industry rather than the 
creation of new industries (Urban Research Trust 1978, Kirby 
1980). 
The developmental approach-18 characteristic of"central 
government policies for the regeneration of the inner 
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cities, These Policies have also been, criticised an. 
redistributive. The Local Government Planning and Land Act 
1980 made provision for the extension of central-government 
activity in local.. and regional development with the 
establishment of Free Enterprise Zones (see Anderson 1983) 
and Urban-Development Areas in Merseyside and the London 
Docklands area, the latter to be administered by central 
government appointed Urban Development Corporations. The 
Free Enterprise Zones, established in 1981/2, provide 
exemptions from development land tax, commercial and 
industrial rates and training levies for locating 
enterprises. In addition, concessions are made available on 
planning controls and capital allowances.,. The-Urban. - 
Development Corporations also use concessions to-attract, 
industry. In addition. they have powers to acquire public- 
.. land and compulsory-purchase private land in their area. 
Thus. road-building, plannine. and housing. policies on this 
land are removed from the jurisdiction of, the local. 
. authority. 
{Duncan and Goodwin 1985). - 
Research on. -Enterprise. Zones lends support-to the 
redistribution argument. Rates relief comprises an. -,,, 
important. element of the subsidies available within 
Enterprise Zones, thus industrial and commercial- 
re-location across . 
boundaries. is a. common practice. Since 
1980. it was round that 300 companies enmploying 3000 people 
; --. have taken"advantage,; of the". Enterpriae. Zone scheme, however, 
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ninety per cent of the companies involved have simply moved 
"from areas immediately outside the zones (British Economic 
Survey 1984). Studies of Enterprise Zones consistently 
suggest that'job. generation within the area is at the 
expense of plant closure. -and 
job loss outside the Zone 
--(Anderson 1983, Butler 1984). Further, regulations are 
imprecise about. the type . of. enterprise to receive 
assistance. Retailing. warehousing and offices gain the 
most from Enterprise Zone location. Manufacturing, -and'. 
especially small firms have the least to gain (Sunday Times 
5.7.81, ¢ Anderson. 1983). This has given rise to a second 
criticism of the developmental. approach, that is, 
concessions by the local authority or in the Enterprise Zone- 
do not guarantee control over job quantity or quality (Loney 
1979, Cochrane 1983). Further. they appear to discriminate" 
against manufacturing industry. 
Third, in a study by Boddy and Barratt (1980)"it was found 
that. demand for land was primarily. influenced by location. 
An effect of this is the reinforcement of regional and local 
inequalities. Industry is more likely to be attracted to 
areas` in. pleasant locations rather than where the need may 
be greater like the inner cities. This is an argument 
suggested by research on Science Parks by The Technology 
Policy-Group at The Open University. The image of 
high-technology in pleasant rural surroundings, as in' 
Cambridge for example, can act as a greater Incentive-to 
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firm-location than the image of high-technology in the midst 
of inner-city decline (Elliott et al 1984). 
The provision of financial assistance to enterprises has-had 
--a-Mixed reception. Local-authority-: initiatives which 
reflect central government activity in the Enterprise Zones 
,. and -Urban Development, Corporations with concessions to 
relocating firms have tended to attract-little controversy. 
although the effectiveness of the strategy has-been 
questionned in terms of value for money (Shutt 1984). The 
most common form of financial assistance has been the use of 
loans and grants. to help private developers construct 
industrial. "estates and other land and premises, schemes. 
Since 1982-some local authorities, largely in the 
--metropolitan areas, have become involved in equity 
investment and grants to firms and. co-operatives., This-form 
of policy has incurred criticism in, two areas. --First, -the 
political selectivity of interventions, for example, the GLC 
commitment to restructure the London economy 'in-the - 
interests of labour. not capital' (GLC 1985). Second, the -, 
financial risk involved in intervention. Criticisms of this 
nature have-centred around alleged-failurearrather than-. -. 
successes, -for example, the headline 'Squandered, 
Millions.... ' in the. Evening Standard refers-to aný- 
investigation-by the newspaper into. businessýdeals made-by 
the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB) which alleges , 
Costa to-the.. rate-payers-of. between seven-and-&. half and 
fifteen million (Evenins Standard 18.10.85).; 
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The aims-of the developmental approach to foster private 
development and secure economic-growth may"result. in-job 
redistribution rather than job creation and give-local 
authorities little control over planning and development--or 
job quality or quantity. In the final analysis, -the 
approach does-not guarantee-economic regeneration. or. -a- 
reduction of"the numbers of unemployed within the local 
area. Although the major problem in many areas-is, 
unemployment and job lose, the connection between funding 
for economic development-in the'form of provision of land 
and-premises and the extent to which this leads to the 
achievement of objectives; jobs for those in need in the . 
area is not made. In relation to the Enterprise Zone 
experiment. Shutt (1984) argues that the problem of benefits 
--to the--local population-is exacerbated by the weakened 
planning system which reduces the extent -to--which-public 
--participation takes"place in local economic--and social 
planning. -The concern with direct employment, benefits have 
led a number of authorities, usually the-more-radical, to 
move toward policies aimed at addressing the- distributional 
-implications of economic change through programmes designed 
for employment rather than growth ends. ', Thus a new emphasis 
is on policies' directed at improving access to employment, 
improving work conditions and providing support for'- 
-unemployed-people and. disadvantaged groups. -These radical 
initiatives are discussed -in -the-next' section... 
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3.5 THE RADICAL LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
The"1981 local. government elections saw the left-wing- 
radical councils. such as the Greater London Council. (GLC). 
Sheffield City Council and the West Midlands County Council. 
lain power-in an atmosphere of optimism-about the socialist 
", potential: of. -the-local authority. The radical economic 
strategies formulated by these councils were seen"as"a 
vehicle for the mobilisation of support for alternatives to 
the economic policies of the Conservative-Government. 
Michael-Ward, the Chairman of the GLC'S Industry and 
Employment committee. wrote: 
'... the Government is committed to-the-free, play oY, market 
forces as the dominant principle of social. organisation. 
Each successful Greater London Enterprise Board 
Project ..... is a demonstration that there can be-an 
alternative'. (M. Ward 1983 p. 16). 
The radical local authorities were concerned to demonstrate 
the importance of-public sector institutions and 
organisations-to the economy with the pursuance of 
-. -firm-oriented-and"employment-oriented economic development 
policies. - 
A brief. description, of the-policies of. the three-local 
-, authorities mentioned. above illustrates the radical 
approach. An approach-, that-has been termed 'Restructuring 
for Labour' bywsome observers (Duncan and Goodwin 1986). and 
refers to economic initiatives which emphasise the - 
importance or local community and workplace involvement in 
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economic planning and development. The notionýof 
-alternative plans, socially-useful products and production 
for social need were important components of the economic 
strategies developed by these councils. 
3.6 THE-GREATER LONDON COUNCIL. 
The title-of the 1981 Labour Party. Manifesto with which 
Labour-took control of the"GLC was '"A Socialist Policy for 
the ©LC'. - The slogan 'Jobs For A-Change' was given to the 
approach. - Its ""aims were: 
1. to bring wasted assets --human. potential. -. lands finance., 
--technoloaical"'expertise and resources -. into-production for 
socially-useful. ends. -- 
2. to-extend. social . control of investment through social- and 
ýco-operative ownership and increase trade union powers. 
3. to develop new, techniques which increase productivity 
while keepini human judgement and skills in control. 
(Editorial-Collective 1982 p. 125). 
On"takint-office, -the-new Labour-Group created an-Industry 
and -Employment , Committee -and an Economic Policy Group , (EPG)- w" 
-to assist the Committee-in the-formulation-of the London 
Industrial-Strategy (GLC 1985). The London-Industrial 
Strategy comprised-a series of detailed"sectoral reports on 
Particular-industrial, commercial and service sectors of the 
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London economy. The reports built on the knowledge of union 
and user groups, tenants associations, community groups and.. 
other interested-parties. It was envisaged that the 
information would act as a base for an interventionist 
economic strategy designed to save and create Jobs in 
London. 
A second organisational innovation was the establishment-of 
the Greater London Enterprise Board (BLEB); -a form of public 
sector investment. agency, as the main vehicle for the 
implementation of the strategy. The GLEB"s-major functions 
included= investment to provide. strategic. or""structural- 
change to include municipal and public enterprise and 
industrial co-operatives, general-investment in start-up,. -" 
enterprises,. enterprises at risk of closure and enterprises 
operating in areas of high unemployment. Included in the 
brief was the development of factory sites (Soddy 1984). 
The similarity of these initiatives. to the Labour Party 
Programme of 1974 is discussed in Chapter. Five. 
A Co-operative Enterprise Board was also--established with 
the specific task of encouragement and assistance to new 
Producer co-operatives. The Greater London Training-Board.. 
was involved. in"advice on employment planning and labour 
market problems and in the development of-training schemes 
in-relation to labour's needs and the London Industrial 
Strategy. 
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Popular planning formed the base of the GLC approach. That 
is, the active Involvement-of community and workplace groups 
in local economic development (GLC 1983). This involvement 
-took the form of workplace and local community plans (for a 
discussion of. the Docklands Plan see Mackintosh and 
Wainwright 1987) that could offer proposals for 
'socially-useful' products and services. It was envisaged 
that these plans would begin to form the base from which 
wasted resources; unemployed workers. empty factories and 
unused-machinery, could be re-introduced into the local 
economy... Linked to this was an attempt to. involve people in, 
the product-design/development. and innovation process. A 
number-of 'technology networks. '. (GLEB 1982)" were 
established to facilitate this social organisation of the 
innovation-process. "and-"to promote links-between-the.. 
, expertise in', -local'Folytechnics and trade union and 
community groups developing plans for. aocially-useful, -" 
Products-and-employment. For, example, exploration of the 
possibilities for linking employment strategies-to public 
sector heating needs was the basis of a ! Jobs. From Warmth' 
plan. 
Among the stream-of initiatives adopted. by. the GLC. to. - "- 
promote economic regenerations bottom up popular planning, 
enterprise planning, industrial democracy,. - 
co-operatives, -socially-useful-products and services, and technology 
networks. ""this thesis focuses on the. initiatives relating to 
the technology networks. The case-studies are presented in 
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Chapter Six, and in addition some comparative reference is 
made to the stratecies for technology developed by Sheffield 
City Council and the West Midlands County Council. 
3.7 SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL. 
In May 1981 the Labour-controlled Sheffield City-Council 
" -established a new Employment Committee and-Department. The 
objectives were-summarised in 'An-Initial outline' document 
published by the Department. The stated aims were: 
'to co-ordinate everything-that the City-Council can do-to 
help: 
1. prevent further job loss in the city. 
2. to alleviate the worst effects of-unemployment and to 
encourage effective training for new skills and"-jobs; 
3. to stimulate new investment, 'to create new kinds of 
_employment, "and 
to diversify Job opportunities-in the city, 
A. -to explore new forms of industrial democracy and - 
co-operative-control over work. ' (City of Sheffield 
- Employment Department 1982 p. 2). 
Like-the GLC, Sheffield Council sought to develop, a directly 
interventionist role in-the local economy. The-Employment 
Department, stiffed by poli. tically. -committed -people from,., -- 
""-outside the traditional local. covernment professions. -began 
work in 1982"with a"budget of two-and a-half million. "Eight". 
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project"teams. were established to work on the following 
areas; ... -. 
Research and Resource Team - to develop an"early. warnin&--. 
system"for"chances"in the local economy, and to help prevent 
the lose of. future jobs, through the development of 
-alternative-employment plans for. key firms, industries and 
sectors. In dialogue with those who, work In them-and those-, 
who-use their products or services. 
Equal-Opportunities (Women and Employment)----to investigate 
the employment situation and needs of women and-to develop 
Job-creation and (re) training proposals for positive action 
both-, inside and outside the local authority. 
Training-for Employment --to work with other-agencies-to 
develop a"training policy and plan for key sectors of 
employment-in the city; identifying specific future skill 
requirements within the local-economy; promoting tailor-made 
(re) training programmes=. and co-ordinating"a critical- 
-response to. the-Manpower Services"Commission"make-work 
schemes. - 
New -Technology- and- Product- Development. - to. monitor the- 
impact of. =new technologies upon-existing-employment= to 
- identify and generate opportunities for diversification into 
-new, human-centred technologies, skills and jobs. 
-Aids-to Enterprises - to offer financial-assistance,.. 
ispecialist"advice and premises to support-existing-and-new 
-firms, -. workers' co-operatives. and job creation--projects 
willing to negotiate. a planning and economic agreement with 
the City Council. 
. 
Economic Development. - to investigate the opportunities-for 
directing large-scale Investment-in-the local economy. 
through-co-financing arrangements with institutions. (eg. 
banks, pension funds) and the best organisational 
" ", . 
arrangements.. for managing such investments. . 
(eg.. . local. 
-enterprise boards). 
Municipal Enterprise - to explore opportunities for"the -" 
-local-authority. -to generate 
jobs by an expansion of-its own 
role as-a"local investor. trader-and provider"of"-services. 
-. -Industrial-Development. - to-promote Sheffield"industries"and 
Products nationally and internationally,.. Dp"organisinf& local 
Participation in. trade-fairs, -toiether with-marketing-advice 
and - assistance;. -and . to attract new-. 
firma and news investment . -. . 
to-Sheffield. " (Reprinted in 
'Struggles -in --the . Welfare 
state ', "Critical Social Policy. Sprins"1984). 
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The. -Department encouraged the development and modification 
of policies by discussions with people involved"in"the 
women's and labour movements. From 1982, increasing 
emphasis was given to public sector employment, initiatives. "" 
""In"'Strategies, for the Employment Department 1983/4' (City 
of" Sheffield. 1983) support was.. given for " campaigns against "" 
-expenditure cuts"and. privatisation, and other projects_ 
relating-to. local authority employment initiatives. 
Sheffield City Council developed a two-pronged approach to 
technology. On the one hand. the Sheffield. Centre for- 
-Product-Development and Technological Resources (SCEPTRE) 
was established jointly by the Employment. Department and the- 
City Polytechnic In-1983. The aim was to support 
enterprises. and co-operatives. in the development of 
socially-useful. -products, "processes and services. A central 
feature of the product development process was. -a-close- 
relationship between producers and users. 
SCEPTRE offers specialist advice in engineering, metallurgy. 
marketing and business development and, in-some cases, with 
finance and premises. Since its formation it. has; 
- Established. a bank of product, service and process ideas. 
- Developed some produc. t. propoeals". to the prototype state. 
- Assisted in prototype to full. production activity. 
- Provided. & general technical service . for approved . "" 
projects. (Sheffield-in the 80's 1985 p16). 
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On the other hand, Sheffield City Council were keen to 
encourage the introduction of more conventional new 
technology. In the same report; 'Sheffield in the 80's', it 
was stated that: 
'In co-operation with the Department of Trade and Industry, 
South Yorkshire County Council and the City Polytechnic, the 
City Council has-helped to establish the Micro-Systems 
Centre"in. Sheffield to give advice on the. introduction of 
new technology-to private firms and co-operatives, and has 
supported other initiatives which ensure new technology is 
used"to-enhance. employment and benefit industry'. 
A. further initiative was a land development scheme adjacent 
to the University and Polytechnic for a Technology Campus. 
It is. envisaged that this would provide a focus for 
industries using new technology. In a. Preaentation. Summary 
to Sheffield City Council in September 1985 the objectives 
of the-Technology Campus-were described:. - 
'The central objective'of the Technology Campus is to =. 
provide the right environment, resources, and location for- 
the-development of new technology industries. It is, 
intended-to encourage new industries and provide new 
-. employment, making research resources available and 
assisting an interchange of ideas. and joint use of 
facilities. 
The aim-is-to foster a wide variety of research-based- 
industries using new-and existing technologies, particularly 
in electronics. computing. materials and-biotechnology. 
It is envisaged that the Campus will-include'flexible 
workspace, a business development centre, product 
development workshops, high quality business units-and 
accommodation for technology- based industry. -(Ibid. 1985 
p2) 
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Sheffield-City Council had a commitment to innovation and 
- -the-"development of socially useful products. In addition it 
was keen to support the adoption and diffusion of new 
, technologies (eg. IT). The possibility of changing the 
direction-of technological advance through the development- 
of-socially-useful-products was set against the realities of 
economic-decline-and the view that the private sector uptake- 
.. of-new"technology is important to the local economy. This 
-dual approach is also evident in the policies of West - 
', Midlands-County"Council and is an"area. that will be 
discussed- in -relation to the policies of the -GLEE -in the--, -. 
case-study. ` 
3. '8'-WEST-MIDLANDS COUNTY COUNCIL. 
The West-Midlands County Council (WMCC), created the'West 
Midlands-Enterprise Board `(WMEB)" in "1982 with a "budaet -of- -"" 
-three -and ' a- half -million. - " The main objective was investment 
in medium-sized--companies with -a potential for-long-term 
Zrowth"-and employment creation. The concentration on 
indicenous"manufacturine enterprises of a medium-size'was 
based on results from past experience which indicated'that 
assistance-to both small and multiplant firms was poor value 
for<money, (Young 1986). The lon storm nature-of an 
investment strategy by the WMEB was emphasised as central"to. 
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policies aimed at economic growth. An attitude voiced by 
Richard Minns; a key figure in the West Midland-Enterprise 
Board `". (WMEB) s 
'... the positive commitment of the investor to-the, 
productive-process rather than an interest-in short-term 
money management. Through planning agreements. involvement. 
of unions and organisations like the. "shop stewards' 
movements"(with their ideas -for retrainig and-building. on 
workers' engineering and production skills), the-investments- 
would be part of a new approach to the. planning-of. 
production -with -finance- firmly -linked to along-term-view 'of 
--the productive process' (Minna-1982 p96). - 
The WMEB was-established as an independent company with 
Directors appointed by, the Economic Development Committee". of 
l. " the-West.. Midland County. Council. It was financed under 
Section 137 of the. Local. Government Act of"1972 which made 
provision for a two pence rate to be spent in the interests 
of the- community. - It was . envisaged that pension-fund. . 
finance,. -including the local authority pension fund, would- 
provide-additional funding. The WMEB functioned alongside.. 
an Economic Development Unit. It was responsible-for 
industrial. strategy. (it was intended to base investment. on, 
sector analyses)-. and monitoring, as well as income 
maintenance... trainint, Council purchasing. policy... 
--co-operatives and other economic initiatives which relate to 
income support and redistribution (WMCC 1984). " Although. 
- the main focus of the policy was on medium-sized firms. 
support for co-operatives was seen as. an important. -factor, 
-- Particularly. if related to. unemployed workers.. attempting to 
develop products and .. retain skills. 
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The-WMEB_. exhibited some commitment to the development of 
alternative technologies by their support for-the Unit. for- 
the . Development of Alternative Products (UDAP) based at 
Lanchester Polytechnic in Coventry. UDAP was established in 
1981-to fill. -the need. for engineering and technical 
assistance-on some . of . the product proposals. -which""emerged .. 
Prom"the"Lucas"Plan (Wainwright. and Elliott 1983).. The 
support for. UDAP by the WMEB. was particularly-aimed"at the 
encouragement of co-operative enterprises;. UDAP provided ass 
istance"to"co-operatives and small enterprises wishing. to--" 
develop-alternative products. 
In the-main-the technology policy developed-by. -the WMEB-was-" 
closely linked to its industrial policy. It emphasised the 
deployment and. use-of existing technologies rather than the. 
design/development of new products. The WMEB's industrial 
policy focused on the regeneration of mature-industries. A 
. major role for technology initiatives was. to make both 
workers and enterprises more aware of the potential-benefits 
" of new technology. - -To"this end a 
Technology Transfer Centre 
", was-set-up jointly-with-Aston University, and-an Advanced-, 
"Manufacturina Demonstration Network became. operational in 
1986. In an overview article on. the West. Midland Approaches- 
, -to Technology Transfer. Liff (1985) defines technology 
tran. fer as 'a form of innovation which does. not require. "the 
firm-"applying. the- new technology-"to"-undertake original 
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research and development work' (Lift 1985 P5).. The main . 
objective of the Technology Transfer Centre was the 
dissemination of information relating to innovations - 
. relevant-to West Midland industries. 
Technology policy for the WMCC was aimed.. at-the diffusion. of. 
., new-technologies, but also there was an awareness of-the 
potentially adverse side-effects of its adoption; 
-de-skilling. and job loss. - The Council Training Programme 
acknowledged the possibility of. alternative applications of.. 
" technologies that could benefit both workers and employers. 
The Training Programmes. soiight to-break down sexual and 
,. --racial skill divisions, provide training 
in-new 
technologies, and also to develop two new areas; -, 
- New-Technology Awareness which . gives workers"and 
communties the skills to evaluate proposals. for new 
" -technology and-develop alternatives; 
- New Technology Agreements; advice to trade -" unionists. on. "" 
-how-to negotiate. over issues concerning-new technology 
(Ibid. P8). 
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3.9' CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RELATIONS. 
The economic initiatives developed by local authorities have 
depended-on"the creative-exploitation-of their limited " 
powers. Economic-development is not a local authority 
activity backed by statutory powers.. For the radical 
Councils. local government provided the-base for experiments 
in 
. popular<. democratic planning and development. The.... 
policies-were-designed to present a practical example or-an 
alternative 'to Thatcherist policies for-social, economic and"" 
Political change., This ideological and political role for. 
local government"was. seen by many as the prime reason for. - 
""-thelflurry.. of. legislative"measures imposed on local 
authorities by the-Conservative Government during-; the 
1980'x. Whilst this view may be overstating the 
significance-of-these alternative policies, certainly-their 
=" implementation.. has been severely limited by-changes in 
-legislation. - 
A major concern for the Conservative"Government, since.,, they 
took office in. 1979 has. been-the control of public 
expenditure. =Exemplified by efforts. to . 
! roll . back the-, 
-""frontiers-of, the-state' with the privatisation of government 
services-and nationalised industries., Attempts to-control-, 
-"local"authority. spendint-have resulted-in-two"major pieces 
of legislatlont rate-capping and the abolition of the 
"y- -higher-tier. "authorities in London-and the metropolitan - 
areas. 
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Local expenditure controls and the search by the 
Conservative Government to restrict the size-or-the public 
sector through privatisation fuelled political debate over 
the erosion of local democracy. Cochrane (1985)- summarises 
the criticisms of the Government's approach to. the problem 
of-local government. They tend to take three forms. First. " 
-the stated"aims. of the government of reducing spendingo 
increasing efficiency and removing an unreasonable burden- 
from non-domestic,. ratepayers have been-challenged-in-their 
, -own terms.. -Second, the legislation has been seen as an 
overt""attack--on Labour-controlled-authorities who are- 
concerned to block-the government's attempts to-restructure 
the welfare state, particularly in the areas-of--housing. -- 
-education and social services administered at the local 
level. Third, criticisms revolve around the erosion-of 
local autonomy and local democracy, seen as the right of 
local-people to choose their own levels and forms-of service 
provision. This-point"was"-reinforced by Kirby (1980) who 
noted- that- -the. 'right to buy' for council tenantsv introduced 
--in-the-1980-Housing Act-removed council-discretion over 
-housing stock"sales. -In addition. the establishment--of "- 
-Enterprise Zones and-Urban Development"Corporations has 
-" verruled-. local democratic control over local-matters in the.. 
local. -area (Shutt 1984). 
The - economic -policies of the radical-councils need-to-be - 
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seen against"a background of increasing change and tension 
between-the centre. and the . locality... A tension. that- ia: " 
illustrated"by the". increasing willingness of both. -parties to 
resort to litigation to solve their differences.. The-1980's 
-have-been witness to the ruling against the GLC's cheap fare 
policy"by the House of Lords judgement. anew Transport-Act. - 
.. Which imposes limits on subsidies to public transport in 
urban areas, "Norwich"-City Council forced to comply by the 
courts With-the 1980 Housing Act and sell their council 
housing stock, and Lothian Regional Council forced to agree 
ýto"the Secretary of State's demands for expenditure cutsin 
the face-of the threatened appointment of"commissioners to 
take over the. elected council. (Boddy-. and Fudge 1984). 
However, it is the, more fundamental -financial -changes which - 
have severely limited the autonomy of local councils. The 
Local Government. Planning and Act of 1980 introduced"a 
" system""of'financial-control in England and-Wales which 
included"central_government decisions-on spending targets- 
for local. -authorities. Penalties were-Introduced on- 
" individual local councils if their spending was not.. 
contained.. This piece of legislation was followed by the 
Local, Government. Finance Act 1982 which &ave-. the -government: ". 
control. over- both local-. expenditure and. 'local". -inconºe. " This 
was achieved. by the abolition of the right . of" "the. -local "" 
"-, authority-. to, levy'. a supplementary-rate to compensate for the 
short-fall -"in " government . grant. - 
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-With-, the. Conservative Government victory in. June. 1983-- more 
plans-=were presented. Rate-capping-was introduced with the, - 
""1984 -Rates, Act. It-Included measures to fix council 
spending"levels. and the amount-to which, they could raise 
"through.. the rates. These-rate-capping plans-were directed 
at the high-spending-councils-(usually. Labour-controlled). 
Plans also-included the removal or the control or-London 
Transport. from the GLC.. and the subsequent.. abolition of-the 
"-metropolitan. -authorities (Greater Manchester, Merseyside, 
South Yorkshire. West Yorkshire, West Midlands and. -Tyne and- 
Wear) and-the, GLC itself (Guardian 27.6.83). 
This conflict between central and local. government"in not. -a""- 
" <new . phenomenon, , 
the , 
issues of, poor relief,. and payment for 
public-works-were redistributive policies which led to 
." "political . battles _. 
in the 1920's. -Poplar is a--famous example 
of the"way,. that local interpretations of, need.., on:. occasion. " 
conflict""with , those laid . down- 
by. central government. In 
this instance. Labour majorities controlled both the Borough 
Council"and the Board of Guardians who administered the Poor 
Law. Conflict over levels of poor relief between. the . 
government and the Poplar Guardiana;. who insisted on-paying 
higher.. rates. of assistance,. -led to an-. Order. issued. -by. -the... _" 
Minister. oP. Health. of . 1422 prohibiting . excess payments, -and 
imposing. surcharges,. on.. the. Guardians who exceeded. these 
.. -limits. However, -the. payments continued. and no attempt was 
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made-to apply the Order or to collect the surcharge. The- 
-abolition of the. Poor Law in 1929 led to-the replacement of 
all Boards of Guardians. by local authority. public"assistance.. 
-,, committees. and a number of localities followed the- example 
set by Poplar (see Maclntyre 1980). The-effect of this 
--rebellion, and. -the and. -the resulting outright confrontation, between 
the Government and Labour-controlled. Rotherham"and Durham- 
-County Council was the. supersession of their-. local-public . 
assistance committees by.. government commissioners.... - In _1934.... 
-- legislation . was passed which -transferred the issue - of . 
unemployment relief out of. local politics to anew ." 
Unemployment Assistance Board (Gyford 1985)-- 
-A more recent example was Clay Cross- in. the. -early "1970"s. .. 
The local population supported . Councillors'. refusals 
to 
Implement, central-government housing policy. This resulted " 
"in"-the-legal. dismissal or local Councillors and the 
appointment of & . central government. Commissioner -"to--run .., "., 
council"housine. in. their place. The attempts by, 
Labour-controlled councils to-resist the rate-cappins-". 
. -legislation of-the present government, is"-another-example. 
In the Rates White Paper which preceded-the 1984 bill, two - 
-main-arguments were presented for cutting local-government 
spending; - tirst,.. it is only--bv cutting-. the levels of Public-. 
spending, and. thus holding down. -the tax. -burden, -that the 
economic-regeneration"of the-country could"be secured, and.. -. 
r 
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second, that rates had become an excessive burden on 
business costs., -erodine competitiveness and thereby 
destroying jobs. However, no, evidence was presented that,. 
cuts in-public expenditure have beneficial effects on 
economic performance (Jackman 1984). ""- 
Throughout 1984 the government faced a series of challenges 
to the Rates Bill and the plans for the-Abolition-Bill; a"" 
one-day tube-and bus strike -in London, a 'Day or Democracy' 
held-by the TUC, and the series of events in, Liverpool - 
leading-toward-the council passing a budget that-would-mean 
bankrupcyfor -the city. (Sunday Times 25.3.84). "-The Labour 
Party conference on, local government held in July 1984 
spawned the beginnings of the 'No-Rate campaign'. Delegates, 
agreed that they would refuse to comply with the 
Government's demands for cuts in jobs and services, and, - 
proposals were"put forward for united resistance tactics for 
all Labour councils to follow for, -the 1985 budget (Guardian 
7.7.84). The strategy"meant that-many Labour councils would 
refuse-to make-a legal budget, in the-spring, of 1985-unless 
"-" the--government relented over its- new arrangements to reduce. 
spending, 
The leaders-of-the sixteen Labour controlled councils which, 
were selected-for rate-capping control by-the Government 
agreed on a-policy-of total non-compliance. The GLC"" 
". resorted to-litilgation-and. -attempted to get-the. -Environment 
-Secretary= Mr Patrick Jenkins' rate-capping-policy-tested in- 
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" -the =courts. (Guardian 13-2.85). However, as the, time . to". make 
a rate grew closer rifts began to emerge among , the Labour-, -". 
Left. -For the lower-tier authorities failure to. make a rate 
left them with an opportunity to do so at a later--date>- 
-before the district auditor could step in to bring an action 
in the courts. The situation was different. for the - 
--"""higter-tier metropolitan authorities who had a legal 
obligation to make a rate by. March 10th.. If Councillors 
". , failed to do so they could. be . surcharged, -disqualified -from 
public office and-possibly bankrupted... -Faced-with this 
Merseyside -. and". South Yorkshire. proposed to . fix a legal rate 
and -embark on a" programme . of - covert -deficit. budgeting. "" -This--- 
left---the.. political.. pressure to support the no-rate option on 
the-GLC and. -the-Inner London Education Authority (ILEA). 
-After long-debate and rifts in"the GLC Labour group, the GLC 
fixed a rate below the-Government's legal. maximum - (Carvel" ". ". 
1985). 
.. One by. one the. lower-tier Labour. authoritles fixed-a 
rate and. avoided outright. confrontation. with -the- Government. -.. .. 
The Abolition. Bill . began. 
its . route through. the. -Commons early 
in, 1984, A major_victory- of the vigorous- campaign,, launched "" ." 
-by "then. aLC. was... the, defeat of. the paving bill that sought to 
abolish. -the - 1985 elections.. (Guardian 29.6.8u) .- Amendments- to' ": . 
-the Bill ensured. the. life of the authorities until their 
proposed abolition on April lot 1986, but new clauses,., 
-designed to-limit-the propaganda. campaign against the 
abolition. of--the -4LC. meant that ministerial approval was. --, 
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" "-required . belore.. signing new contracts for-engineering and 
-building works-worth more than '250.000-and<all. otherz- 
" schemes, -"including publicity campaigns, costing over 
'100,000 (Guardian 12.7-84). The bill paving--. the way for 
the abolition passed-its final hurdle. in the Lords in". "July 
1984, and the GLC. and the. metropolitan<authoritiea were ". 
abolished on April 1st"1986. 
These instances-point-to the constant, "possibility--of ,. ' 
-confrontation-. between. central and local government, tighter 
legislative measures usually follow as central-government 
--reasserts its control. Duncan and Goodwin (1985) argue that 
-the-current spate of- legislative measures by, central.. - 
government need to be. located'in this context. 
The -conflict between-central and local "¢overnment " has -""been .. 
'seen. by. some-. commentators as a conflict between political- 
democracy"andr'-economic'. democracy (Blunkett-. and. 3acksone 
1987). The attempts by-the Conservatives to redefine'-the 
boundaries, of local government with their. encouragement". for. ... 
. -the-market provision"of services is in effect -a more limited., 
" role for . local- government which -explicitly -rules , out" ,"". 
-redistributive policies at the local level (Bramley 1984). 
Thus the"conflicts. "are-technical/administrative"concerning - 
" the"most. "cost-affective means. of service provision. -and 
Political,. -concerning the. allocstion- of resources to " 
services"(BAUS"1983). '"Blunkett and dackson"(1987), argue 
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that the-ideological confrontation between-the-centre and. - 
. -the locality has . its . roots 
in -the. development of radical- 
economic-strategies that changed the political agenda and 
" , began-"to challenge-the Government's policies-in practice. 
Politics is about setting agendas for what should be done,,. -: 
-"and,. how it can-be achieved, the economic strategies of the 
- radical authorities began to challenge.. the "' commonsense'.,, -, 
economic-policies of the Conservative Government. 
The intuitive appeal-of these arguments is strengthened by.... 
." . -the , historical . examples of Poplar and Clay Cross and the 
legislative measures. which=followed these events. "The -" 
-reduction of local-government autonomy, the spate-of court 
cases,. and"the increasing financial, limitations on radical 
. 
initiatives all contributed to the decreasing room for 
manoeuvre for economic policy-initiatives.., Theabolition"of, " 
-the. GLC in 1986rmeant. that. the institutione. eatablished to 
implement -their economic strategy.. faced. severe financial ". 
-constraints.,. This needs to be borne in mind-in"any attempt 
to assess-or evaluate these. policy initiatives.. 
--Ata" the-time. of-writing. the OLC-and the. West Midland County. 
Couneil"have been-abolished.. Sheffield City. Council""-- 
-remains, "but,. In March _1988--the. Government-announced plans 
for an Urban Development Corporation"in"Sheffield which will 
--override., the powers -of . the local. authority. -in this 
dasianated 
. "-area. 
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3.10 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. 
The radical local authorities proposed an interventionist 
economic programme. - This chapter has illustrated the -"" 
-differences between the economic policies of the radical 
-local authorities, and the largely developmental approaches.. 
usually favoured as economic activities for local 
Government. However, this is not to imply-that, "radical`"" 
local. authorities did not also include developmental 
policiea"in-"their overall portfolios. Three effects of the 
radical - policy - initiatives - are'. immediately-apparent. First, 
-interventionist - policies represented -a creative- departure 
from developmental-local economic policies-and traditional 
assumptions about the role, of the-local authority-in this 
area. Radical initiatives led the way for other local 
authorities to investigate firm and-employment-oriented 
-policies. "- Second. - the- GLC changed -the -administrative base 
of local government by creating new`departments=and"- 
appointing politically sympathetic Officers working-more 
closely with-Councillors. Third. the 'There"is an 
Alternative' approach fuelled political debate-about the 
privatisation-of-local-servicesq the eirosion4of-local- 
1'-democracy: -. and i-the -economic.: policies -off the Conservative - 
Government.. -- -What the radical`-local -authorities -set- out- to 
achieve-was the-restructuring Of the local economy in the 
interests -of labour. The reason why was-&a-a. demonstration--, 
--Of a" socialist-alternative to Thatcherism. 
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The question. which emerges is. whether strategies were... 
primarily a political. exercise or the presentation". of". a real 
economic. alternative. The discussion"of the legislative and .. - 
financial. constraints on localauthority. powers concluded 
" "that-their . activities were limited. This is -particularly ;.. "" 
marked. in the national. economic context where intervention 
on a local scale faces severe problems; the. ownership. -and. 
" "controL, of": most . local 
industries lies. -outside -the locality, 
and often outside of. Britain , altogether.. Bennington. - 
(1985) - 
illustrates this. point . 
in the context of - Sheffield -where an 
average . of.. a -thousand jobs. lost per month "in the private... -. 
, -sector-was-compared to : the . best estimate - of " 
jobs directly. " 
created or sustained. by the. Employment Committee-as &- 
"thousand over-two years. : This statistic places attention on 
numbers. of -jobs (always. -an uncertain calculation) . 
but. in 
terms-of costs. the. measures_, taken-by. the, Enterprise-Boards 
compared favourably with the Government's. Enterprise"Zone. 
-experiment -with -costs per job-. of-. around five thousand pounds 
as against costs of around sixty-five thousand. per. job in. 
the-Enterprise Zones (Bennington 1985). 
If compared, to the, developmental approach . taken . -by-local""". 
-authorities then.. the radical. initiatives do- address. some of, 
the problems. -The-'jobs at any price!. attitude (Loney"1979) 
-was-clearly-addressed by the-use of . planning agreements " to 
influence the- number and quality ., of.. Jobs< created. "-"This. -" 
. -potential- for -change -and the achievement of--wider- policy 
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objectives= equal. opportunities.. increased.. industrial": 
-democracy and " so. on. depended, on . the. amount of. leverages that 
-the"localauthority could attach-to subsidies. - The 
--important-factor was their implementation. . Cochrane-(1983) 
draws-attention to-several. -points-of-difficulty; even though- 
---firms. -maw be in receipt of financial- assistance it-does not 
necessarily follow -that. they will uphold a commitment-to- 
-,, Planning agreements. (although there were efforts by, the BLEB 
" to" monitor agreements and gain the- active- support- of. -the 
trade unions concerned in the enterprise). For small firms, 
dependent on the market and-the policy decisions- of larger. 
, -companies,, -fulfilment of.. agreements maybe-restricted. In 
" subsidiary. companies.. local. planning agreements-may-not . hold- "" 
much sway against,, the national "and often international plans 
-: of the. parent- company.. - These- problems, again. --reflect- -the- "; 
: dilemma of economic intervention. -local authorities operate 
in a -locality whilst firms operate. -in a national-and- 
international context. 
The emphasls"in"radical economic strateiriea of support. for-- 
co-operatives. - was . slso an area likely to. -be. limited in its 
contribution -. to -economic reeneration. -since. co-operatives 
-race-. -the same problems " am, small -firms -trying -to: -compete in -a 
hostile economic climate.. -- 
Further, criticism, of- the radical- approach-has: -been, voiced . -bv- - 
-: -commentators who question the radical - nature""of these 
x' 8 
economic strategies., They argue that. the.. Enterprise.. Boards-",,, 
eatablIshed.. by-the. GLC and WMCC, whilst concerned to""achieve 
some. -long-term.. input into the decision-making. o! "" private -- 
=industry through equity. share-holding, are also-providing 
cheap capital to private. industry, and. in". this . way. reflect. - 
. the-more developmental forms of economic policy which 
subsidise-industry and commerce (Cochrane-1983", Boddy 1984). 
"These. arzuments muzzest that for any. initiative-a local 
authority-does. not have the resources to effectively.. 
intervene,. in. the local. economy. Rather their strength lies 
in -their-. role. as- employers, -purchasers. and " providers . of v. ", 
zoods.. (Roddy- "1984. Bennington: 1985) " The -creative - uae " of 
this role. and.. existing powers-enables an . authority. ý to ... 
fulfill many. of. -the points--put forward by the Royal-Town. 
Planning - Institute -Report. (see 3.2) in the- areas of -local -- 
"-,, employment, . planning, . monitoring " the". local " economy _and 
, facilitating the creation of investment-opportunities. -The 
local-authority is a major employer in the local area so 
that recruitment, positive discrimination and.. training:.,. 
"-Policies-can". "have -a-major effect on . the local-labour-market. 
., The-local authority's capital programme-represents. --"". 
--important investment resources for the local. area, providing 
business for-local firms... For example... Sheffi-eld! s .. capital. "» 
"-"". ýand revenue: spending.. of,, "eighty-four-. milIion -on construction. - 
" repairs, and -related building " activity. is.. estimated.. to-... 
- -account--tor over three-quarters Of all-" investment, and 
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employment in. the local construction-industry (Bennington 
-1985). 
Another important-area of influence for "the ,. local- authority. 
" is purchacing.. power. and its use to stimulate " the local - 
econoay... --The GLC had purchasing power-:, of. "a. -thousand, million .... 
-" pounds .a . year,. while . Sheffield. spends . approximately eighty 
million. pounds. - -Although the local authority 
is.. leZally_- 
, bound to purchase the cheapest products available, there are 
possibilities in. this area for the development of, locally 
--manufactured alternatives to those goods which are currently 
imported.,. Municipal . enterprise. and . the. -local . authority.. as.. ".. 
"produoer -has .a long. history. (Saunders 19811),. which still 
Includes-. -Direct-Labour Organisations..,. The . -potential, "for. the 
"developaent. ot"-. this function by the local authority-was 
" investleated""by the radical- initiatives, for. . example. ý- the. - 
" "" - GLC s campaign _for " ! Jobs .. From Childcare'. and .! Jobs . From 
Warsth! ". (GLC--1983). 
The--position- of -the.. local authority is a-prime. one". tor --the., 
identification of needs relating to service provision. This 
is particularly... tr-ue for those areas where collective. -, 
. "-Provision. "is-a. more. sensible. approach. or areas where there 
is insufficient consumer demand-for the private sector. -. -- 
:- . -development. of" - zoods. and .- services ... The. popular planning = 
approach.: of which ; the, technology. networks . played, a central...,. 
---, -role, promised. a.. means by which the local authority could- 
tto 
act. in: a,. catalytic way to link users. with unmet. needs, ".: r=. 
. "", unemployed,, workers"and redundant technical capacity. In ".. 
some. -cases there. was.. the possibility for the. local-.. authority 
to-provide -the -finance. the skill to develop the. product, and 
the purchasing. power. to. provide, a"stable market.... In"effect, 
an alternative economic strategy-that generates employment 
through public-sector led investment and purchasingýtoýmeet 
_needs for collective service provision. This-as a direct 
contrast to- -the_ private market mechanism. geared.. primarily:, to 
Individual. -consumption (Bennington 1985). 
The -QLC and Sheffield City. Council... took on board-these. - 
-ideas-on Isocl&lly-usefuL'.. Iproduction. vioneered by the-Lucas 
Plan. and-created the. facilties in the form of-the 
technology. networks in- London, and SCEPTRE in Sheffield. 
These-are discussed in Chapters Six. . While in. some+parts, of. "". .. 
-°ita=work. WMCC adopted a similar approach via'"UDAP, there-are. 
important -differences.. The WMCC policy -focused. -primarily on,, 
ldiffusion' (the provision of information on existing ideas) 
rather than-the-support for product. -design/development and 
innovation. 
Given the--limitations on-policy initiatives for local ". 
--authorities with on]. limited political and economic, -power. 
thers"are three main. ways that. the radical"initiatives"have 
I-, exerted an. inlluence: 
' 1" the -radical--economic initiatives have. -questionned -and---.. - 
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"--challenged-, the complex of.. political, legal and ideological 
-. 'assumptions and limitations over . what... local-. authorities-can.. . 
s .. and -should do. 
2. they have challenged interpretations. of . how, the " econosw".. -.. 
" works, -who it works for-,. and how -it . should work. - -Both "the "" 
Left and-the-Right of the political spectrum " are ' agreed " that 
. -... these--alternatives represent political. pilot""schemes-(Duncan 
'" and- Goodwin 1985). 
3. they. have challenged the notion of local_zovernment. and-. 
""--local, politics. as centred: aroud"service delivery. -rather a 
Process-or campaigning and political -. mobilisation-has been - 
"-advocated.... The effect of... building popular support . for 
alternative strategies, changing-. the. political. agenda,. and-, 
--. supporting the developent of. durable , initiatives- outside of- 
the local authority were seen as particularly important, for. 
example, the community and trade union resource centres and 
the technology networks were created as on-goinx .. 
, political/technological projects 
(Soddy 1984). 
Clearly, the"radical local-economic. strategies represented 
challenges to-the economic. policies of the Conservative 
-. government. ' The -expansion of the. role or local government- 
in local-. economic development-. hag not been actively 
x"supported"by central government-, -but-In. -the case. of. the 
. radical .. local . authorities. It has been ... actively-. discouraged. 
Rate-cappinc,. particularly. --puts economic-initiatives". at 
"-"riskr, in, an-atmosphere of scarce resources the local 
authority must meet - statutory duties first.. Closer,., 
examination . of . the radical.. 
initiatives. hixhlights the 
-difficulty of intervention and the"practical-. example-of an".. 
--alternative. .. Local authorities have little real . power -to 
influence-economic change directly. Their, position"as"-, 
aaents.. of. technological-change are limited for the same 
- reasons.: -. -That said, and mindful of 
the constraints--and 
" position -in-. the, national political context . -the-" case-study, ", 
162 
presented'. is of the. GLC's. radical. technologaº . policy. In the 
next chapter-on the methodology of the research. an 
assessment-or, evaluation of. the policy initiative.. -is ., 
.. discussed in-relation to these constraints. 
". 
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CHAPTER-FOUR: THE METHODOLOGY. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The central feature of a research project is-the methodology 
or the"selection. of research methods, be they participant 
observation, scientific experiment-or survey techniques.. 
-- -The -methodology acts as- the. link -between -theoretical -ideas. 
, and-research activity.. It provides -the -framework for the, -, 
-theoretical analysis of the research problem. This chapter 
seeks to explain and discuss how-the general questions of: 
this-research. -project led to the choice of a case-study 
research-design,. and the employment"of-a variety of-methods., 
"for-the data collection. 
The choice of data collection methods-has important- 
consequences for a' research project. '. For-example, the use 
of one - single'. method often cannot. villuminate. 
all: aspects-of 
""""the-reality, under' investigation. -. ! Multiple triangulation' 
is a strategy advocated by Denzin (1978.2nd-ed). It is- 
based on the combination-of several different-methods or 
techniques of". investigation on the same-unit of analysis. 
16ue 
"The.. aim of this type of. approach . is to. positively 
(affect the 
. validity- and reliability of research.. findings.. . The. argument.. 
underlying-the approach rests on-the belief that the choice 
of research . -methods is.. not. an . atheoretical, activity. The-"- 
" -study., of >-the . same= phenomena . using purely participant 
observation-techniques. or only. survey.. techniques would. "lead - 
to qualitatively-differing conclusions. -Denzin states; 
'I have repeatedly suggested"that. the. sociologist should. 
---examine-a. -Problem. from-as many different --methodological 
, "perspectives. as possible. My definition of each method has 
" -implied a, triangulated perspective.. Participant-observation 
was seen as combining survey interviewing, -document. 
analysis,. direct observation and. observer participation' 
(1978 p291). 
In this research prodect an attempt has been made-to be=- 
guided bv. this approach- An approach which has been-taken 
up by social researchers generally. 
"-4.2 RESEARCH. QUESTIONS. 
The research project began. in. October . 1982. The interest 
in 
-the-project-was as a continuation of-research on the 
development. of -socially-useful. products by-workers at 
Lucas. . -. 
. Aerospace... Research on the Lucas Plan-. (Wainwright and 
Elliott 1983) had been undertaken by members-of the. 
" Technology Policv. Group. at The. Open. IIniversity. Some of the 
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key personnel involved in the development and-research-, on:: 
"the.. Lucas " -Plan had -moved . to -the Greater London Council . "(GLC ) 
when the. Labour ., administration took. office. in" May, A981. 
--Theýmain: focus of_. the_research"was to-explore"how", the 
technology. -policy . 
issues arising from.. the -Lucas--Pla. n"" could " 
be -developed- in . the context . of a local authoritys the --GLC. 
The underlying theme may be illustrated ". by. a . general. and - 
rhetorical question. voiced. by a. leading-member of the-Lucas 
Shop 
. Stewards', Combine Committee: 
'... why, when we have the technology to build Concorde are 
people still dying of hypothermia? ' . (Cooley., 1985 p19). 
T- ., This question . relates to the allocation of resources to. " and 
the priorities. for, technological-development. -In addition. 
-it-highlights the general problem of why certain 
. technologies are developed-and others are not, even though 
-there. -may , be a". perceived social need for them. This 
theoretical and practical problem.. located. in the context of... 
" "a" local_. authorlty . led to the formulation- of the-two Seneral 
", research questions of -the study. 
First,.. why do certain innovations lead to-development and 
-commercial exploitation. why. others do. not.?. 
Second, how can a local. authority develop and. implement a 
technology policy that is based on social need? 
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" The-research project took the form of an exploratory study. 
The technology policy proposals formulated: and implemented,. 
by the. GLC represented a new departure for-a, local 
authority. given the absence of a. readily. available. body.. ". 
of-existing research into-the area-the testing of-tightly 
constructed hypotheses and operational . definitions". was- 
" . deemed . inappropriate. In. this sense _the research was 
concerned with. -theory-generation as-an on-going"activity 
.. during. fieldwork, rather"than theory testincs. "this is an 
approach that has been advocated by.. Glaser and-Strauss 
(1967). 
4.3--THE-CASE-STUDY-APPROACH. 
The_nature. of=the research project. benefited""from"a 
case-study approach. -The project was. of a- real-life . set of. 
-events,. unfolding-during the-period. of"the'research: 1982 - 
1986. It was a longitudinal study . in. which " particular. "-. 
reference=. was. made to'"the exploration of-the-factors 
affecting-policy implementation. For-an. "exploratory-study 
the attitude. of-seeking, rather than testing, -requires a 
flexible-framework which &llows., for-adaptation and-change as.. 
-the researcher. discovers more-about--the'case. -Inquiry is 
constantly in the process of reformulation-and-redirection,, 
as, -"guided. by the-features of-the'study, new-information is 
tGZ 
obtained or emerging hypotheses require new information 
(Selltiz 1976). 
There were several reasons why. the. case-study approach - 
offered an appropriate research design. First, a case-study 
provides-, a framework within which various. researeh methods. 
can be employed. In this way it is possible to anmass 
multiple sources of evidence using a range of research 
'techniques participant. observation. Interviewing and 
primary and secondary documentation. -. -Second. case-studies 
are usually preferable when the alms of the study focus on 
the understanding of the diffuse causes and"effects of 
change (Moore. 1987). The emphasis on change allows 
investigators to trace a complexity-of-developments-and to 
collect insights into processes operating over a period of 
time (Selltiz 1976). Third, the approach makes it possible 
to look in some'depth into a_particular issue. 
This research project required. an. approach that"could offer 
the-opportunity. to`observe and analyse, in some detail, an 
event of historical importance, namely,. local authority 
involvement in a radical technology policy. 
The selection of the 'technology networks' as units-of 
analysis within the case-study was based on their 
comparability. but as importantly. as representative-of a 
range of alternatives which enabled the idea of 
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socially-useful-product design/development. to be considered. 
bv,. how it. is treated in.. -, different circumstances. 
Fourth. as. an exploratory strategye case-atudies. -allow-. the.. 
flexibility to generate hypotheses even though-there-may not 
be a clear set-of, outcomes. from the-policy process (Yin 
1984). 
The criticisms that. are made. of. the. " case-study research---. - 
--design tend. to . Pall-. into two. main. areas. First, it is 
ar&ued that lack of rigour may. lead to bias of"findings-and 
" {. conclusions. =. Second, the ability . of.. the case-study to 
" provide-. a basis. -for scientific generalisation . 
is -questionned. .. 
(Yin 198I)... Case-studies rely on the ability of the* 
researcher to draw together many diverse-. bits of. information. 
into a unified and coherent interpretation of events, -thus 
it must--be conceded that there is a danger-that- conclusions. """" 
. -may.. reflect_the. researcher_'s. predispositions rather than the 
. object-of study. However. 
'. 
. even if this -criticism a 
is. " . 
"". appropriate. to many. case studies, it-may not be wholly 
undesirable. -, for research that in-aimed at generating. -rather 
than-. teotine.. --. hypotheses. .. In addition. " it " is a criticism 
that, can be aimed at almost any . form, -of research -endeavour. t 
With.. an. awareness. of the dangers"of bias, care can be taken 
by the researcher to amass multiple. sources of evidence 
using. differing research techniques, which may go some way 
to averting criticisms . of lack . of- rigour. 
In relation-to the 
t6ct 
-, " second. criticism, again case-studies do lack-the statistical 
validity of samples that have been properly selected. The 
extent-to which valid generalisations can-be made depends on 
the degree to. which the case, studies themselves are typical 
and the care used. in drawing conclusions (Moore 1987). 
However, -it is important to note that exploratory studies 
merely lead to. the presentation of insights or hypotheses; 
they do not test or demonstrate them. -The- selection of .a 
"casethat. has special features such as.. this. project has in 
relation to loeal. authority technology policy means that-by. 
-definition the chosen case-study 
is not typical. An- 
exploratory study needs to be seen as a-first step; more. 
carefully.. controlled studies are required to test whether 
the hypotheses that emerge have general applicability, 
(Selltiz 1976). The. case-study_is appropriate for trying to 
find-clues and ideas for further research,. although the 
findings may not provide a basis for scientific 
generalisation,, this does not preclude the. possibility of 
--relating. empirical evidence to. theoretical propositions and 
- thereby generating hypotheses . that. may--lead -to-the expansion. 
--"of. theory. in a. relevant area. This is the ultimate coal of 
this kind of research work (Selltiz-1976. Yin, 1984), - and the 
"" aim of--, this research project. 
i 
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4.4 FIELDWORK. 
The fieldwork on the project fell into two separate stages. 
First. -from January to June 1983, a pilot study using 
participant observation techniques. During this period the 
aim was to learn more--about the policies being developed by 
the GLC. and thereby gain an overview-of-. their general - 
approach. This period -provided the opportunity to 
formulate the research questions which formed the base of an. 
interview schedule undertaken largely during-the period 
- November 1984 to March 1985. Throughout the. -project, 
extensive secondary source material was collected and 
-meetings of groups relevant to the-research-were-attended... 
This". consisted of attending the. Popular Planning Forum, and 
meetings. arranged as part-of the . lobs . From . Warmth-campaign. 
The-methods used in the initial-pilot study"phase of the 
project are discussed first. 
On", taking. office in 1981, the Labour-administration set 
about the establishment-of an Economic-Policy-Group (EPa) 
and -& Popular- Planning "Unit . "(PPU) -"at County Hall and, at -a 
-" later -stage the Greater London Enterprise -Board " (BLEB) " at- - 
the Elephant. and -. Castle. 
Initially, -the focus " for the- 
fieldwork was the PPU. This Unit was-concerned"to-publicise. 
the GLC's economic strate&y and to, encourage forms-of 
Participation in-the-policy development: process.. -. 
Participation was articulated as an important element of the 
t-tI 
proposed GLC technology policy.. Participant observation 
techniques were used to build a picture of events at the 
PPU.. 
Gold (1958) distinguishes four degrees of involvement for 
observation methods: the-complete participant, the 
participant as-observer, the observer as participant and the 
-complete observer. The complete. participant role is covert 
within a group or organisation and the intentions of the 
researcher are not revealed. Adoption of this role would 
have meant. joining. the-PPU as"a full-time employee which was 
not appropriate. Instead, an attempt was made to join the 
Unit in a 'participant as observer' role. In this case the 
researcher makes their presence known. The objective is to 
form -a`series. of relationships with the members-of the group. 
-relevant to the research project. Nachimas and Nachimas 
(1976) note the potential problems of. this role: 
'A%participant-as observer confronts three major problems - 
establishint_relationships"with"members. of""the croup, 
finding sourceful and reliable informants and maintaining 
the observer-observed"relationship'(p 93). 
-" In""the-PPU all of. these problems were- experienced. 
The first problem was negotiation of access. Contact had 
been. made with-one of the Unit". s. -members but this person was 
not present at the first meeting with. other members of the 
group. -Permission was requested to work voluntarily at the 
Unit for two days a week in order-to gather information 
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about. their. activittes and objectives in relation to the 
encouragement of local participation. in the GLC"s economic 
policy. development. At this meeting the group members 
present were resistant to this suggestion on the-grounds 
that they already had placement students, they were unsure 
of the value of my potential contribution, and they were 
-uncertain as to. my political sympathies regarding the work 
that they were doing. The decision was made to discuss the 
matter when all of the groups members were present. Another 
meeting was arranged, the outcome. of which was that access 
was agreed, albeit reluctantly. In January 1983 I began to 
work voluntarily at the Unit for two'days"a week doing 
routine clerical and administrative tasks. However, the 
difficulties of acceptance were a constant problem. The 
pressure of work in the Unit was high and most members 
worked long hours and had little time for discussion, this 
made. the-establixhment of key relationships difficult. 
Confidentiality was another-area in which-problems-were 
encountered. Although it had. been discussed-. and agreed in 
principle at. the outset of my. involvement at-the--Unit,, in ". 
-practice this worked rather differently. I had access to 
all- written material emerging from the- Unit and -attended. . 
some general policy strategy meetings. but. some group 
members remained uneasy about this. Confidentiality was an 
individual prerogative and some group members found it 
difficult to talk openly or freely with 'outsiders' present. 
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This-problem was due to the political sensitivity of the 
work of the Unit and the hostile media coveraze of the GLC'S 
activities at that time. 
I worked at the Unit for approximately six months. 
Increasingly my time was taken up with the ever-growing 
"--administrative tasks (I became responsible for the mailing 
list). As a consequence of this the maintenance of a role 
.. -as-a. researcher-became a problem. The . tendency was to 
disappear into the structure of_the. organisations with 
little time for systematic data collection. -During the time 
at the Unit the data gathered was largely. background--" 
-material on-the GLC's policy initiatives. I kept a"research 
diary anda notebook to jot down discussions of policy 
strategy in the Unit, and to monitor the types of 
educational and publicity strategies used to encourage 
-participation in the Council's initiatives. The findings 
from this period-of research are presented in Chapter"Five. 
4'. 5, FIELDWORK AT THE GREATER LONDON-ENTERPRISE-BOARD. 
Aware of the difficulties that I may encounter with a. 
Participant observation approach, I subsequently began-a 
Period of fieldwork at the Greater London Enterprise Board 
t1+ 
" --(KLEB) from October 1983 to February 1984. A degree of 
access was negotiated for a presence of one day a week in 
the Technology Division at the GLEB. The atmosphere in the 
Technology Division at that time was largely defensive; the 
, organisation-was a recent innovation by the GLC and there 
was a period of finding it's feet. The BLEB had been . 
established-as an independent organisation charged with the 
implementation of the GLC"s economic policy in July. 1982. 
As . an-. agency that provided financial aid and advice to 
businesses in the London area it was inundated with-requests 
-for-assistance. There was a reluctance to allow -me open 
-- access to files, particularly. those containing material of a- 
-"--commercially or politically sensitive-nature. The 
iy 
uncertainty of the staff in. the Division to their role and 
the role of the organisation as a whole in this early stage 
of its history also acted as a barrier to the collection of 
information. Thus this period was used to amass documentary 
evidence (minutes of meetings and so on) of the Technology 
Division's activities, particularly. around the establishment 
of a. series of 'Technology-Networks'. These-networks became 
the focus-of the research and are described in Chapter Six. 
The data. collected during this period--of fieldwork was. - 
-largely descriptive: it related to the background of the 
GLC's overall policy initiatives and-more specifically to- 
their. technology policy. The data gathered was not for the 
purposes of proof of a. hypothesis. Rather-it was an. 
% --I .v 
exploratory exercise to Sather the information necessary to 
the construction of questions for an"interview schedule. - 
The nature of the data collected up to this time was 
published material by the GLC and the BLEB, Council minutes 
and minutes of meetings. 
Organisational bias and selectivity of reportage are 
acknowledged as factors that act to diminish the validity of 
collected data. There was an attempt to check information 
by informal conversations with the people at the PPU and in 
the Technology Division at the BLEB. Where possible, checks 
were made using secondary sources in the form oP articles 
about the GLC initiatives which-appeared in academic 
Journals and newspapers. Regarding the newspaper items, the 
Political bias of the reportage was taken into account by 
noting the structure of the articles and their sympathetic 
or unsympathetic response to the GLC's approach. In certain 
newspapers the bias was consistent over a period of time. 
4.6 FRAMEWORK FOR RESEARCH DESIGN. 
The next stage of the research process, . the period March to 
--September 1984, was to focus the study into-a manageable 
project. This period was used to formulate the questions to 
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,.,. be asked in the interview schedule, to"identify the relevant 
units-of analysis and the-form of data analysis that--would 
be appropriate for the case-study. The fieldwork completed 
showed that the key units of the technology policy 
formulated by. the GLC and in the Technology Division at the 
BLEB-were the Technology Networks. Five Technology Networks 
--were established to promote the design-and-development of 
socially-useful products. A central feature"of the 
technology network strategy was the encouragement of 
participation from community, trade union and user groups in 
" -the selection, design and development of products. The 
Technology-Networks were chosen as the units of analysis of 
. the study. The-identification of the Networks as the focal 
points of the study was followed by a period of literature 
search to see-how this could aid the research structure. 
The research question that emerged was how could a local- 
-authority 
generate a technology policy based on social need. 
The research aim was to link the theoretical problem of why 
certain technologies are developed and. others are not with a 
possible explanation based on the research findings of the- 
--study... The research findings would then generate-further 
hypotheses for further research. 
, The literature review showed that-the methodological base of 
innovation studies tended to comprise technical and 
-organisational. factors as relevant units of--analysis. for 
I-1-1 
example,. R&D capacity. -size. of. firm,. V management strategies, 
-marketing techniques and so on (see Freeman 1982).. The 
'success' or 'failure', of an innovation was-based-on; 
commercial criteria, such as-market share and profitability. 
The innovation studies perspective. allows the selection of 
-both 'successful', and 'unsuccessful'--. product innovations as 
aids to explanation of product development, adoption and. 
diffusion. However, it was not possible to use this 
framework for the GLEB technology initiative. To follow 
-through the success or otherwise-of a particular product or 
project was problematic because the extent of. "product, 
innovation (and demand or need-pull). that-would emerge from 
the Networks at this. early stage.. of. development- was.. -.,. 
uncertain. -There was not the benefit-of hindsight from 
which many., innovation studies are able-to draw on. . The. 
, innovation. process and . subsequent- diffusion of products. is a 
Ions-term-activity. The . innovation -approach waa. - not_. ">. 
-appropriate within the time constraints-of the-research 
project. In addition, the socially-useful element of 
potential-product innovations meant that evaluation in 
purely commercial terms was-not-considered-feasible. '-- 
The other strand of literature -that. related to, the area of 
study was the social. process of. innovation discussed in, 
Chapter Two. . -This perspective emphasised the importance of 
'actors' (Callon 1980) and-'social. groups' (Pinch and Bijker, 
1984) to the-design-and development of technologies. The 
tZg 
concept of social group was used to. define institutions and 
organisations as well as organised and unorganised 
individuals. In the same way. the concept. of actors 
included the diverse groups of people influential to the 
development of a technology; technologists, scientists, 
users,. manufacturers, government-departments and'so on. 
This work aims to investigate how technological artefacts 
-are-consciously or unconsciously designed to achieve 
objectives other. than the purely technical or economic (see 
Noble 1979). Again. this approach relies on the existence 
of concrete product innovations` around which the abilities 
of actors. and social groups to shape the'technology can be 
investigated. At a later state some products did emerge 
-Prom the Networks so that a research strategy of this kind 
may have been possible. However, at . the.. time. the decision 
was made. to concentrate on the social processes of policy 
implementation within the Networks irrespective of whether 
particular products could provide. a focal point. 
Before discussing the research strategy in more detail it is 
worth mentioning another direction that the research could 
have taken. The technology policy formulated-by the GLC-and 
the GLEB-placed great emphasis on-the close connection 
between product design and development and social need. An 
approach to the research could have concentrated on the 
social need aspect. The main reason why this was not 
attempted was that, as discussed earlier (Chapter Two), the 
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concept of social need is problematic and. thus the 
possibility of formulating a useful definition that could be 
operational for the purposes of measurement seemed to be too 
large and uncertain an undertaking. An approach which 
sought to identify groups of users of. the Networks and 
-investigate their perceptions of social need (naturally 
subjective) may. have been possible".. at. -a- later- stage 
in the- 
-Network's history.. However, at the time of the research 
project one of the major tasks facing the staff in the- 
Networks was the encouragement of participation. As"part of 
their activities the Networks were involved in-building 
-their own constituencies. so"that there was not, a ready pool 
of user groups. to form a representative sample"or to not up 
"a meaningful study of consumers. It seemed to be more-, 
sensible to. concentrate on how the Network staff. were 
approaching the problem of participation-and socially-useful 
product-design and development. 
The". uncertainty. of policy outcomes for-the technology 
initiative meant that the concentration. on policy 
Implementation-processes was-a reasonable way to proceed 
with the research. The Technology Networks were proposed as 
organisational establishments. through which the technology 
policy could be implemented- 
Two central propositions informed the Network approach to 
innovation: 
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first, that tone of Londons most precious assets is the 
skill. the ingenuity, the creativity and the sheer 
enthusiasm of its people'. and second. 'London possesses in 
its three Universities and seven Polytechnics one of-the 
richest scientific resources in the world' (GLC 1982). 
-For the purposes of the research the GLC technology policy 
is seen as a theory. This way of regarding policy formation. 
is advocated by Majone (1975) who argues that: '.. policies 
are, in fact, tentative theories - about the nature of 
social processes. and the working of social institutions.... ' 
(p. 50). In a similar vein Hedberg and Jonsson (1977) argue 
that policy or theory acts to generate strategy and 
activity. If "the strategy is seen as an hypothesis,. 
subsequent action will test this hypothesis and thus verify 
or falsify the theory or policy. Guided by this approach to 
the understanding of policy implementation, "the knowledge 
gained from the initial period of. fieldwork at the GLEB was 
used to construct a. tentative theory on which the technology 
policy initiative was based., The strategies of policy 
., Implementation were formed into working research hypotheses. 
The main value of this-, approach is that it offers the 
ability to construct an. analytic framework that allows an 
evaluation of the GLC and the BLEB technology policy in. 
their own terms. That is. were they able to achieve the 
objectives of. their own policy formation? 
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4.7 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS. 
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The central propositions for the Technology Networks 
described in 4.6 were the basis of the GLC socially-directed 
technology policy. The propositions implied, first, that if 
facilities were created for the design/development of 
socially-useful products, the people of London would use 
them. -Second. links forged with Polytechnics and higher 
education institutions-could tap their spare capacity in 
terms"of time and technical resources. 
The propositions led to the formulation of-my research 
hypothesis: 
User involvement in the selection, design specifications and. 
development of products together with access to technical 
resources are the key components of a-socially-useful 
technology-policy. 
This hypothesis turns the general research question of the 
study; *how could a local authority generate a technolgy 
policy based on social need'. into a"proposition or 
statement that-can be investigated: Propositions serve to 
guide - the' research endeavour ýýby ' making . the- information' 
sought-more explicit. This in necessary to identify the 
relevant units of analysis and the best waysýof tackling the 
data collection. I 
Operational definitions define more. precisely the central 
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concepts of the study. User. involvement, access to 
technical resources and -social-use were; concepts-. identified 
-.. during the first stage of the research,. and used to. denote 
certain aspects of the technology. policy-under. -" 
investigation. By unpacking these concepts the central 
elements may. be used as indicators"or.. guide-posts for 
data-collection... In this way-the link-in made , between, - 
concepts and-empirical data, this, enables. an evaluation.. of-. " 
-the. GLC/GLEB technology strategy through the-investigation 
of the. implementation process. that is, how the theory or 
policy worked out in practice. 
A. 8 INTERVIEW. SCHEDULE. 
The operational: definitions. of. the. central concepts were. 
used". to. construct a semi-structured interview schedule (see 
Appendix. One). -The choice of a semi-structured, interview" 
technique. -was made out-of a concern to, explore-the issues 
relatively freely with the respondents., The checklist of 
". questions. ensured that all interviews followed the-same 
format but-within that the respondents were able to-talk- 
freely around central subjects. '.. The . interviewees' 
, 
perceptions of their role. together with facts, opinions and 
inaishts--were-seen-as important-to-responses. 
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At the time of the research the Networks were developing"to 
.. -different . time-scales, and tended to-emphasise different 
elements of the technology strategy. Some were concerned 
-more. with community involvement than product innovation. 
whilst others were concerned to emphasise product- 
innovation. The strategy was . being. implemented 
in different 
ways-and it was important to recognise both the diversity of 
-function as well as the diversity of perceptions of the 
strategy. A structured interview technique would have meant 
that questions were-precisely formulated and the choice'of 
response-pre-defined. This technique is more important, for 
, survey-research where. there is a need to collect data that 
is"amenable'to quantification. The data collected in the 
Networks was of'a qualitative nature. 
A complementary method to semi-structured interviewing could 
have been .a period of participant observation 
in one-of the 
Networks. Whilst the value of a combination of-techniques 
for. added reliability and'validity'of data collection is 
acknowledged, the-decision was made not. to attempt this. -, 
With hindsight, it could be. argued -that . this -represents a 
weakness in the data-collection methods.... However, time... 
constraints and the difficulties associated with participant 
observation at the PPU and at the-Technology Division at-the 
GLIB, 
. acted to support the decision to proceed by 
interviewing. 
- Interviewing allowed-data-collection-from. 
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specific people employed in the Networks where access to 
their time was pre-arranged. . Within-the time limits of the 
-project this research method presented the-means-for data 
collection in. all of the Networks. In this way the ." 
differences-and similarities between them could be observed. 
At the time of interviewing direct observation techniques 
were also used to note the layout of the buildings, their 
accessibility and so on. 
For the research the Technology Networks and, Technet Limited 
in - the. Technology Division at the BLEB were defined as the 
relevant. units- of analysis. Within. the . research- as .a whole., 
there-was-a"concern to pay attention to both the micro or 
internal events in the Networks, and also to macro or 
external factors that. affected policy implementation 
processes. It was important to locate the-case-study of the 
GLC/GLEB technology policy-in its political and economic 
context (see Chapter Three) because this-was directly 
relevant to policy implementation processes and policy 
outcomes..., The-Technology Network study is discussed first, 
and. then the investigation of"the. macro or external factors 
affecting, -the 
implementation process-are. -discussed. 
For"the"Technology Network study the co-ordinators of each 
Network were contacted, first. by letter and. then by. - 
"" telephone. to. arrange an interview. Those contacted were 
willing to-give their time (apart-from. -the co-ordinator. of 
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the. London New Technology Network, in this case-another 
member of staff was interviewed). The interviews-were 
"undertaken,.. each lasted approximately one and a half hours 
and notes were taken at the time. An effort was made-to 
, proceed in. a conversational style so that interviewees 
talked freely around central issues in the interview 
schedule.. Care was taken to listen and to follow up 
additional topics if they came up in conversation. In 
addition. to the co-ordinators other individuals were 
interviewed if suggested by the co-ordinators themselves as 
being, important_in some way to the direction that the 
Network was taking (For a diagrammatic map-of respondents..., 
see Appendix Two). The interview period was. from November 
1984 to February 1985 depending on when interviewees had the 
time. --By this time, all the Networks were established and 
had been operational for at least a six-month period. 
Interviews were also carried out with key personnel at 
SCEPTRE in Sheffield and UDAP in Coventry because these 
organisations were similar to the London Technology 
Networks. An element of- comparative. data"from these -. 
organisations was thought to be-useful for analysis of"the 
research findings. 
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4.9 QUALITY OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN. 
There are several ways to judge the quality of a research 
design (Yin 1984). First, is construct validity. In this' 
project care was taken with the operationallsation of the 
concepts that formed the interview schedule. It was 
necessary--that operational definitions would-be immediately 
understandable to respondents. Information-from the 
fieldwork at the PPU and the-GLEB, and published documents 
from the GLEB on their Technology Network initiative were 
used to guide definitions. In this way, concepts and the 
questions emanating from them were understandable to 
respondents. Where possible checks-on responses from the 
interviews were made with the documentary evidence available 
( Council-minutes, GLEB and Network publications). Also the 
report of findings, in draft form, was sent to respondents 
for their comments. 
A second aspect of the quality of research design is 
external validity. The nature of"the concepts and ' 
Operational definitions ensured that the findings from the' 
data collection could be linked to the GLC/BLEB technology 
policy or theory. Thus. the information was internally 
generalisable. The use of comparative data from Sheffield 
and the West Midlands, and a search for comparative cases in 
the secondary source literature added to the ability to 
relate the case-study findings to theory. 
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Third, the reliability of the data collected was aided by 
checks with documentary evidence from the GLC/GLEB and the 
use of secondary source literature in the form of articles 
in academic journals. newspaper. reports. and so on. With the 
"publications,. particularly those published. by the GLC and 
BLEB. potential organisational bias was acknowledged. 
However, the objective of the investigation was to include 
different perceptions of the technology policy so that this 
did not matter to a large extent. The bias could be 
acknowledged but seen-as an element of the research itself. 
With the use of documentary evidence and secondary source 
reportage the point was to converge on the same set of 
, events from as wide a range of. perspectives as possible. 
Thus throughout the time of the research project care was 
taken to-collect. published material on the events at the 
GLC/GLEB and the Technology Networks from"newspapers. and. 
journals. These were regularly scanned in-The Open 
University library-and additional material was collected 
from visits to the Information Division at the BLEB. It was 
taken into. account that bias and accuracy of reportage are 
elements present in published material.. However. their use 
-was-to corroborate and augment evidence from, other sources. 
When reviewing documents and secondary source literature it 
was borne in mind that the material was written-for a 
-Particular-audience and was concerned to achieve certain 
objectives. An attempt was made to avoid being"mis-led by 
VB2 
trying to identify why the material was written and for what 
audience. This helped with the interpretation of the 
contents of the material and with the aim of being as 
correctly critical as possible. 
4.10 ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK. 
The analysis of the case-study findings relates to the 
initial research questions- The-data collected-from-the 
Technology Networks was collated under the concept headings 
of user involvement, access to technical resources and 
social use. The findings are presented in Chapter Six. 
A deductive form of explanation (The Open University 1981) 
-": -was . used. to relate -findings to-the-initial-research 
questions and verity. or falsify the GLC/GLEB"technology 
policy-or theory. The evaluation rested on whether the 
Technology Networks-achieved the objectives set out in the 
initial policy statement; 
a) user involvement. in product design, _ 
b) technology transfer between the Polytechnics. Networks 
and the community. 
a)-innovation or socially-useful products. 
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As mentioned earlier the Networks developed-in different 
ways and emphasised' different parts of the strategy, thus 
evaluation under these headings was-in the Networks own 
terms. One of the difficulties of a more objective 
measurement lies-in the intangible nature of the output from 
social organisations like the Technology Networks. 
Additional data relating to the implementation process was 
collated under the headings of the analytic framework 
described below. 
As the data. was being gathered there was a. "concern to link 
the micro-analysis of the policy implementation process in 
the Technology. Networks to macro or external factors 
affecting the policy implementation process. It was clear 
that-the working of the policy could not be understood 
'without setting it in the context of the wider political and 
economic environment. Thus the periods of fieldwork already 
-discussed were supported by library searches for available 
literature pertinent to the area of study. - the nature of 
central/local government relations. the economic policy 
initiatives of the other 'radical' councils; Sheffield and 
the West Midlands (see Chapter Three). In this way, 
fieldwork. and literature analysis proceeded. hand in hand. 
Relevant literature analysis was also important-for the 
analytic stage of the project. 
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An-analytic framework for policy implementation-processes is 
suggested. by Thsin (1987), this tramework"includes. the".. 
following elements: 
1. Background to policy - the historical. economic and 
political. context of the policy formation. 
2. Policy implementers-- the agencies involved-in the policy 
" process. 
3. Policy aims and-objectives.. 
4. " Social influences on policy implementation. 
S. Economic influences on-policy implementation. 
6. Political influences on policy implementation. 
This analytic framework. was used as a guideline in this 
research. to"collate the information from fieldwork and from 
secondary source. analysis.. The framework allowed attention 
, to-be paid to-both-internal and external factors affecting 
the policy implementation process.... Thus the. data collected 
was collated. as follows 
1. Background to policy - findings. from . the. initial . pilot.. 
study phase of fieldwork at the PPU=and the GLEB, "-presented 
in Chapter Five. 
2. Agencies involved in the policy process - study of the 
Technology Networks, findings. presented in Chapter Six. 
3. Stated and perceived objectives of the policy - GLEB/GLC 
, documentary analysis and, the technology network study. 
a. External constraints on the policy - these involve the 
" wider social. political and economic factors that-have an 
: impact on implementation. 
The"data-collection for the latter area ofýthe research 
relied-on 'secondary sourcea_... (_although. -the, porceptions. of- the 
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--interviewees were included where relevant). Much-of this 
material is presented in Chapters One and-Two, the . 
. literature survey on the innovation process and the social 
shaping of. technology. In addition. published material 
directly related to the societal context of the GLC is 
presented in Chapter Three as the setting for the research. 
This', material. is drawn on in the analytic stage of the 
research project to. assist. with explanation-building,. (see 
Chapters-Seven and Eight). As mentioned earlier, with the 
use of secondary sources care was taken to be correctly 
critical. 
Throughout the research project the aim'was to ensure an 
on-going-process between ideas, generated by the area of 
study and theoretical concerns of innovation and 
technological chance. In this way it was possible to 
continually refine ideas. 'and make the wider significance of 
the"study. and its relation to theory understandable. Ideas 
tended to be investigated and refined. by a. process of . 
writing draft chapters that were commented on by a, number of 
people"at. The Open University and. at. other academic 
institutions. 
For the interpretation and analysis of findings two methods 
of-explanation are employed - deductive'and inductive (The 
Open University 1981). Interpretation-, of the Technology 
--Network-study proceeds deductively. -that is, ` from the 
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general policy objectives to the evaluation of specific 
hypotheses by observation. The relation of empirical work 
to theory proceeds inductively, that is from observation to 
empirical generalisation to theory. 
The next stage or the analysis consisted"of constructing 
interim policy outcomes - what did the Networks achieve and 
how did, this-compare to the initial. policy statement. Here 
note. was taken of what the initiative did achieve as well as 
what it did not. 
The next step was to construct-a valid explanationýof why 
this was the case. Explanation-building of this form 
proceeds inductively. The comparative data collected from 
Sheffield and, the West Midlands was compared to the findings 
from the Network study. -This enabled a distinction to be 
-. made between general problems of the technology policy 
approach-(other cases were similar) and""those-that were 
specific to the GLC/GLEB initiative. 
This process of refinement and comparison for explanation 
building is advocated by Yin (1984). . The comparison of 
similar. cases discovered through secondary. source analysis 
offers. additional information for the generation of 
explanation. In this way it becomes possible to offer an 
explanation as to how a local authority can generate a 
technology policy that is based on social need. 
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Attention, to-the larger question of what the case-study 
reveals about why certain technologies are 
designed/developed and others are not requires an 
investigation of the external constraints identified. from 
fieldwork and secondary source analysis. This involves a 
process of returning to the background context of the GLC, 
for example, investigation of the-limitations of a local 
authority's sphere of influence. and how this affects-its 
potential. as.. an agent of technolgical change. The relation 
of findings-to this"larger. question is'an exploratory. 
- exercise offerins possible. explanationa. and the. suggestion 
of hypotheses for further research... The. theoretical 
concerns about the nature of the innovation process and the 
social-shaping of technology aid this. process. This forms 
the content of. Chapter Eight. 
The analysis. state of the projeat. sought to link-the 
GLC/GLEE study with the theoretical concerns of 
technological chance. The conclusions of the study and the 
end-result"of the research, presented. in Chapter Nine, 
suggest certain priorities. for resource allocation . b' local 
authorities--concerned to. achieve socially-directed ' 
technology.. policy objectives. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE GLC INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT INITIATIVE. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION. 
In this chapter the main points of the Greater London 
Council (GLC) Industry and Employment policy are described. 
The information was collected during the early stages of 
fieldwork carried out at the Popular Planning Unit (PPU) at 
the GLC and the Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB). 
Discussion of the initiative follows a brief historical 
outline of the strands of thought which emerged within 
left-wing politics during the 1970s. The resurgence of 
local socialism. the Labour Party Programme of 1973, workers 
plans and community planning are discussed in relation to 
the GLC policy initiative. It is important to draw 
attention to these movements and the way that they 
influenced the policy initiative. 
First, a discussion of Labour and the local state clarifies 
why local government was seen as an arena of potential 
socialist advance. This is relevant because it indicates 
that there has always been conflict and change at the local 
level throughout the history of local government (Chapter 
Three described the form this conflict has taken during the 
1980s). Second. the Labour Party Programme for Industry of 
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1973 is discussed because there are clear parallels-with the 
type of policy initiative attempted'by the GLC. The benefit 
here is of historical insight, called upon in the discussion 
of the policy initiative. Third, workers' plans and 
community planning. which may be seen as culturally familiar 
activities to the 1970s, were directly relevant to the GLC 
'grassroots' approach to local politics. What emerges from 
this review is a picture of an attempt by the Labour- 
controlled GLC to link together a number of political 
concerns and perspectives which developed independently, and 
in quite different contexts, within their overall approach 
to economic development. The distinctly different cultural 
and social patterns of the 1970s and 1980x. -generally 
subsumed under the headings of group activity and 
individualism, respectively, have had important consequences 
for the GLC policy initiative. These are discussed more 
fully in Chapter Seven. 
5.2 LABOUR AND THE LOCAL STATE. ` 
Labour Party involvement in local government has a Ions 
history dating back to the formation of-the Labour Party in 
1906. However, the establishment of a Local Government 
sub-committee an thv National E3tatutivc? Cofmaitioo if1 1(2 
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was the first attempt by the Party to co-ordinate activities 
at a local level (Gyford 1985). 
Within the labour movement there are identifiable themes 
which have moulded-views on the nature and role of local 
government. First, municipal socialism as advocated by the 
Fabian movement. This was laid out in the Webbs' 
'Constitution for a Socialist Commonwealth' published in 
1920. In this document. it was envisaged that, ultimately, 
most of industry would be administered and controlled at the 
local level (Bassett 1984). The practical application of 
this tradition was developed by Herbert Morrison, albeit in 
a more limited way, during his years on Hackney Council and 
the London County Council in the 1920's and 1930's 
(Donoughue and Jones 1973). Morrison wrote extensively on 
local government and socialism and was in favour of gaining 
popular support for incremental municipal control and 
reform, within the confines of the statutory powers of local 
government. This was a view shared by the central Labour 
Party; incremental reformism through state institutions 
would build the road`to socialism. Maclntyre (1980a), notes 
that this perspective was based on the view of the state as 
dominated by a capitalist class, but not an inherently 
class-based institution. Thus it was open to take-over by a 
socialist majority to be used for the benefit of the 
community. 
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The Morrisonian tradition of reformism, through the state was 
in contrast to the activities of the more militant 
localities such as Poplar and the Little Moscows in the 
1920's and 1930's (Maclntyre 1980b). These Councils were 
more concerned to advance socialism at the local level by 
direct challenges to central government, as noted in Chapter 
Three. Morrison felt that this undermined the image of 
Labour councils as sound and efficient alternatives to Tory 
ones (Donoughue and Jones 1973). 
In the post-war period local government was relegated to a 
more passive role as the Labour Party emphasised central 
government as the road to socialism (Bassett 1984). 
It is since the late 1960s. with the growth of community 
activism, that local government and local socialism have 
begun to re-emerge. This may be seen most clearly in the 
development of the representational role of local 
government. In other words, its role in the interpretation 
of how society works and why (Duncan and Goodwin 1985). The 
development of its representational role was particularly 
evident in the policies of the radical local councils 
discussed in this project. In part. this can be attributed 
to theoretical developments on the nature of local 
government. 
'... the consciousness of the great mass of working people 
is around local issues. Consequently, the concept of the 
'local state' highlights at one and the same time the nature 
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and power of the state in our society and the-importance of 
organising class struggle around state issues in the 
locality'. (Corrigan 1979 p204) 
The Marxist perspective of local government and its 
potential for the advancement of socialism introduced the 
concept of the 'local state'. Theoretical analysis of this 
concept grew out of the empirical studies of inner-city 
deprivation, funded by central and local government, under 
the Community Development Projects scheme set up in the late 
1960s and early 1970s (Corrigan 1979). The findings of 
these studies suggested that the preoccupation within local 
government with welfare services blinded it to the 
industrial restructuring which was affecting'the whole 
context of the local economy. The focus of attention for 
the local authority should include local industry and the 
economy (Benington 1986). 
In addition, much debate followed the publication of 
Cockburn's (1977) book, entitled 'The Local State'. 
Cockburn presented a case-study of Lambeth Council and 
implied that the local state operated in the interests of 
capital, thus its potential as a base for political action 
was limited. Cockburn emphasised community activism as the 
base for historical change. However, the functionalist 
account of the state in Cockburn's analysis has been 
criticised by Saunders (1980) as a crude interpretation. He 
arsues that the autonomy of the local state differs over 
time and between localities. In relation to the radical 
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local authorities. the slogan 'restructuring for labour' 
indicates their concern to act in the interests of labour 
and the local community. however. the ability to ensure this 
autonomy from the interests of capital within the context of 
the local economy was limited (see 5.12). 
Further work portrays the local state as both agent and 
obstacle to chance. A view that led to Dearlove's 
identification of the 'problem' of local government; '... 
local government is especially vulnerable to working class 
demands, pressures and even control' (Dearlove 1979 p244-5). 
In 'In and Against the State' (London Edinburgh Weekend 
Return Group 1979), the authors acknowledge this 
contradictory nature of the local state. On the one hand as 
provider of services, but on the other, provision in a way 
that fragments and distorts problems'for client groups. 
This Group argued, therefore, that political struggles need 
to address problems of the social relations, that is, who 
controls and governs, implicit in the state as well as the 
more practical problems relating to adequate service 
provision. Despite disagreement among commentators on the 
nature and role of local government, this theoretical 
analysis has contributed to its re-emergence as an arena for 
Political struggle, particularly in relation to the attempts 
by the Thatcher Government to erode the autonomy of local 
government, as discussed in. Chapter Three. 
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In many cases the struggles around the state on issues of 
service provision have involved women, for example, ' services 
that relate to the family, housing, childcare and so on. 
The women's movement has been influential in the development 
of anti-hierarchical and participatory forms of political 
activity through the practical experience of struggle.. 
Practical experience coupled with the theoretical analysis 
of the state, is the basis of what may be termed 
'prefigurative politics' (Rowbotham, Segal and Wainwright 
1979). This political perspective incorporates the view 
that political struggle and the forms of social organisation 
that arise from them should contain elements of future 
socialist solutions. In other words, tackle the social 
relations implicit in struggles around service provision by 
having a sense of the future direction and change that is 
aimed for. This denotes an offensive, rather than defensive 
political strategy. 
The perspective of pre-figurative politics played a"large 
role in the GLC strategy. Particularly in the area of 
popular planning. In this way the GLC attempted to 
capitalise on its representational role and demonstrate a 
political alternative to Thatcherism (Duncan and Goodwin 
1985). The strategy of pre-figurative politics was seen as 
crucial to future social chance. Thus some elements of the 
radical economic initiatives were designed as political and 
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ideological pilot schemes; that is, they were not expected 
to be 'effective' in their own terms but to prefigure some 
future goal. 
A further influence on the radical economic initiatives has 
been the critiques of Keynesian demand-management by the 
Conference of Socialist Economists (C. S. E. ). This group 
focused theoretical attention on the sphere of production, 
the restructuring of the manufacturing sector, changes in 
the labour process and the role of the state (Benington 
1986). The Chief Economic Adviser at the GLC was Robin 
Murray, a key figure in the C. S. E. Group. The sector 
studies which formed the base of the London Industrial 
Strategy (LIS) drew on this school of political economy 
(Benviington. 1986). 
The renewed interest in the role of local, government as an 
arena of socialist advance has been subject to debate at the 
level of the national Labour Party with the development of 
the Alternative-Economic Strategy (AES) (Labour - 
Co-ordinating Committee 1980). As a national strategy for 
growth, employment and the social control of, industry the 
AES built on the Labour Party, Programme of 1973, and 
assigned local democracy and community mobilisation central 
roles. The AES contained proposals for the reduction of 
central controls for local, councils and the, search for new 
gcurces of local finance. The development of community 
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plans was central to ensure a grassroots democratic base for 
the AES. The local plan would involve a more active and 
interventionist role for the local council through the 
establishment of local planning agreements with firms in the 
locality, support for co-operative enterprises and the 
tapping of pension funds for municipal investment (Ibid. ). 
Although the AES aroused much criticism and debate from 
within the Labour Party it put the role of local council's 
onto Labour's national political agenda. 
This role has continued to be developed through the period 
of the'research, and has been influenced by developments at 
the GLC and, more especially. around the creation of the 
GLEB. For example, the 1986 Charter for Local Enterprise 
included-proposals for a national network of Local 
Enterprise Boards. The National Executive's Committee 
statement to the 1986 Labour Party Conference spelt out 
their proposals as follows: 
'Labour will work through enterprise boards and other 
agencies and where appropriate, directly through local 
authorities, to support industrial development in a variety 
of new and innovative ways. They will be encouraged to; 
- provide funds for investment in return for equity shares. 
In this way Local and Regional Enterprise Boards will be 
able to take an active role in shaping the development of 
local industry instead of merely acting as passive money, 
lenders. 
- extend their support beyond finance to include business 
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advice, assistance with finding property, funding of R&D and 
training. 
- support further expansion of workers' co-operatives - 
where workers have a genuine say over the strategy the 
company pursues and the way it is run. 
- encourage the development of community industry by 
providing finance. premises and management services. 
- develop research links with local polytechnics and 1, 
universities to set up 'tech-nets' (information exchange 
systems for new products and process technology). 
- provide financial and technical assistance-to people 
wishing to go into business but usually not viewed with 
sympathy by banks and other financial institutions - 
notably, redundant workers, women and ethnic minorities 
(quoted in Mole and Elliott 1987 p. 121). 
This brief history of the attitude to-local government in 
the Labour Party. and which has particularly captured the 
minds of the Labour Left demonstrates the combination of 
influences central to the emergence of local socialism; 
municipal enterprise, participatory democracy and 
pre-figurative politics. 
5.3 LABOUR PARTY PROGRAMME FOR INDUSTRY. 
At the beginning of the 1970s the major concern for 
politicians and. economists-alike was industrial decline and 
the collapse of the manufacturing sector (Moore and Rhodes 
1976). The Labour Party in opposition devised a policy for 
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the regeneration of British industry. The proposals 
included the creation of a National Enterprise Board (NEB) 
and a planning agreement system to act as instruments of 
positive public intervention and planning in the private 
sector. It was envisaged that the NEB would act as a state- 
holding company for existing state shareholdings, and in 
addition, take over some twenty-five of the hundred largest 
companies in Britain. This would give it significant 
leverage to influence the direction of the economy as a 
whole. 
In conjunction with the NEB a comprehensive system of 
planning agreements between the government and all large 
firms, especially the top one hundred, was proposed. with 
sanctions against those refusing to co-operate (Labour Party 
1973. Holland 1975). The Programme also included measures 
to increase industrial democracy in nationalised industries. 
Through the NEB and planning agreements. shop-floor based 
democracy, organised through trade-union channels, would be' 
created (Coventry et al. Trades Councils 1980). 
As the Labour Party moved from opposition to office the 
potentially wide-ranging measures of the Labour Party 
Programme (Labour Party 1973) were curtailed. The 1974 
Labour Government's Industrial Strategy was launched at a 
meeting of the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) 
in November 1975. The NEDC; a tripartite body äomprising 
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the government, the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). agreed to the 
publication of a White Paper 'An Approach to Industrial 
Strategy' (1975) as the basis for future work. This White 
Paper laid the foundations for the Industry Act of 1975, the 
chief objective of which was the establishment. of the NEB. 
The NEB was to provide financial assistance to companies in 
key sectors. Another measure proposed in the White Paper 
was'an investigation of the constructive ' use of public 
purchasing policies to develop the export potential of 
appropriate industries (An Approach to Industrial Strategy 
1975). 
The initial-White Paper was published in August 1974 and the 
Industry Bill appeared at the start=of 1975, both while 
Mr. Benn was Secretary of State for Industry. The Industry 
Act 1975 established the NEB. created powers for the, 
Secretary of State to prevent or reverse the overseas 
ownership of manufacturing enterprises and provided for the 
disclosure of information on manufacturing enterprises to 
ministers and trade unions. 
The 1975 Act also gave statutory recognition to planning 
agreements. These were voluntary agreements between an 
enterprise and the government concerning the strategic plans 
of the enterprise over a specified period. Consultation 
with the relevant unions was intended to be part of the 
lb 
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process of drawing up a planning agreement, if necessary 
making use of the 1975 Act's provision for disclosure of 
information (Devine et al. 1985). 
From spring 1974 to summer 1975, the Department of Industry, 
under Benn, began to implement an interventionist strategy 
that was not only based on commercial criteria but which 
showed consideration for social factors, such as employment 
needs, as a basis for aid to industry. In particular, 
financial assistance was provided to five firms although the 
Industrial Development Advisory Board had advised against it 
- in three cases to workers co-operatives looking to rescue 
jobs (for example, the Scottish Daily News) after the 
original firms had collapsed. However, after the defeat of 
the Left in the June 1975 EEC referendum Benn was replaced 
as Secretary of State for Industry and transferred to the 
Department of Energy (see Stewart 1977). The Industry Act. 
which differed from the Bill, was passed in November 1975 
after Benn had left the Department of Industry. 
At the beginning of 1976, the Department of Industry 
published its Criteria for Assistance to Industry. A basic 
principle was. that the cost of assistance to enable an 
enterprise to become viable ie. profitable, had to be 
weighed against any relevant social considerations including 
employment, balance of payments, rationalisation, research, 
and sectors of industry of special significance to the 
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economy (Department of Industry 1976). Draft guidelines for 
the NEB were published in March 1976 and the final: 
guidelines in December-1976. In the end the NEB was 
required to operate to commercial criteria, denied 
compulsory powers and permitted to acquire majority 
shareholdings in firms only with their consent. The'role of 
planning agreements was also downgraded. for example, it 
took fifteen months to conclude the first one, in March 
1977. with Chrysler UK. - The irrelevance of this planning 
agreement was demonstrated in 1978 when the parent company 
reached an agreement to sell its European operations, 
including Chrysler UK, to Peugeot-Citroen, without bothering 
to discuss the matter with the UK government (Devine et 
al. 1985). 
The other route of-financial assistance was through general 
and sectoral schemes; the purpose, of which were toupromote 
investment in-general and to stimulate investment, ' -, 
modernisation, efficiency and rationalisation in specific 
industries considered to be of particular national 
importance. The Government's Industrial Strategy involved 
the creation of Sector Working Parties (SWP's). Their work 
involved three states. First, the NEDC would identity the 
industries or sectors that it considered to be the most 
important for the achievement of the Government's Industrial 
Strategy objectives. ` Once completed the SWP's would 
undertake detailed analyses of the particular problems and 
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Possibilities of their industry or sector and recommend 
appropriate action. Finally the findings of the detailed 
SWP analyses would be collated as a basis for general 
discussion. The aim of this approach to industrial strategy 
was to stimulate discussion and action at industry level, 
and, in addition, to feed information upwards to help the 
government to assess its policies, and determine its - 
priorities. By the end of March 1979 fourteen sectoral 
schemes had been instituted covering: wool. textiles, 
machine tools, clothing, footwear, ferrous foundry and 
others (Devine et al. 1985). 
Davies et al (1980) found that in 1975/6 state aid was 
primarily of'the supportive rather than the picking-winners 
type. Although rescue operations claimed the most publicity 
they were never envisaged as the main purpose for which 
selective assistance was provided. By 1977 this had begun 
to change, it was estimated that financial assistance was 
about evenly distributed between rescues and schemes, with 
rescues! becoming less and schemes becoming more important 
(Department of Industry, 1977). 
The Labour Government created the tools for large-scale 
economic intervention. along the lines of Fabian social 
reformism (see McBriar 1962. Sancton 1976). However, these 
tools were never used-to their full potential. -The NEB did 
not'have sufficient funds to significantlav affect public 
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ownership, and planning agreements were largely left 
unexplored. Two problems emerged from the strategy, first - 
should criteria for=intervention support or supplant market 
forces ? And second, how were implementation and monitoring 
to be achieved ? Although the Government formulated the 
Industrial Strategy. implementation rested largely on 
management and unions, with the attendant problems of 
ensuring the translation of analysis into action at the 
level of the firm (Young with Lowe 1971). 
A number of Sector Working Parties reported that within 
firms, management were reluctant to work jointly with union 
representatives and often information was- not. circulated. 
Joint planning, if attempted at all, between management and 
unions was largely a process of worker consultation 
arrangements that were popular in the 1970s as a response to 
job-enrichment programmes. Consultation was around a 
pre-defined agenda set by management, discussion of work 
patterns, Job control and job security remained a management 
prerogative. --. 
Central to the idea of industrial democracy is trade union 
influence over the higher levels of industrial 
decision-making; long-term investment, product development 
and diversification, productivity targets and so on. This 
raises the issue of managerial control. An-issue which 
attracted a great deal öf controversy following the 
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publication of the Bullock Report (Committee of Inquiry on 
Industrial Democracy 1977). Employers argued that a merging 
of management and union roles would lead to greater 
inefficiencies. Unions argued against the imposition of 
democracy through legislation; democracy must grow through 
political battles on the shop-floor. Worker representation 
alongside conventional collective bargaining would be 
unworkable. Collective bargaining should be extended to 
include company board-level decisions but this would be 
incompatible with participation in the form of 
worker-directors (Coventry et al. Trades Councils 1980). 
The left-wing of the Labour Party prescribed a democratic 
base for industrial policy. This involved mechanisms for 
the democratic determination of priorities for resource 
allocation, the development of a framework to ensure the 
social accountabilty of enterprises, and the involvement of 
workers in running their place of work. The 1972-4 Labour 
Party policy of NEB control of twenty or so of the'largest 
companies, planning agreements and industrial democracy was 
an attempt to achieve this. At that time the strength of 
forces committed to the status quo was great enough to 
prevent the implementation of the policy (Watson 1977). 
However, the main elements of the Industrial Strategy 
reappeared in the Industry and Employment policy developed 
by the GLC - the creation of the OLEB, enterprise' planning, 
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sector-strategy planning were all present in the GLC 
initiative and mixed with influences from outside mainstream 
party politics. 
5.4 WORKERS, PLANS. 
The attempt by the Labour Party in the 1970s to base an 
industrial strategy on the premise of industrial democracy 
discussed above was matched by attempts to develop 
democratic planning outside of mainstream politics. The 
promotion of industrial democracy through the Bullock Report 
(Committee of Inquiry into Industrial Democracy 1977) _ 
foundered on the limitations of governmental influence over 
economic activity at the level of the individual. enterprise 
and the lack of support from trade unions for legislated 
democracy. Planning from above required, for 
implementation, an equally weighted initiative of planning 
from below. The GLC Industry and Employment policy 
acknowledged the need for popular democratic support for 
policy initiatives and were concerned, to stimulate a process 
of worker and community planning. 
Workers' plans began to emerge in the mid-1970's encouraged, 
by Benn while he was the Secretary of State for Industry. 
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The shop stewards' movement established shop stewards' 
committees, often multi-union, multi-plant, and sometimes 
multi-company, to work on policy proposals for their 
companies and industries which could become part of Labour's 
planning agreement procedure. These initiatives included 
Lucas Aerospace, Power Engineering Industry Trade Union 
Committee, Dunlop, Scotch Whisky Combine, Metal Box, Thorn, 
and other Combines; Joint Stewards' committees in the car 
and machine tool industries (George 1983)., Perhaps the most 
important-of these plans in terms of the GLC strategy, and 
certainly the most publicised, was the Lucas Plan 
(Wainwright and Elliott 1982). 
In 1976, shop stewards' working at the Lucas-Aerospace 
Division of Lucas Industries published an 'Alternative 
Corporate Plan'. The Plan included detailed proposals for 
'socially-useful products' which could be made by the 
workforce, as alternatives to arms production, and which 
would stem the tide of redundancies at Lucas Aerospace. The 
Lucas Plan proposed 150 products in all. mainly in the areas 
of energy. transport and medicine, these included gas-fired 
heat pumps, a hybrid. road/rail bus and improved kidney 
machines. 
Product proposals were developed through a system of site 
project teams. Shop stewards on each site were concerned to 
develop ideas for socially-useful products that built on the 
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existing skill, expertise and'knowledze of product 
development among the workforce. The technical resources 
within Lucas Aerospace in the form of equipment and services 
were taken into account for product planning. In addition, 
an attempt was made to link product proposals to social 
needs through discussions with community groups (Wainwright 
and Elliott 1982). 
The Lucas Plan represented an offensive strategy against 
unemployment. It put the idea of socially-useful products 
on the technological agenda, particularly in the field of 
renewable energy. And importantly, was a concrete example 
of the effectiveness of worker involvement in product 
development. In some cases, product prototypes were 
developed by sympathetic researchers in Polytechnics, and 
some product ideas have been developed, but not by Lucas 
Industries. 
Wainwright and Elliott (1982) monitored the developments 
surrounding the Lucas Plan and related how the management at 
Lucas Aerospace were obstructive and hostile to it. After 
some years of struggle the Plan was marginalised and several 
key shop stewards were dismissed. 
Several of the sacked shop stewards subsequently found 
employment with the radical local authorities in Britain, 
many of their ideas were used as a basis for an alternative 
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technology policy. Mike Cooley, a leading member of the 
Lucas Aerospace Combine Shop Stewards' Committee. joined the 
Economic Policy Group (EPG) at the GLC, and later became 
Director of the Technology Division of the Greater London 
Enterprise Board (GLEB). Thus in many ways the Lucas Plan 
was the progenitor of the sort of approach to innovation 
developed by the GLC (Mole and Elliott 1987). 
5.5 POPULAR PLANNING. 
The democratic approach to product planning exemplifed`by 
the Lucas Plan and the creation of alternative policies for 
unemployment was also applied by community organisations 
during this same period. Activities in the community 
centred around trades councils and between 1978 and 1980 the 
trades councils. and the stewards' committees published a 
booklet called 'Popular Planning for Social Need (George 
1983). It called. Por an economic and industrial strategy 
based on alternative policies. for jobs, housing and other 
areas of perceived social need. Their view was that 
economic and'industrial planning must be based on activism 
at the Qrassroots, on concepts such as 'socially-useful 
production' and geared toward the allocation of resources to 
unmet needs (George 1983). 
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The planning responsibilities of local authorities include 
structure plans and local plans. Structure plans are 
development plans and cover a period of twenty to thirty 
years, that is , they are long-term 
plans. ' Elements of 
these plans include both the physical and economic aspects 
for an area, such as, land use, employment needs, 
recreational facilities and so on. The structure plan 
comprises the overall policy. Thus, the London Industrial 
Strategy (GLC 1985) formulated by the GLC and discussed 
below, represents this form of local authority planning. 
Local plans involve borough council areas and provide for 
more detailed provision, the idea is that they feed into and 
co-ordinate with the structure plans. The GLC, via the 
Popular Planning Unit, were concerned to encourage popular 
participation in the formulation and development of local 
plans. thus'the Docklands Plan (discussed below) would feed 
into the London Industrial Strategy (GLC 1985). 
Participation in local planning has been part of the local 
political agenda since 1968. A statutory obligation for 
local authorities under the Town and Country Planning Act, 
1968, was public consultation over structure planning. - The 
Skeffington Report (1968) sought to advise on the best 
methods for participation. such as publicity, that would 
resolve problems of implementation of local authority 
Planning. - The purpose of participation - initiatives was to 
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secure a problem free implementation stage and participation 
initiatives usually took the form of consultative 
strategies, such as public meetings, once the plans had 
already been drawn up. However provisions for 
participation. albeit partial. do not necessarily lead to 
public involvement. It was found that middle-class, more 
affluent groups with a history of participation in resident, 
associations and other local and issue based organisations 
were more likely to take up opportunities for participation 
in planning than were the more working class groups. 
(Cockburn 1977). 
The Community Development Projects set up by the Labour 
Government in 1969 represented the official initiative that 
would ensure working-class involvement in community affairs. 
Each of the twelve Community Development Projects had a 
local action team run from a neighbourhood office. Local 
team operations comprised several elements; assessment of 
needs. the stimulation of local residents to take 
responsibility for their needs, organisational innovations, 
such as self-help groups. that would involve both community 
groups and the local authority (Cockburn 1977). Many of the 
project teams found that the experience of urban deprivation- 
did not hinge on the activities of the local people, rather 
these social problems were symptoms of the inequalities of 
the distribution of power and resources in society (Corrigan 
1979). Thus the focus for change was not the-local 
population but the centres of organised power. For the 
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community this involved a process of activism and 
consciousness-raising around issues affecting their lives 
(Cockburn 1977). 
The popular planning initiatives in the GLC programme were a 
legacy from community action. As one commentator noted; 
'Local politics (was seen) as a process of constant 
campaigning and mobilisation rather than simply a process of 
service delivery'(Gyford 1985). 
The need was to facilitate, stimulate and build local 
initiatives. Hilary Wainwright, the Director of the Popular 
Planning Unit at the GLC described the Unit as: 
'... generally an educator and sort of mobiliser. the Unit 
cannot deliver the goods in the sense of actually setting 
plans implemented. The idea is to bargain for plans, fight 
for plans and bits of these plans will be implemented. It is 
a strategy for opposition and a strategy for resistance 
rather than a strategy that assumes power although it has 
got implications for how power would be used'(Wainwrizht 
1983). 
The idea mirrored the Lucas Plan-in that the strategy was 
offensive. The prefigurative element of local politics was 
particularly advocated in this Unit. Popular planning meant 
to actually draw up and prefigure plans for the community 
that included both industrial strategy and service provision 
(Rowbotham, Segal and Wainwright 1979). For example, the 
heating campaign 'Jobs From Warmth (GLC 1983) sought to 
build alliances between a number of different groups around 
the issue; trades council and trade union groups, women's 
groups, tenants organisations, unemployed workers, users and 
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so on. 
As discussed in 5.2 prefigurative politics and a federal 
organisational structure as a framework for action and 
change has been greatly influenced by the women's movement. 
Critical of traditional strategies for socialism, new ways 
of organising the struggle which explicitly express aims and 
objectives that have a utopian element have been developed. 
Women's groups have also sought to integrate their demands 
with the concerns of other groups. for example, demands for 
more nurseries and child-care centres require a shift in 
expenditure from defence to health and education, which is 
also a concern for peace groups and environment groups 
(Rowbotham, Segal and Wainwright 1979). The strategy adopted 
in the Popular Planning Unit was to encourage these forms of 
organisation in order to precipitate change based on the 
needs articulated by the local community. 
5.6- THE GLC INDUSTRY AND EMPLOYMENT STRATEGY. 
The Influences that have helped to shape the GLC initiative 
point to the creation of facilities to support the 
democratisation of working and community life. hence the 
term 'restructuring for labour', which has been applied to 
this form of policy initiative (Goodwin and Duncan 1986). 
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The elements of the GLC Industry and Employment policy 
includes first. following the Labour Party Programme 1973, 
an interventionist strategy based on the identification of 
enterprises and industrial sectors important to the social 
and econonic processes of the local economy. This element 
of the economic strategy has been supported by the creation 
of an Economic Policy Group (EPG) to-undertake sectoral 
analyses and indicate priorities for investment in a similar 
way to the Sector Working Parties discussed in 5.3. A 
second organisational innovation was the creation of the 
Greater London Enterprise Board (GLEB); a public investment 
company. Third. mechanisms, such as, planning agreements to. 
support the position of workers, and the achievement of 
further objectives such as, equal opportunites. Fourth, the 
encouragement of worker co-operatives and alternatives forms 
of production exemplified by The Lucas Plan. And finally, 
the democratisation of local community planning and local 
economic management through the creation of the Popular 
Planning Unit (PPU). 
The Industry and Employment policy of the GLC comprises 
these main elements, the following discussion concentrates 
on the organisational innovations of the EPG, GLEE and PPU 
because they represent the major strands of the policy. 
The Units established by the GLC Industry and Employment 
Committee and EPC were: 
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The Popular Planning Unit were concerned to help trade 
unions and local communities develop plans for different 
sectors and areas of industry and employment, and to advance 
their realisation through campaigns, propaganda and 
education. 
The Project Development Units brief was to provide and 
monitor funds for decentralised locally-based agencies, 
including Co-operative Development Agencies, to further 
projects on employment issues aimed specifically at the 
unemployed, the disabled. ethnic minorities and women. 
The Industrial Development Unit assisted trade unionists to 
understand industrial developments and corporate planning, 
particularly where their own companies were concerned, so 
that advance warning of threats to employment could be made. 
The Contract Compliance Unit was responsible for ensuring 
that the GLC purchasing power was used for the benefit of 
Londoners and under conditions that improved working lives, 
including the assurance of equal opportunities for women. 
ethnic minorities and the disabled. 
The Property Register and Housing Unit worked with the GLC 
valuer and the GLEE Property Unit to maintain a computer 
based register and to support modernisation and development 
schemes for London's run down industrial properties.. 
The Greater London Training Board was given the overall 
responsibility for Industrial Training in London, with the 
aid of a Training Board Support Unit. 
An Employment and Welfare Unit was designed to coordinate 
work on employment, education and health issues, that fell 
outside the scope of GLEB. 
In addition, policies for specific Industries, sectors and 
areas were developed by individuals and teams in the 
Industry Unit. the Cultural Industries Unit, Infrastructure 
and Areas Unit and the Financial Institutions Unit 
(Barratt-Brown 1985). 
5.7 THE ECONOMIC POLICY GROUP (EPa). 
The creation of the EP4 in March 1982 was an organisational 
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innovation within local government bureaucracy. Officers 
were appointed who were sympathetic to the GLC programme and 
who could work closely with elected members of the Council 
on the formation of the industry, and employment policy. The 
EPG acted as an advisory group to the Council. They were 
concerned with the structure plan for the Greater London 
area, which was published as the London Industrial Strategy 
(LIS) by the GLC in 1985. 
The London Industrial Strategy (GLC 1985) consisted of a 
series of strate¢y documents which covered specific 
industries like printing and retailing, and sector analyses 
such as Energy, Housing and so on. Specific papers and 
proposals were developed through a combination of 
documentary research and discussions with shop stewards and 
user groups, thus a form of economic democracy was seen as 
important to the formation of policy proposals. The LIS 
once published was seen as a discussion document, open to 
amendments and alterations. Policy proposals were concerned 
to build on the real concerns of working people over jobs 
and services. For example, the strategy document on Health 
care combined an analysis of the deep problems in the NHS in 
London with proposals for increasing pay and conditions for 
health service workers, and possible. alternative directions 
for improved healthcare ie. the employment of alternative 
medicine practitioners (LIS, 1985). 
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For a map-of the Units at the GLC and the Divisions at the 
BLEB that were relevant to the research see Figure 3. 
5.8 POPULAR PLANNING UNIT (PPU). 
The PPU were concerned to encourage and facilitate community 
and workplace planning through campaigning. propaganda and 
education. 'Jobs For A Change' was the name-given to the 
strategy. Publicised in a book of the same name (GLC 1983) 
and in a newspaper issued free to Londoners. To stimulate 
popular participation in local-planning, * several strategies 
were employed. First, a mailing list was drawn up to ensure 
that all interested groups received the newsletter and 
notification of meetings and so on. Second, a Popular 
Planning Assembly was formed to bring different groups 
together. However, this Assembly only ran for a few months 
as it did not gain the support or momentum hoped for it 
(Wainwright 1987). Third, a series of Adult Education 
Institute courses were developed-around. -the issue of. 
jobs 
and alternative planning. These activities were aimed at 
the establishment of an appropriate infrastructure of 
education. support and co-ordination for planning projects. 
Tutor hours with. the AEI and WEA were arranged so that 
tutor-organisers could work with local'groups on proposals 
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for socially-useful employment. Once tutors were appointed, 
a series of public meetings were arranged to publicise 
popular planning and the resources available to help groups 
extend their campaigning and bargaining demands. The Unit 
was particularly concerned to build on initiatives rather 
than merely promote popular planning in general. The links 
with the GLEB enterprise planning were fostered to increase 
popular planning opportunities in, the workplace. 
Research and information facilities that could strengthen 
local organisations were also supported. for example. CAITS, 
the Greenwich Employment Resources Unit (GLC 1982) 
Before discussing local planning, it is worth reiterating 
the main points of the PPU approach, so that their legacy to 
workers plans and prefigurative politics is made more 
explicit. 
Popular planning is about matching unused resources; 
unemployed people. machinery and buildings with needs 
expressed by'the community. For example, a 'Jobs from 
Warmth' campaign sought to demonstrate that by building 
alliances between tenants and building workers it becomes 
possible to understand the needs of both groups-and find 
ways of meeting those needs and create employment at the 
same time. Hilary Wainwright . the Director of the Popular 
Planning Unit explained the approach; 
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'The idea of popular planning, or workers' plans, is 
building on ideas and demands that are already coming out of 
working class struggles - most struggles are based around 
needs. Popular planning is just articulating those in a 
more detailed way and beginning to show how these needs 
could be met. For example, you. can. say that a lot of the 
demands of the women's movement are around social needs. 
Popular planning will only build on that by helping to make 
some of the connections between needs and resources and 
people working with those resources more explicit. At the 
GLC, we are talking about Jobs from childcare - the idea of 
investing in'child care centres to create jobs to meet child 
care needs, and that is one way of creating useful jobs'. 
'Alternative plans.... begin to reveal the kind of economy 
we are fighting for and begin to point to where we need to 
build alliances and connections'. (Wainwright 1983) 
Abrief discussion of the Docklands Plan highlights' some of 
the problems that the Unit faced with the implementation-of 
their policy. In the first instance, the GLC were involved 
in issues over which they had little or no direct power. in 
relation to the Docklands area this was because of. the 
creation of the London Docklands Development-Corporation 
(LDDC) by the Conservative Government in 1980, which took- 
over the powers of the elected authority (see Chapter 
Three). The campaign against the LDDC proposal fora 
STOLport (a short take off and landing airport) began in May 
1982. Residents were concerned about noise, safety issues 
and the prospects of job creation for local people by the 
development of the docklands. area to the LDDC's plans. The 
Joint Docklands Action Group (JDAG) had been-involved in 
campaigns against the dock closures for some years, for 
them, faced with this new prospect, the concern was to gain 
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the support of politicians in the fight against the 
STOLport. In its first year of operation the PPU gave 
priority to the campaign. Commitments in the Labour 
manifesto before the GLC elections in 1981 had been made to 
designate the Docklands as a priority area with policies for 
jobs for local people. public housing and an improved 
transport system. 
An amalgamation- of the resources of the GLC with the local 
groups involved in the campaign ensured technical support- 
frompthe GLC Scientific Services Branch. in the form of 
information on. -noise regulations. runway lengths and flight 
take-off patterns. The Public Inquiry into the STOLport was 
announced to begin in June 1983. The Campaign in 
conjunction with Newham Docklands Forum decided that a 
'people's plan' for the Docklands area would strengthen and 
support the arguments that were opposed to the STOLport... 
Financial aid was gained from the PPU and Newham Council for 
a shopfront resource office to co-ordinate proposals-for the 
people's plan. The GLC-approved f, 14,000 for five staff 
over a five month period. staff were local people-with 
detailed knowledge of the issues and needs-of-the area and 
the different community groups involved in the Plan. The 
Campaign sought to involve as many local people in the. 
proposals for the Plan and solutions to the problems facing 
the Docklands-area-by door-to-door canvassing, neighbourhood 
meetings and'a newsletter. - The People's'Plan focused on job 
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creation through the match of local skills to local 
resources (Newham Docklands Forum and the GLC PPU 1983). 
The LDDC objected to the presentation of the People's Plan 
at the Inquiry but the GLC had the power to insist, they 
were also able to assist with the legal costs so that the 
Campaign could employ its own lawyer. What the Campaign 
achieved was the ability for local people to formally 
present their opposition to the LDDC proposals at the 
Inquiry. Since then the struggle has continued, 
particularly over noise levels. The People's Plan Centre 
was refunded by Newham Council after the abolition of the 
GLC in 1986, though without any full-time workers. 
Several potential problems emerged from the PPU involvement 
in the Docklands Plan. Despite formal equality the GLC had 
all the power in terms of funding the organisation and could 
easily have dominated the Plan's development. Thus there 
was the necessity to ensure the correct balance between a 
hands on and a supporting role or the popular planning 
approach would have been downgraded into a more consultative 
participation arrangement. In addition,, there was political 
pressure on the PPU to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
their approach, at a meeting to launch the People's Plan 
there were disagreements over the publicity, with some local 
groups feeling that the GLC and the PPU were gaining the 
publicity for what had been an essentially on-going campaign 
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against dock closure since before the GLC took office. 
Whilst the GLC had the financial resources to support the 
Campaign a fine balance was also needed between what was 
essentially prefigurative policies and what could be 
delivered. In addition, local opinion over the LDDC 
proposals was divided, some of the local residents were in 
favour of the LDDC feeling that more jobs would be created 
by the LDDC than by the alternative plan. ' Indeed the budget 
for the LDDC in 1985/6 was £73 million compared to the-f2 
million budget of the GLC and the GLEB (Macintosh and 
wainwright 1987). 
This example of the popular planning strategy points to the 
way that the GLC could act to facilitate local campaigns 
through the provision of resources and expertise, but the 
approach was not without its problems. 
The popular planning strategy gained publicity through the 
Docklands Plan and other plans such as the Lewisham Energy 
Plan. Their role was overtly prefigurative and gained much 
success through the newsletter. As importantly.. they 
achieved a cultural breakthrough with the 'Jobs. For A 
Chance' music festivals organised by the PPU and the 
reduction of costs of entry to places of entertainment, such 
as the Southbank complex. 
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5.9 THE GREATER LONDON ENTERPRISE BOARD (aLEB). 
The GLEB-was created by the GLC in July 1982 as a limited 
company desiCned to implement their Industry and Employment 
policies. It opened for business in January 1983. The GLEB 
was financed, until the abolition of the GLC, primarily by 
Section 137 of the 1972 Local Government Act; this refers to 
the two pence rate to be used for the benefit of Londoners. 
In addition, the GLEB was free to obtain finance from other 
agencies in the public and private sector in hand with its 
investment procramme for job creation and-job preservation. 
The operational guidelines for the BLEB were formulated by 
the Industry and Employment Committee of the GLC. The main 
objective was to reverse industrial decline by a strategy of 
intervention and planning for key aspects of the local 
economy. The GLEB had a brief to provide technical and 
financial support to enterprises and make investment 
interventions that would further the development of London's 
industrial base, improve technological prospects and thereby 
preserve employment (Mole and Elliott 1987). 
An annual funding agreement reached with the GLEB by the GLC 
Provided a budget of £30 million in 1982/3. £25 million in 
1983/4 and estimates for-C-33 million in 1985/6 (GLEB 1985). 
Decisions on investment were to be based on-both economic 
and social criteria. The investment functions covered three 
: 30 
main areas: - 
1. Investment to promote strategic'or structural chance. 
This refers to investments in industrial co-operatives. new 
public enterprise and municipal enterprise; areas which were 
central to the London Industrial Strategy (LIS) and which 
were unlikely to be supported by existing private sources of 
funds. 
2. General investment. covers funding to both public and 
private sector enterprises within Greater London, however 
within this category priority is given'to enterprises that 
are newly starting up, at risk of closure or operating in 
areas of high unemployment, whether this is a geographical 
area or a particular trade and where retraining 
opportunities are evident. 
3. Development refers to-site acquisition, factory"buildint 
and other related activities (Barratt-Brown 1984a). 
The objectives of the GLEB. were set out in their Corporate 
Plan (GLEB 1985). Financial assistance was linked to social 
objectives, *,, the promotion of enterprise planning and 
industrial democracy through planning agreements, including 
the promotion of equal opportunities for women, ethnic 
minorities and the disabled. 
The strategy rested on the creation of a number. of 
functional divisions- within the organisations 
Sector Development - where possible, GLEB would assist in 
the development of Londons industries to benefit both 
consumers and workers. Based on an understanding of the 
fundamental characteristics of each'target sector, the 
formulation of restructuring plans, and their implementation 
by specialists-through the GLEB's investment strategies. 
Equal Opportunities - GLEB aimed ' to' tackle racial and sexual 
discrimination in all its projects. Enterprises were 
encouraged to promote equal opportunities and practice for 
women, ethnic. minorities and people with disabilties. 
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Conditions which linked financial support to the achievement 
of these objectives was applied. 
Novel methods of social ownership and control - this 
involved the formulation of an Enterprise Plan, the precise 
form differed according to circumstances. In all cases 
trade union access was required and an emphasis was put on 
the improvement of job quality. 
New forms of property development - property initiatives 
were pursued with the involvement of the-local comunity, to 
provide infrastructural support for technology, projects and 
area initiatives. The GLEE selected two areas as special 
initiatives; the Hackney Road and the Royal Docks. Area 
offices were set up, staffed jointly with the GLC, to 
co-ordinate and integrate the full range of GLEB's programme 
within the two areas. 
Acknowledging the acceleration of technological chance, GLEBý 
will continue to play a leading role in the promotion of 
socially-useful applications of technology, and will 
actively encourage links between the academic and commercial 
worlds. 
Company restructuring -'GLEE will play an exemplary role in 
restructuring and reviving companies in difficulties by the 
use of enterprise planning and the application and 
identification of entrepreneurial skills. 
The Co-operative Sector - Co-operatives will be fostered and 
supported because they represent one radical method of 
worker involvement in production. 
Education and Information - GLEB will publicise its approach 
to the problems facing the London economy and the role that 
Londoners can play, using methods which encourage two-way 
communication with the public (GLEB 1985 p. 6) 
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To ensure the implementation of the strategy the GLEB drew, 
on personnel from a wide variety of backgrounds. The Board 
of part-time directors had backgrounds from the private, 
public and voluntary' sectors. and knowledge and experience 
of business; finance. applied technology, local government, 
co-operatives and the trade union movement. The GLEB 
houses seven functional divisions; 
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Sector strategy investigates particular industries of 
importance to the Greater London economy and develops 
strategies which guide the GLEB Intervention. 
Investment Division provides financial and business 
management appraisal. 
Structural Investment concerns itself with enterprise 
planning, liason with trades unions, and the development of 
co-operatives. new forms of ownership and control and 
industrial democracy. 
The Area and Property Division tackles the problem of 
dereliction and high unemployment in parts of London, and is 
developing an integrated system of property development 
advice in line with Enterprise Board policies. 
The Technology Division sees new product proposals through 
from initial design to the establishment of manufacturing 
enterprises. -and links academic research to groups in the 
community with ideas. through a series of technology 
networks. 
A Finance and Administration Division handles the internal 
organisation of the GLEB. and an Information Division 
promotes all aspects of the Board's work through press 
liaison, publications and exhibitions (GLEE 1983 P. 7). 
For the BLEB the primary emphasis was not a financial return 
on investment; projects and enterprises supported needed tö 
be viable, however investment appraisal included the 
assessment of a social return on the community. . 
The 
willingness of enterprises in receipt of GLEB support to 
enter into planning agreements, the provision of eQual 
employment opportunities, the manufacture of socially useful 
products are examples of possible social benefits. This 
general approach was summarised by the GLEB's former 
director, Alan Mcaarvey: 
'WO do require all our investment projects to be 
economically viable - otherwise jobs saved or created cannot 
be secure. But we do not look for the maximum financial 
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return. Instead we look for a social return, in terms of 
the number of Jobs - and equally important, their quality. 
Our policy of enterprise planning seeks to guarantee work 
people basic rights - to trade union organisation. to basic 
information about their company, to equal opportunities, and 
to a voice in the future of their companies. 
Willingness to implement these policies is a condition'of 
BLEB assistance. just as much as economic viability. 
Projects which meet these two criteria are also judged by 
how they contribute to other social objectives. Is the 
product socially-useful? Is the project of special benefit 
to women or ethnic minorities? Is the enterprise a 
co-operative. or one that contributes in some way to greater 
industrial democracy? If the answer to any of these is 
'yes', the project has added weight. 
But we also follow strategic objectives for specific key 
sectors of London's economy. worked out in our sector 
strategy division in co-operation with the GLC's Economic 
Policy Group. These strategies don't just provide a 
framework for judging the projects that apply to us for 
assistance. They provide a basis for us to go out and 
actively seek investment openings where we feel this would 
give us a vehicle for implementing our strategic plans for 
particular sectors. (GLC 1984a). 
The GLEB attempted to achieve these goals by investing in 
selected areas of high unemployment, and in selected 
industrial sectors. The approach may best be illustrated by 
looking at the types of intervention and investment that the 
GLEB has made. 
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5.10 GLEB INVESTMENTS. 
In its first year of operation the GLEE found itself 
inundated with requests for assistance. Crisis management. 
that is, rescues of enterprises facing difficulties or 
closure comprised a large part of investment activity. The 
attempt to avoid job loss in larger enterprises was. a 
central concern. it was in this area that 'enterprise 
planning' and increased industrial democracy were 
particularly applicable. The following example demonstrates 
the approach. 
The GLC Industrial Development Unit operated an early 
warning system for firms that were in financial difficulties 
or under threat of closure. One of the few remaining car 
component firms in London producing lamps and mirrors came 
into this category and the GLEB's attention was drawn to it. 
The trade union convenor, together with the manager made an 
approach to GLEB. The problem was the attitude or the 
owners to the business. After lengthy negotiations' they 
agreed to sell. Talks were also held with British Leyland. 
the firm's main customer. The BLEB bought the company with 
a . P_90,000 stake in its future development, thus the 
employment of 200 workers was secured. The company was not 
making losses but needed financial investment in the modern 
equipment and production systems necessary to continue to 
operate in a hiZhly competitive market. 
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A new management board was established of BLEB Directors and 
existing managers. An enterprise plan was negotiated. 
between the GLEB, management and the Unions to include 
training, industrial relations, equal opportunity 
-provisions, new products, new investments, future wage and 
price levels and a-lasting collective bargaining procedure 
over these matters. With new ideas from the workforce and 
with technological back-up from GLEB's New Technology 
Network, it was. intended to help the company to diversify 
away from its total dependence on the motor car industry 
(Barratt-Brown 1984b). Worker involvement--in enterprise 
planning and the stress. that was put on-new product 
development and manufacturing opportunities had much to do 
with the influence on the strategy of the Lucas Plan 
initiative and, the-development of workers' plans in other 
industries, together with the 1973 Labour Party Programme on 
the NEB and planning agreements. 
The GLEB also invested in: a range of workers' co-operatives, 
many of them serving 'social markets' or'providina community 
services. The social criteria for ' investments stand out 
clearly in this context. For example, Lambeth Toys is a 
co-operative producing educational toys that reflect the 
multicultural nature of London. Turnaround is a 
distribution. co-operative specialising in, books and 
pamphlets produced by independent, radical and, communit', 
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publishers that are often ignored. by the major distributors; 
their range covers feminist, peace, gay, ethnic minority, 
industrial and environmental issues (GLEB 1984b). 
Product diversification as a means of regenerating 
enterprises was a factor in many of the GLEB Investments.. 
For example, Walter Howard Design, a furniture company in 
receipt of GLEB support, and involved in high-volume- 
production of low-priced bedroom and living room furniture 
had its premises refitted and redesigned in preparation for 
a new phase of development. The new design-led product 
range that was planned was aimed at markets in the higher, 
quality furniture sector (BLEB 1984b). 
Another example of GLEB support for innovation was Wagon '" 
Unloaders Ltd., a Chiswick company which was developing a 
novel form of freight unloading: the UndeRover. The product 
was devised in response to British Rails call for a mobile 
unloader which could reduce the prohibitive costs of current 
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freight handling which force many smaller companies to 
transport bulk by road. The BLEB acted to put the company 
in touch with AMD Engineering. another BLEB investment whose 
precision skills in engineering were important to the 
project. A prototype of the UndeRover, & , single-person 
operated, self-powered mobile unloader which could handle. 
solid fuel, grain, minerals, chemical powders and other-dri 
Soods, was developed with the help of British Rail Research 
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and the National Materials Handling Centre at Crantield. 
The P-50,000 investment by the GLEB was matched with a 
f50,000 grant from the Department of Industry under the 
Government's Support for Innovation Scheme (GLEB 1984b). 
5.11 TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVES. 
The GLEB formulated a two-pronged approach to technology, on 
the one hand a commitment to the design/development of. 
socially-useful products by the creation of a series of 
Technology Networks. -And on the other hand the development 
of a technological base via property developments; the 
Technology Parks. This latter side of the strategy was 
aimed at the 'sunrise industries' of microelectronics, 
computers and robotics. 
The Technology Parks were essentially property developments 
with housing for small new technology enterprises. They 
were established around an existing high-technology firm in 
receipt of GLEB assistance. The cluster of 
similarly-oriented companies in the electronics sector* for 
example, could provide a more secure path to the longer-term 
development of these companies. 
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The Technology Networks established by the Technology 
Division of the BLEB were designed to promote technology 
transfer from academic institutions to local enterprises, 
and encourage community and workplace involvement in the 
design/development of socially-useful products. The 
Technology Networks are the focus of the case-study and are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
In this section the Technology Parks are discussed in more 
detail. The Synergy Centre was established around AMD 
Engineering in Richmond, a company involved in the 
development and production of robotic technologies. The 
London Production Centre was set up in Wandsworth based on a 
Rediffusion electronics plant and the Whitechapel Computer 
Works was established in the West End. These Parks were 
essentially property developments of the more traditional 
variety described in Chapter Three. The BLEB bought the 
premises. provided support in the form of'finance and 
business facilities. to existing enterprises. and offered 
nursery unit space for other small start-up enterprises 
operating in the same technological sector. The expectation 
was that, the Technology Networks would provide back-up, 
technical support, particularly LNTN which was involved in 
the application of new technologies. 
The Technology Parks represent an attempt to intervene in 
the innovation process in the diffusion and adoption stage, 
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as well as. in new product development. The facilitation of 
the diffusion stage of the innovation process was a key,, 
component of the WMEB strategy, particularly in the area-of 
manufacturing technologies, and was also evident-in 
Sheffield City Council's decision to establish a Technology 
Campus (see Chapter Three). 
The general guidelines for investment by, the GLEB operated. 
also in the Technology Parks with enterprise planning a 
central part of the investment package. It was in this 
respect that the BLEB strategy differed from more 
traditional approaches discussed earlier. - - 
A brief description of three of these Centres serves to 
indicate the approach. 
The Synergy Centre, known more formally as the Marble Hill 
Technology Centre was established by the GLEB in April 1984. 
It was based around AMD Engineering a company rescued from 
receivership by a GLEB investment of '205,000. AMD 
Engineering was a company producing hiZh-quality components 
with a. skilled workforce of precision and product engineers. 
This was the core company on the 28,000-square feet. site. 
The intention was that a number of similar electronics and 
high-precision engineering enterprises could be housed on 
the site. Eventually it would become a manufacturing centre 
for robotics and associated technologies. It was planned. 
that. a company founded by John Reekie, -described-in the New 
Scientist as the 'Henry Ford of Robotics', would be 
established on the site. Reekie pioneered the production of 
cheap robotics from standardised parts, including robotic 
teaching aids, and a, computer-controlled robot arm. The 
firm were working on a small-tracked vehicle for bomb 
disposal, fire fighting and similar uses (BLEB 1984a). 
The Synergy Park, -according to Dr. M. Cooley, the Director of 
the Technology Division at the GLEB; 
'will ensure a working community of interdependent high 
technology companies, -sharing facilities. -striking sparks 
off each other, and ensuring that their work, and the 
subcontracting it will produce, all stays in-London'. 
In particular the high-technology firms would be able to use 
the skills of AMD craftworkers for their specialised 
prototype and production engineering requirements (GLEB 
1984a). 
The tenant enterprises shared wages administration.. a 
canteen, a creche, switchboard, and human centred Computer 
Aided Desizn facilities. Tenants were also required to 
negotiate and implement an enterprise plan with the GLEB. 
For example. the Enterprise Plan negotiated with: AMD 
Engineering and the relevant trade union (AUEW), included 
the clause; 'the company will always seek to produce 
products which are socially-useful. No products will be 
manufactured which will be used in aggressive acts of war, 
or are capable of being so used'. in addition there were 
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provisions for worker participation and access to 
information via consultative procedures and the 
establishemnt of an elected union worker-director on the 
company board. 
Whitechapel Computer Works. was established to support 
computer hardware manufacturing in London. This start-up 
enterprise was involved in the manufacture and prototype 
development of the MGI, a 32-bit workstation with a very 
high resolution graphics capacity. The American computer 
journal Byte called it 'the first truly personal 
workstation'. it had particular relevance to-CAD 
applications. The company was based on the GLC owned 
Whitechapel Technology Centre. 
The London Production Centre (LPC) was the outcome of a four 
and a half million pound investment by the GLEB in a two 
acre site in Wandsworth. The. move by Rediffusion Radio 
Systems Ltd. to Crawley meant the loss of a hundred jobs for 
employees unable to make the move. The GLEB scheme meant 
that these 100 skilled workers could move into smaller 
companies operating on the site. The specialised companies 
included Broomhill Electronics, producing circuit boards, 
wiring harnesses and other equipment. Other companies on 
the site were Involved in activities ranging from plating 
and spraying, packaging and shipping to printing and 
maintenance. The remaining space of around 70 per cent of 
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the site was to be converted by the LPG into workshops, 
office and studio space, with a special emphasis on uses 
related to the electronics industry (GLEB 1984c). 
The LPC represented an attempt to support strategic 
industries like electrical, electronic and instrument 
engineering in London. The commitment to 'nurturing' small 
companies gives a priority to premises. Andy Hartwill 
employed in the Area and Property Division of the BLEB 
stated: 
'We've already got places to put very small companies when 
they're just starting out but, at some stage; you have to go 
into volume production - that's where LPC comes in' 
(Electrical Review 7.12.84). 
The technology networks provided facilities for small batch 
production in start-up enterprises, it was envisaged that 
LPC and the companies operating there. could provide further 
manufacturing opportunities for several satellite-design and 
marketing companies with prototype products. This sort of 
strategy would solve the problem of links with the 
commercial manufacturing world. This technology transfer 
strategy was planned for certain products developed through 
the networks, for example, the microelectronic based energy 
saving controllers for domestic and industrial heating and 
ventilation developed through LEEN. In the London 
Technology Strategy (Blackburn and Sharpe 1987). it was 
stated that the-eventual objective was four to six product 
design and marketing companies based`on the London 
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Production Centre site clustered around Broomhill 
electronics as the manufacturer. 
The support for the diffusion of new technologies in the 
Technology Centres by the provision of premises, shared 
facilities and the possibility of on-site subcontracting 
work was part of a policy designed to lay the base for the 
establishment of high-technology manufacturing centres in 
key industries in London. 
5.12 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION. 
In a review article Benincton (1986) lists the main 
characteristics of the radical local authority initiatives. 
they; 
a. see the public sector as the necessary stimulus for 
economic change. 
b. see lack of planning as a major cause of. economic° 
decline, and aim to develop new forms of industrial and 
sectoral planning, backed up. by popular involvement. 
c. give priority to the defence and development of existing 
indigenous industries, technologies and jobs. 
d. focus on the sphere of production. as the basis for 
economic regeneration. 
The effective implementation of their strategy would have - 
meant a restructuring of the local economy in the interests 
of labour. Clearly, this did not happen. The 
pre-figurative or exemplary nature of the policy initiatives 
coupled with the power of rhetoric and politics makes any 
assessment a difficult undertaking. Sharples (1986) notes 
that this is because; `much of the local economics is, 
hypothetical, an account of what could be done with more 
resources, powers and time for-local authorities!. That 
said, it does not preclude a closer investigation of some of 
the problems faced by the GLC and the GLEB_with policy 
implementation. 
As mentioned in 5.1 the emphasis on the sphere-of prod'ction" 
was stroncly influenced by-the political economy of the 
C. S. E.. - 
Robin Murray (1985), the Chief Economic Adviser to 
the GLC wrote; 
'We see industrial policy as being primary, conducted not 
through--the general manipulation of markets, but by 
particular interventions in production, enterprise by 
enterprise, branch by branch, ' (he added) 'as long as the 
market and profitability remain the main economic mechanisms 
there will be an inherent tension'. (Further) 'in 
intervening in the market economy, what we aim to do is 
strengthen the socially-useful forces, however bound they 
may finally be by the conditions of profitability. That is 
why we speak of operating in and against the market'. 
This economic analysis is particularly suited to local 
authority economic intervention, a pointy supported by 
Sharplesý(1986)-when he notes that it plays down the 
importance of macro-economics and demand management, ' both 
outside the control, of'the local authority. For the 
GLC/CLEB the problems of the local economy. lay in, production 
rather than a lack of market demand, the focus of their 
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attention was= particularly on the manufacturing sector. For 
Murray (1985) progressive planning and sectorially targeted 
industrial investment was the route to economic 
regeneration. Nevertheless, the problems for local 
authority economic activity that were mentioned in Chapter 
Three-were evident if some of the GLEB's activities are 
looked at more closely. Not the least was the'tension 
inherent in the policy between social-use and profitability, 
between challenging or accommodating the realities of- 
productivity-and market competitiveness. This was the same 
tension that emerged with the Labour Party Programme of 1973 
and articulated-as: should the criteria for. economic 
intervention support or supplant market forces (see 5.3). 
The legislative and financial constraints affecting local 
authorities means that economic intervention'will 
necessarily have a marginal impact on the local economy. In 
many cases the ownership and control of companies lies 
outside the local area (Cochrane 1983). The lack of 
statutory powers of intervention meant that the GLEB were 
dependent on companies approaching them for assistance, this 
was the only way that they could obtain any leverage over 
company activities. Thus, the GLEB faced the same problems 
that bedevilled the NEB established by the Labour Party in 
1975. In its earlier stages it led to an emphasis on 
rescues of enterprises facing difficulties, in its later 
stages when sectoral strategies were"more. developed, it 
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severely curtailed effective-implementation. 
The companies that approached the, GLEB. were usually facing 
cash-flow problems, imminent closure or difficulties 
relating to maintaining competitiveness with outdated 
equipment. Support for product diversification was seen as 
central to the. economic regeneration of failing enterprises. 
or enterprises which needed to increase their 
competitiveness in a particular market. The BLEB provided 
risk capital to start-up and largerexisting enterprises for 
. commercially-oriented product 
development which, though 
problematic. offered"the possibility of some commercial 
success and job preservation. However, in its early stages 
of operation, the GLEB found that enterprises in need of 
support did not require much technological aid, rather-it 
was more a question of the, retention or expansion of 
existing markets and production activities in selected 
sectors. 
In an interview (Interview-Johnson 1986) with an employee at 
the. Technology Division of the BLEB in 1986 the difficulties 
experienced by, the GLEB were described. He. argued. that 
criticism. of the GLEB. tended to focus on"its, structural-and 
managerial nature. In fact. to understand the failure of 
some. of their portfolio investments it is necessary to look 
at the economy and. the problems in particular industrial 
sectors of markets and terms of trade. The main question 
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should have-been are projects able to continue on that 
basis, rather than-can jobs be saved. According to the 
interviewee, in view of the problems faced by the economy 
most investments made by the BLEB were mistimed and 
inadequate in terms of finance. One example is that of a 
foundry in Croyden. Their market was almost entirely 
composed of one customer, a company producing washing 
machines. The targets that the foundry needed to reach to 
become economically viable were all over-estimated. plans 
were afoot to expand even though they were unable to 
maintain supplies to existing customers. For the foundry. 
terms of trade worsened, their equipment was outdated and 
they could not deliver the quality. Within this industrial 
sector the name of the game is quick turnaroundý, and high 
quality. The firm drifted along, for a while and eventually 
collapsed. Newman (1986) notes . 
that. the bankrupcy of - 
William Howard-Designs following an investment: -of, 500,000 
was a 'spectacular example of-the problems involved in 
putting new investment into enterprises with capital,, 
shortages and management and market problems. 
With many of their interventions the BLEB faced the 
constraint, of. poor quality"manazement. John Palmer, the 
former Director of the-Information Division at the GLEB 
articulated the problem; 
There was a 'quite appalling dearth of quality professional 
management to be found,. particularlv.. in small to 
medium-sized businesses. All too many firms-who find 
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themselves seeking help from local enterprise boards or 
other agencies are in that position because of the low grade 
quality of their management as much as any other factor. 
Even when enterprise boards start off with a 
determination to maintain a hands' distance' relationship 
with their investments they often find themselves being 
drawn into direct management' (Guardian 24.12.85). 
This posed problems for the GLEB who did not have marketing 
and entrepreneurial expertise. largely as a consequence of 
the difficulties of recruiting personnel with the correct 
mixture of skills. Newman (1986) summed up the problem when 
she wrote; 
"There are few committed to the GLEB approach who have a 
financial or industrial background together with experience 
of industrial democracy. the GLEB underestimated the 
importance, of the new type of management skills required'. 
The GLEB encouraged"in-house product diversification in 
enterprises it supported, it also encouraged new product 
development through the Technology Networks. Where product 
development-was'supported it was found that although 
products had been developed to marketable product stage, 
industrial partners and private investors were not easy to 
find for'the stage°of moving to full-scale production. This 
was the case with two of the products developed in the 
London Energy and Emplöyment Network's-workshops. -'John 
Palmer, the former Director of the Information Division at 
the BLEB"saw this as one of the difficulties faced by 
enterprise boards: 
'There have been cases where local enterprise boards have 
facilitated the development of innovative and potentially 
world-beating new products only to find that it is next to 
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impossible-to secure commercial exploitation (Guardian 
24.12.85). 
Whilst the GLEB were able to provide `seed-corn' finance to 
inventors to support projects at the development stage they 
did not have the resources to invest in full-scale 
manufacture and production. The original idea was that such 
products would prove attractive to commercial interests. 
Once developed to manufacturable stage, the product would be 
taken up by the conventional market mechanism with possibly 
the original company itself being taken over by a larger 
one. There are several' reasons why small firms " 
manufacturing single products are not very viable commercial 
projects= the costs of manufacture of an untried and tested 
product, the finance for new product development or products 
are considered too novel (Mole and Elliott 1987). To some 
extent this problem was addressed in the Technology Centres. 
The manufacture of high-technology components in"the core 
company on the site solved the problem of access to 
manufacturing'opportunities and moving from product 
development into volume production for smaller start-up 
enterprises. The aim was to link the innovative power of 
the Networks (discussed in Chapter Six) to. a federated 
cluster of development, production and marketing companies 
with adequate manufacturing capacity. 
The BLEB strategy stressed the sphere of production rather 
than distribution or marketing. For interventions the 
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social objectives of Job creation and preservation 
necessitated the-economic viability of the company. Thus 
with rescues the GLEB were forced to operate within the 
market. Enterprise planning was the means-by which the 
wider social objectives could be achieved. However this 
raised the other problem that emerged from the Labour Party 
Programme in the 1970s; how were implementation and- 
monitoring to be achieved? Cochrane (1983) noted the 
difficulties of monitoring planning agreements for 
enterprise boards. Enterprise planning was dependent on 
strong workforce representation via trade unions for 
implementation. In this way top-down provisions by the GLEB 
could be met with shop-floor planning from-below. - 
This part 
of the initiative built on the experience, of workers' plans 
during the 1970s. However, the Lucas Plan represented part 
of a campaign against redundancies, it was not anon-going 
political project in the company. Enterprise. planning has 
never. been part of the trade union culture, in the 1970s 
their response to the Bullock Report indicated their belief, 
that it was incompatible. with collective bargaining 
procedures (see 5.3). Thus, even in enterprises with a 
strong trade union. orsanisation this part of-the economic. 
initiative would-face problems. In addition, many. of the 
companies that approached the GLEB were medium to small in 
size and had only a weak trade union organisation, so-that 
it proved difficult for workers to participate effectively, 
To achieve effective implementation the policy would require 
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the BLEB to take an active role in the day-to-day management 
of the company. In an article on the GLEB. Ines Newman 
(1986) an employee of the London Borough of<Hackney Economic 
Development Unit. raised the problem of monitoring in 
relation to equal opportunities, particularly in skilled 
manual areas of employment which are traditional male 
preserves. The strategy faced the problem of fostering 
social investments-or furthering social objectives that in 
many places hardly exist in the real world; for example, 
equal opportunities for women, in male-dominated areas of 
employment, black enterprises and enterprises run by women. 
This brief run-down of some`of the problems facing an 
economic strategy of this kind illustrates the difficulties 
for an organisation- like the GLEB of operating within a 
capitalist system in the throes of economic recession. 
Coupled with the external constraints on policy 
implementation were co-ordination difficulties between the 
OLC and the GLEB. Different groups within the organisations 
pulled in different directions. some emphasised new 
products. some sector strategies and some property 
developments (Mole and Elliott 1987). The background and 
particular concerns'of"key individuals had an enormous 
impact on policy formulation and implementation. Mike 
Cooley, the Director of the Technology Division at the GLEB 
'product championed' the Technology Networks. Their brief 
closely followed the experiences of alternative product 
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development. emphasised in the Lucas Plan. Popular planning 
was very much the central concern for Hilary. Wainwright; the 
Director of this Unit at the GLC. Her background in the 
womens movement and workers' planning served to emphasise 
the pre-figurative nature of the GLC approach. Whilst the 
different political orientations of groups and individuals 
does not preclude their working together on a co-ordinated 
economic policy, it did mean that the strengths of 
personalities was. a relevant, and sometimes oppositional. 
factor in the achievement-of a co-ordinated policy. 
Throughout the period of office for the Labour GLC policy 
initiatives received high media profile. This pressure 
forced the need for 'successes' to exemplify the 'value for 
money' of a politically interventionist-approach. Again 
this acted to force the initiative toward a rescue-type 
approach where 'jobs saved' could be headline news. The job 
creation and preservation brief for the GLEB presented 
dilemmas in the form of where to aim priority investment. 
Should the GLEB support new small businesses in 
high-technology areas# such as in the Technology Parks, or 
concentrate on saving existing Jobsand funding, labour 
intensive co-ops making socially-useful products. The 
constraint on public spending meant that the possibility of 
influencing public sector demand for socially-useful 
products was minimal. Products may be socially-needed but 
it was difficult to create a specific economic demand-for 
zs3 
them. An urgent requirement was for ways of. creating 
markets. for example, buy locally, brand image (GLC 
product), mechanisms for linking producers with consumers. 
The Labour Group's original manifesto commented that 
'although national measures will also be necessary. there is 
much that a regional authority like the GLC could do' 
(Barratt-Brown 1984a). Barratt-Brown. a member of the 
Economic Policy Group at the GLC, went on to argue that the 
GLC's overall programme of, investing in'jobs and 
restructuring the London's economy; 
'was, in effect, rendered impossible by the absence of any 
positive national measures. indeed by the privatisation of 
the public sector and by the capping of Local Government 
rates and ultimately the abolition of the GLC. ' 
He suggested that ultimately much of the GLC's industry and 
employment work was inevitably therefore defensive - trying 
to resist cuts. 
The effect of these legislative pressures on the GLC/GLEB 
was explained by an employee at the Technology Division of 
the GLEE (Interview-Johnson 1986). With the planned 
abolition of the GLC in April 1986. restrictions on funding 
were introduced by central government in 1985 (see Chapter' 
Three). The GLEB's own funding was curtailed at the 
beginning of 1985 which led to restrictions on new 
investments, and difficulties of funding existing portfolio 
investments that required relatively large amounts. From 
mid-1985 the BLEB Board were not keen to commit new money. 
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The Conservative Environment Secretary, Kenneth Baker, 
argued for an increased-accountability for the BLEB once the 
GLC was abolished.. During the plans for the changeover of 
funding from the GLC to the London Boroughs. funding for the 
GLEB of eight million was tied up by the Conservative 
Government, thus they were unable to continue. many projects. 
With the impending collapse of key projects, a project team 
approach was developed in GLEB to support-these, enterprises. 
However, as one commentator working in the GLEB at that 
time noted, these teams were literally made up of people who 
were willing to get involved but did not have the relevant 
expertise. - 
Funding continued to be a problem and in early 1986 the GLEB 
was re-organised and slimmed down from a staff of 90 to 66. 
Splits began to emerge in the organisation between employees 
with a commitment to the principles of the OLEB, and other 
whom the commentator termed 'careerists'. 
At the time of writing the GLEB still exists, although it 
has slimmed again to thirty five people. The funding it 
receives is from small subscriptions from the London 
Boroughs. and the sale of viable projects and property. The 
funding largely goes towards wages. Spending on investment 
requires residual monies to achieve a coing concern status. 
This has had a drastic effect on viable protects, for 
example, AMD Engineering faced cash-flow problems-that would 
Alsz, 
have, been alleviated by the end of-the year, but the BLEB 
were unable to provide investment. 
This discussion of the problems facins policy implementation 
for the GLEB has made the strategy sound like a rather ad 
hoc- entrepreneurial initiative. - It was an economically and 
politically ambitious project, bound by its very context to 
run into difficulties. As Ken Livingstone, leader of the GLC 
wrote; 
'The Labour Party has seized on the important but limited 
success of Labour council Enterprise Boards as the answer to 
our problems at exactly the same time we have realised the 
limits of their effectiveness' (Guardian 23.9.85). 
The radical economic strategy based on production for social 
need was difficult to put into' practice in existing 
enterprises. In the next chapter the Technology Networks 
are looked at in detail. Their potential role in a policy 
based on planned production for social need centred around 
the design/development of socially-useful products and the 
close connection between producers and users. Benington 
(1986) summarises this approach to an economic strategy. 
The local authority is in a good position. to recognise unmet 
needs, often their collective provision is included-in their 
statutory duties, for example. the heating needs of council 
tenants, aids-for disabled and so on. The Technology 
Networks were designed to act as a bridge between users with 
unmet needs and unused technical capacity. In some cases 
the local authority (ea. the development in Sheffield of a 
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dehumidifier to tackle the problems of dampness and 
condensation in older housing) has been able to provide both 
the finance and skill to develop the product, and the 
purchasing power to provide a stable market. The role of 
the-Technology Networks in this form of economic strategy is 
discussed in Chapters Six and Seven. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE TECHNOLOGY NETWORKS. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION. 
Local authorities have developed their role in economic 
development largely as a response to growing unemployment 
and local industrial decline. With only limited financial 
resources many policy initiatives have been only indirectly 
concerned with the creation of employment (see Chapter 
Three). The GLC/GLEB explicitly identified technological 
innovation in the form of socially-useful products as one 
means to create employment. They were. concerned to 
influence the political allocation of resources to_ 
technology and thereby achieve. some leverage over the form 
and direction of product development. But equally 
importantly, they were concerned to influence the nature of 
the technology itself by creating the facilities to 
encourage an alternative social organisation of the product 
design/development process in the form of the Technology 
Networks. 
The GLC/GLEB. approach to technology was strategic, in the 
sense that its response to technological opportunities was 
to provide 'seed-corn' finance to projects at an early stage 
of development. This point in project/product development 
zirla 
is an area where difficulties maybe encountered in gaining 
access to funding from the more traditional sources. such 
as. banks, venture capital agencies and so on. 
The Technology Networks and Technology Parks represented the 
main elements of the GLC/GLEB Technology Strategy. In both 
areas the aim was to 'nurture' the design/development of new 
products. The Technology Networks were designed to give 
back-up support and facilities to user groups, and, in 
addition, to facilitate technology transfer from academic 
institutions to local enterprises. The Technology Networks 
comprise. the focus of the empirical research. The 
Technology Parks, described in the previous chapter, -were 
designed to provide a secure environment for start-up 
enterprises. 
The general economic and social criteria for investment in 
companies formulated by the GLEB applied also to 
technological projects. Priority was given to projects- 
which had technological implications for the local community 
and the local boroughs. Particular emphasis was given to 
socially -useful products and exemplary projects which 
extended technological opportunities to otherwise 
disadvantaged groups, for example, training in new 
technology-for women and ethnic minorities. 
The technological areas that were delineated as appropriate 
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for the GLEB Technology Division support were areas which 
did not have huge entry costs* were'not capital intensive 
and did not use technology to downgrade or destroy skills 
and knowledge. In relation to the Technology Networks. the 
GLEWs role in technology policy was to create the 
facilities for the development and promotion of 
socially-useful products and technology transfer through the 
Technology Networks to local enterprises. 
This chapter describes the background.. role and operations 
of the Technology Networks and comprises information gained 
through interviews with respondents who were directly 
involved in the technology policy implementation process. 
First the background to the idea of the Technology Networks 
is'described and then a short case-study of each Network is 
presented. Findings are collated. under the general headings 
of a) background. b); policy, c). day-to-day operations, d) 
user involvement, e) access to technical resources and f) 
socially-useful products. 
6.2 BACKGROUND TO THE TECHNOLOGY NETWORKS. 
The Labour manifesto for the 1981 local Government of the 
'radical' Labour-controlled GLC put a special emphasis on 
- 'production for need', referring specifically to the Lucas 
Aerospace workers' campaign for the right to work on 
ocz ZLC 
socially-useful products (discussed in Chapter Two). The 
Manifesto read: 
Groups of workers such as the Lucas Aerospace Shop Stewards' 
Committee have, -with the support of the 
Labour Party, begun 
to develop ideas on alternative production - using 
technologies which interact with human skills; making goods 
which are conducive to human health and welfare; working in 
ways which conserve, rather than waste resources. 
We believe that these initiatives - which constitute a 
fundamental rejection of the values inherent in capitalist 
production - must be supported by a. Labour GLC. We shall 
therefore be'prepared to assist groups of workers seeking to 
develop alternative forms of production, with finance, with 
premises. or in other ways (Labour Party 1981). 
The Technology Division of the GLEE was responsible for the 
implementation of the technology strategy. The Director of 
the Division was Mike Cooley, who had been a leading figure 
in the formulation of the Lucas Plan. He joined the GLC in 
1982 as one of the first members of the Economic Policy 
Group. and he moved to head the Technology Division when 
GLEE became operational in 1983. The Technology Networks 
were based on two organisations that had been created to 
work on product proposals presented in the Lucas Plan: the 
Centre for Alternative Industrial and Technological Systems 
(CAITS) in London and the Unit for the Development of 
Alternative Products (UDAP) in Coventry. These 
ortanisations sought to develop product prototypes-on the 
basis that the more prototypes of alternative products 
designed and developed to meet the social needs of both the 
producer and the user, the stronger the bargaining poäition 
of workers fighting redundancies. 
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CAITSwas founded in 1978 at North East London Polytechnic 
by Richard Fletcher. a lecturer in the Engineering. 
Department and Mike Cooley. Activities at CAITS 
encompassed practical work on product prototypes and the 
political promotion of the concept of socially-useful 
production. Although a balance was sought between practical 
and political activities, CAITS became rather more 
well-known on the political side as a. centre of expertise on 
workers' plans and socially-useful production. 
UDAP was established in 1981 with funding from the Cadbury 
Trust. It is located in the Engineering Department of 
Lanchester Polytechnic and mainly emphasises the practical 
activities of work on product prototypes through student 
engineering projects. 
The Technology' Network proposals included both political and 
practical activities for the Promotion of socially-useful 
production. - Although they were not to be located within 
academic institutions. the links with these institutions was 
seen asa means to foster a 
. 
Pool of academic theoretical 
design and technical skills that could be-matched with the 
'tacit' knowledge; 'the things we know but cannot tell' 
(Polanyi 1976 p. 79) of workplace and community groups. The 
creation of facilities in the formýof the Networks would 
allow both forms of skill to be acknowledged, exercised and 
developed. The Networks were designed to facilitate-the 
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production of alternative products on a local or regional 
basis rather than only within companies, like Lucas 
Industries which employed a high proportion of design and 
technical staff (Wainwright and Elliott 1982). 
The Industry and Employment Committee of the GLC in its 
1982/3 Capital Programme for GLEB included a provision for 
expenditure of-up to j. 3.2 million on technology. It was 
proposed that the Council's concern to develop new 
technology would be most effectively implemented by the 
establishment through the GLEB of a number of area-based and. 
product-based Technology Networks incorporating innovation 
centres, product banks., machinery/production/equipment banks 
and technical support and advice units (GLC 1982). 
In,, their. General Policy Document (GLC 1982) the GLC 
acknowledged the need to look at the problem of technical 
chance in many of the industrial. sectors in London and to 
attempt to harness the appropriate use of new technology to 
the creation of employment. The support for new 
technologies was based on the view that 'human-centred'* 
technology, which builds on human skill rather than 
displaces it. was the preferred direction of technological 
advance. It was stated that 'new technology can be designed 
to maintain and develop existing manual skills and tacit 
knowledge in a way that enhances work rather than degrades 
a63 
it"(GLC 1982 p. 1) 
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Thus, whilst the GLC and GLEB recognised the importance of 
technology to the development of the London economy, the 
emphasis was put on *alternative ways'in which (it) can be 
introduced, which have quite different implications for 
energy and material use, for ecology, -for those who operate 
the new technology and for those who use or consume its 
product' (GLC 1982 p. 2). 
Two central propositions informed the GLC approach to 
technology: first, that 'one of London's most precious 
assets is the skill, the ingenuity, the creativity and the 
sheer enthusiasm of its people'; and second, 'London 
possesses in its three Universities and seven Polytechnics 
one of the richest scientific resources in the world' (GLC 
1982 p. 2). 
Against this background of thought on technological 
alternatives, and influenced'by the nature and role of CAITS 
and UDAP the creation of five Technology. Networks was 
proposed. The Networks were to exhibit the following 
features: 
a) they would be based in separate buildings or in a 
distinct area of an existing Polytechnic or University 
College. and be staffed by people who act as the interface 
between the professional scientists and the community. They 
would be sited and designed in order to welcome those who 
would normally be hesitant-to enter academic institutions, 
Perhaps having a shop-front as the Science Shops. have so 
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successfully done in the Netherlands., 
b) they would include a new enterprise support unit which 
could provide technical, production, planning and marketing 
advice to co-operative production and other similar 
initiatives, drawing on the expertise within the scientific 
institution, as well as the skill of their own small staff. 
c) the small interface unit would arrange for appropriate 
contact for people in the community to make use of the 
facilities of the polytechnics and universities for their 
own research and development needs. 
d) the centres would be intentionally sited. in localities 
rather than being concentrated at one place in London in 
order to widen the access of people to them. - At the same 
time they would be able to draw on GLEB's central 
technological resources for specialist help. 
e), the networks would also encourage undergraduate and 
post-graduate projects on product ranges that would be 
useful to the communities around them. 
f) we would expect some specialisms to develop between the 
networks, determined in part by the facilities and special 
expertise of the institutions to which they were linked 
(energy on the South Bank, for example), and in part on the 
needs of the area (ie, the need for mechanical and 
engineering technology in the West London area). 
g) each network would contribute to a product bank which 
would consist of a pool-of product innovations which would 
be patented for use by working people. An Innovation Bank of 
a similar sort has been developed in. Limerick`. iri"Ireland. 
sourced both by product ideas pröduced in "Ireland as well as 
those imported from abroad. The British Technology Group 
(BTG) also have available product proposals which may be 
licensed by enterprises. In the case of the technology, 
networks, we would expect ideas to be contributed Prom. the 
educational institutions. from technical and manual, workers 
in the workplace and communities, as well as being brought 
in from abroad. 
h) the networks would also include as appropriate a machine 
bank. consisting of second-hand machinery which had been 
refurbished as part of a training programme and was then 
available for use by co-operatives and other appropriate 
groups. 
i) the networks should aim to involve in their management 
and day to day operations not only representatives of the 
scientific community, and of locally-based workplace groups. 
but also representatives of the local community and other 
voluntary groups concerned with the development of 
abs 
socially-useful technology (GLC 1982 p. 3) 
The Industry and Employment Committee (IEC) Report on 
Technology Networks has been described in full because it 
provides a good account of the basic idea of a technology 
network - in theory. The creation of organisations to 
promote the appropriate use of technology to satisfy needs 
that are unmet by the market offers an example of an 
approach to technology transfer, product development and 
design which is democratically controllable and open to the 
influence of trade union and community groups. 
The central objectives of the Networks; user involvement in 
product design/development and the establishment of direct 
links between innovation and employment meant that in 
practice the networks differed quite substantially from the 
CAITS model. CAITS had clearly defined and focused 
activities in both a political and practical sense; it 
provided information and technical assistance to workers 
developing alternative plans in particular industrial 
sectors. The Networks were more loosely defined and faced 
the task of building their own political constituencies. 
Five Technology Networks were established, two were 
area-based and three were technology or issue based. The 
area-based networks were Thames Technet, the aouth-East 
network which was linked to Thames Polytechnic, and'the 
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Product and Employment Development Network for North and 
East London (PEDNEL). This latter network. was then chanced 
to the London Innovation Network (LIN);. and had links with 
the Polytechnic of North London and the Design Development 
Unit (DDU) at Middlesex Polytechnic. The three 
technology/issue based networks were the London Energy and 
Employment Network (LEEN) which focused on energy related 
equipment and services. the London New Technology Network 
(LNTN) which focused on microelectronics and information 
technology and'. Transnet which focused on transport issues 
and related technologies. Qti--e `ýE 4 .) 
The five networks had both trade union and community group 
representatives together with representatives from voluntary 
sector groups and the polytechnics on their management 
committees. They operated as independent organisations with 
their own buildings, administrative staff and workshop 
facilities. The funding of projects was via Technet Ltd., a 
company formed by the Technology Division at the GLEB. The 
Management Committee, known as the Network Council was 
responsible for policy decision-making within the general 
guidelines formulated by the BLEB, administrative staff were 
responsible for day-to-day management. 
It was envisaged that the Technology Networks would provide 
the research and development facilities, using the 
Polytechnic resources it neceaaariv, for the development of 
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prototype products which could feed into the GLEB"s wider 
strategy of support for new and existing enterprises. The 
product prototypes would then be produced and manufactured 
by BLEB supported enterprises and co-operatives. 
The technology networks represented elements in an 
essentially supply-side strategy (technology-push) to be met 
by the 'market' of unmet needs (demand) articulated. by the 
community and workplace groups involved in a process of 
local planning and enterprise planning. - The 'market''was 
seen to comprise of public sector service provision or the 
social market. - 
The major concern for the networks in their early stases was 
the formation of an organisation and focus that could-begin 
to address the problem of how to promote socially-useful 
technologies within the dominant culture of a competitive 
market economy. 
The wide brief of the Technology Networks meant that the 
forms of organisation and operations; the practical 
implementation of -the 
brief, depended, to a large extent on 
the perceptions and interpretations of key individuals 
directly involved in the policy process. As the Networks 
are described the differences between them and the 
strategies employed to achieve policy-objectives are 
apparent. 
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6.3 THE LONDON ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT NETWORK (LEEN). 
LEEK was the first network to be established. It was formed 
in 1983 and began life in County Hall. later moving to 
offices in Avonmouth Street beside the Greater London 
Enterprise Board (GLEB). The building, called the London 
Energy Centre. *housed substantial workshop facilities for 
product development. The LEEN finally settled in 
refurbished premises near Kings Cross. These moves reflect 
phases in the development of the network. 
a) Background. 
LEEN began as an umbrella organisation for a number of, 
groups interested in energy-related issues. these included 
the London Network for Alternative Technology and Technology 
Assessment (NATTA). the Intermediate Technology Development 
Group (ITDG). the Socialist Environment Resources 
Association (SERA), the Energy Resource Research (ERR) group 
and representatives from the South Bank Polytechnic's Centre 
for Energy Studies. In"addition, the Central London 
Polytechnic was involved via its support work for the- 
establishment of an Energy Conservation and Solar Centre 
(ECSC) which gradually took a leading role in LEEN. " Local 
Heating Action Groups, the Warmth Energy Saving Co-operative 
and the Lewisham Energy Centre became involved at a later 
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stage. The initial-formation of -the Network as a. loose 
federation of. interested groups meant that the development 
of. the Network could be-divided into two distinct phases. 
This-presented a choice of respondents to contact for the 
arrangement-of interviews. The decision was made to 
interview two people, from different groups. involved in the 
project during its initial phase; Adrian Atkinson from SERA 
and Colin Hines from ERR. and-to interview the Development 
Manager of LEEN after its re-organisation; Susie Parsons. 
At the outset LEEN had an open form of management and 
functioned as. -a funding body for. different organisations 
involved in particular energy projects. The main focal 
structures. were the. London Energy Centre-at Avonmouth Street 
and the ESCS at St. Pancras. 
The energy and. emplovment brief was very broad and posed 
difficulties for the initial activities of the definition 
and establishment of. a coherent organisation. The idea of a 
network was as a federation of groups that. came together to 
work on a particular project; this-'definition raised the 
problem of organisational structure (Interview-Atkinson 
1984). 
The model for innovation that formed the basis of-the 
Network idea was potential user-involvement-in product 
development. At the initial stage'this meant that there 
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were a spectrum of ideas on the best model of a network 
among the groups involved, ranging between technology or 
products and energy conservation as a service. For many of 
the alternative energy organisations their interest was in 
utopian change rather than technology thus the product 
concept was unclear and irrelevant (Interview-Hines 1984). 
Those groups who were more technically oriented had little 
experience in the design and innovation of products. For 
Adrian Atkinson (Interview 1984). the technology focus was 
seen as a central element to the network but should exist 
alongside the opportunity for grassroots initiatives in the 
form of popular planning for employment-around energy 
problems. For groups like the Warmth Energy Co-operative 
and the Lewisham Energy Centre the focal point. was on 
low-technology energy conservation measures for their main 
constituencies of community groups. For many of these 
groups the relevance of some distant-network was 
questionned. At this stage LEEN operated as a funding body 
in receipt of a flood of proposals from groups involved in 
energy Issues. The LEEN Council was made up of nine members 
of energy organisations and three appointees from the BLEB. 
The Council vetted proposals and attempted to establish 
priorities and a policy framework. Susie Parsons, the 
Development Manager of LEEN after its re-organisation 
described this period as one where *People already involved 
in energy issues handed out money to each other' 
(Interview-Parsons 1985). a view also upheld by Colin Hines 
.! 2'1 2 
the respondent from ERR. 
In the first year of its life LEEN did not, have a central 
strategy or; written. plan. ' The models of the network 
preferred differed widely, for some an entrpreneurial model 
was favoured, whilst others argued for a small organisation 
designed to encourage local initiatives and give local 
authority funding some kind of voice. The projects 
reflected this, diversity. ITDG was involved in small 
business packages, London NATTA in energy conservation. in 
local authority and commercial buildings. the ECSC. in, 
district heating. schemes and draughtproofing"co-operatives. 
Atkinson (Interview 1984) referred to LEEN at this point as 
tan umbrella. for different opinions and peculiar alliances'. 
it was his belief that the atmosphere in. the Network was 
one of 'you scratch. my. back and I'll scratch yours', the 
different. organisations_involved had a. variety"-of. priorities. 
and axes to grind, there were vested interests and -too many 
disparate projects, although the main emphasis was. on.. 
energy-saving measures. 
b) Policy. 
Following this period it was decidedby., the GLEB that a more 
corporate. structure was required, with full-time employees, 
if LEEN were-to develop a co-ordinated policy and strategy. 
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The network then moved away from a loosely co-ordinated open 
structure to a solid organisation with a strong central- 
core. From July 1984 this re-organisation meant that LEEN 
employed its own staff and had a work programme that was in 
part-to do with Job creation and energy projects and partly 
organised as a consultancy. The Development Manager 
appointed was Susie-Parsons who immediately began work on a 
strategic development. plan. ' Given the explicit employment 
brief there was a need to'identify the best strategy fora 
potential impact on employment. the network did not have the 
resources for more direct'Job creation. Priority'was given 
to the promotion of'employment through energy efficiency 
measures and services; an area that had been identified in 
the first draft of the London Industrial Strategy. In the 
field of energy, at least at the local level, the main 
factor was not the lack of socially-useful technologies; 
what was required was the political, institutional and 
financial commitment of resources that would-allow for the 
implementation of these technologies (Interview-Parsons 
1985). 
The LEEN policy was to direct attention. to energy issues on 
three levels. Working with a number of'local authorities, 
trade unions and voluntary organisations 'The Charter for 
Energy Efficiency' developed by LEEN was aimed at- 
influencing energy policy at a national level with 
suidelines and recommendations for . policy, initiatives on 
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energy efficiency. In London, the London Energy Action Plan 
was launched in April 1986, this was a London-wide policy 
for energy efficiency that included estimates. for investment 
resources and potential pay back. At a local level the LEEN 
worked with some London Boroughs in the provision of 
practical advice and services. This involved training on 
energy awareness for local authority employees, tenants 
groups, advice agencies and so on. Training courses on 
draughtproofing programmes were also developed. -The aim was 
to identify energy problems that tenants had in order. to 
give the apppropriate advice. and raise conciousness about 
- energy issues. For local businesses the LEEN were concerned 
to develop advice services on organisation for energy 
efficiency, access to finance and so on. 
c) Day-to-day operations. - 
LEEN was organised as a company limited by guarantee, it had 
a membership of fifty organisations"ln 1985. This, had risen 
to seventy by 1987 and included tenants associations. 
community groups, local authorities and trade union 
organisations (Parsons 1987). The management or'Council was 
comprised of-Technet appointees. elected members from the 
organisations and co-opted members'who represented 
Particular interests that were relevant to the work of the 
network. Twelve full-time staff were'emploved, this 
I 
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included eight consultants from the member organisations and 
five administrators. The staff were largely composed of 
people with technical qualifications and experience and 
included a spread of engineers. architects and those with 
energy study qualifications. 
In Its first year of operations LEEN was funded by Technet 
Ltd. Budget requirements for the year were around430,000 
pounds. By the second year LEEN had begun to generate a 
small amount of revenue with the aim of producing a third of 
its own income. At a later stage it was estimated that It 
would need to produce half of its own income-if it was to 
keep-going. In the year 1986/7 429 of funding was from the 
sale of services and products and commissions for specific 
services (Parsons 1987). In addition the LEEN produced 
publications on 'Energy in the Eighties' as a means of 
generating income. Publicity was important for the task of 
establishing the network as the centre of expertise on 
energy issues in London, they produced a quarterly bulletin 
and were concerned to gain a fair amount of press coverage 
through frequent press releases. 
The main focus for LEEN was to work with local authorities 
on their energy policies; Right to Warmth policies were 
introduced in the London Boroughs of Hackney and Islington. 
LEEN provided the back-up support in the shape of heating 
advice services to tenants. housing associations and the 
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local authority. These heating-and Insulation packages 
consisted of a combination of different conservation 
measures appropriate to particular types of housing stock, 
for example, tower blocks-in Hackney and old people's homes 
in Southwark. To support this work LEEN funded ERR to 
develop a computer programme; Heatplanner as a tool for 
agencies concerned to measure the costs/benefits of energy 
efficiency measures. LEEN also funded ECSC to develop &new 
type of low-cost data logger for use in energy audits in 
public buildings. The exemplary use of these measures in 
Council housing in Hackney provided a model of requirements 
for London's housing "stock. The use of this'model added 
potency to local authority campaigns for finance from 
central government to invest in energy efficiency and 
conservation measures for council housing. 
d) User involvement. 
Participation and user involvement in the network was 
through membership of associated organisations, the LEEN 
compiled a mailing list which had grown to eight hundred in 
1985. Although the network was accessible, 'the LEEN did not 
Pursue a shop-front policy. Susie Parsons (Interview 1985) 
noted that 'people do not travel for information, it was a 
better strategy to compile information on specific areas 
that were applicable to certain groups of tenants and then 
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go to them to advise on their heating problems'. LEEN was 
concerned to build alliances with community groups and local 
councils to provide user feedback on heating and energy 
efficiency needs.. This was achieved by a deliberate 
strategy of seeking to recruit community organisations and 
trade union branches into their membership. Thus their 
strategy for participation by users tended to be pro-active 
and centred around specific issues and specific localities, 
such as a local authority housing estate. 
e) Access to technical resources. 
The establishment of links with the Polytechnics; South Bank 
Polytechnic. Central London Polytechnic and. Imperial College 
were not easy. Parsons (Interview 1985) argued that there 
was a flaw in the theory that people in academic 
institutions were interested and had goodwill towards 
projects; she added, 'this was a misconceived notion, links 
with the Polytechnics were very dependent on contacts. 
personalities, and individual commitment'. The current 
nature of funding in academic institutions-centres on the 
concern to gain research contracts, thus individuals were 
reluctant to give unpaid time. The links with other 
networks were achieved through meetings and collaboration on 
specific projects, for example with Thames Technet on advice 
for an energy-savins community laundry, and with the London 
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Innovation Network on a low-energy house. Links with the 
Technet Ltd. at the GLEB were good, again this was dependent 
on personalities but Parsons felt that their contact person 
in Technet was supportive and ready to give sensible advice 
(Interview 1985). 
f) Socially-useful products. 
Product development was in the workshop facilities in 
Avonmouth Street and consisted of a rolling programme. Most 
of the projects were initiated by people already involved in 
LEEN or individualsconcerned to develop their existing 
capability or ideas. LEEN were concerned with commercially 
viable products and had the facilities for small-batch 
production if a market assessment had been encouraging. For 
example, an inventor from Reading University contacted LEEN 
and ITDG with an idea for a small and economic 100W wind 
turbine. The product had a potential market as a domestic 
electricity source.. and was also useful for developing 
countries. for example there was some interest expressed 
from, Vietnam. Once the development' work at the. LEEN', 
workshops was completed an independent company was 
established. 
Another example of product-development was the 'Pedelec 
Stella', an electric bicycle developed by a sole inventor 
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who was then able to gain development facilities in the LEEN 
workshops and financial assistance of -L76,000 for 
development work from the GLEB. The bicycle was launched in 
March 1985, just after the launch of the Sinclair C5 
Electric Tricycle, and a production company was established 
for-the product. 
Other projects supported by the GLEB and the LEEN included a 
novel steam engine fora motor launch developed via ITDG. 
and a domestic heat pump system developed by LEEN. Two 
prototypea, of the domestic heat pump were-developed and 
tested in 1984 and ten units were scheduled for production 
. in 1985 
for field testing. LEEN also developed a user 
friendly heating controller, and a. ventilation control unit. 
The LEEN workshop facilities were used for further 
development on the road/rail bus prototype which was 
initally built at CAITS/NELP using a conventional bus that 
was modified to be able to, run on both road and rail. This 
was one of the-projects that had emerged from the Lucas 
Plan. - 
It was hoped. that the products and projects that were- 
developed in the workshop at LEEN with investment finance 
from the GLEB would. with a workinc. prototype, be more, 
likely to attract finance for production and manufacturing 
from agencies involved in the distribution and investment of 
'capital - banks, venture capital agencies and so on. In 
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this way the GLEB and LEEN's role was of nurturing embryonic 
projects with socally-useful and employment potential by 
supplying the initial investment research and development 
facilities. By 1987 LEEN had had one product, a single 
board computer. on the market and was negotiating with a 
potential manufacturer for the datalogger for environmental 
monitoring (Parsons 1987). 
LEEN was not only-concerned with new products, an increasing 
emphasis was on the deployment and use of existing, fairly 
simple energy saving measures such as draughtproofing, 
backed up by advice, information and monitoring services. - 
For the LEEN the. main strategy was to, 'campaign for. 
resources for existing technology to be used. They did not 
see themselves as a job creation agency, they did not have 
the investment capacity. Nor were they a business that 
could be assessed by economic criteria. However, their 
potential for indirect job creation was very large. And of 
course jobs were created in the organisation itself. 
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6.4 THE LONDON NEW TECHNOLOGY NETWORK (LNTN). 
4 
Like LEEN, the LNTN began life in County Hall and then moved 
to a large, 20,000 square feet. building in Camden in 1984. 
Set back from the road the nature of the building design did 
not encourage a walk-in atmosphere. Up to half of the space 
was. for small factory units for start-up enterprises 
involved in new technoloxies, for. example, a women's new 
technology co-operative and enterprises involved in 
electronic music systems. and interactive literature 
computer'software. -. In addition there were workshop 
facilities for technical projects funded, by the GLEB,. an 
exhibition/meeting area and a. canteen. The LNTN was 
officially opened in 1984 by Neil Kinnock. the-leader of the 
Labour Party, and launched with an open-day exhibition 
depicting the technological facilities and interests of the. 
Network. 
a) Background. 
LNTN was. established to focus on microelectronics and 
information . technology. 
Human-centred. technology was of 
particular interest. Dr. M. Cooley. Director of the 
Technology Division at GLEB had been a pioneer in this field 
in the UK together with Professor H. Rosenbrock of UMIST. It 
also figured strongl' in the Lucas Plan (see Wainwright and 
Elliott 1982). 
_ 
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The case had been. made by Cooley (1983) and others that new 
machine and data-control systems using computers could be 
designed to enhance workers' skills and creativity rather 
than displace them or lead to redundancies. In the context 
of Computer Aided Design (CAD) Rosenbrock argued: 
We need not develop CAD systems which refuse to use-the 
special skills of the operator and the special properties of 
the human mind. We can instead develop systems which will 
accept the skill of the user and collaborate with it to 
increase productivity. We need not develop flexible 
manufacturing systems which fragment and destroy the 
machinist's skill. We can allow that skill to develop into 
something new. The same can be said of office automation 
and. to the extent that it is not too late, to printing. 
Such professional areas as medical diagnosis will offer the 
same kind of alternative choice. This I regard as the most 
important challenge facing engineers and technologists in 
the next twenty years. (quoted in Cooley 1983 p. 28). 
Rosenbrock continued to pursue research in the field at 
human-centred technologies at UMIST and GLEB with the 
involvement of LNTN maintained a strong interest. In 1986 
the GLEB were awarded '1.8 million by the EEC to oversee a 
human-centred manufacturing project under the EEC's ESPRIT 
Programme in liason with UMIST and other research 
institutions. 
In the GLC General Policy Document (GLC 1982) it was 
acknowledged that there was a need to address the problem of 
new technology for industries in London. but the emphasis 
was on this 'human-centred' approach. The aims of. LNTN. were 
to encourage the application and development of 'new' 
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technolosies in a socially-useful way. New technology 
refers to those areas of recent rapid development including 
microelectronics, computer technology and software 
development, and its spinoffs in the areas of information 
technology, robotics, automated manufacturing systems and so 
on. 
During its initial stage the LNTN attempted a process of 
co-operative management, but increasingly after September 
1985 became more formal and hierarchical (Interview-Sheen 
1985). This was as a response to directives from the GLEB 
for tighter administration following the curtailment of 
their own funds at the beginning of 1985 when preparations 
began for the abolition of the GLC. The interview at LNTN 
took place after this period in December 1985. The 
Co-ordinator of the Network was unavailable at that. time and 
so the interview was carried out with one of the-full-time 
workers; John Sheen. 
b) Policy. 
The general brief for the Network was the socially-useful 
application of new technology. An. important aspect of this 
function was the 'demystification' of computing technology 
forlaw persons. This meant making the-facilities and 
personnel of the Network available to trade union and 
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community groups. In addition, education and training 
programmes in new technology were run. The Network was 
particularly concerned to promote equal opportunities in 
employment and ran an EEC funded microelectronics training 
course for women. 
The objective of the exploration of the social use of 
computing and computer-related technology was to democratise 
and pool information resources for use by community groups 
and other organisations. An understanding of the possible 
alternative applications of new technology which could 
enhance the quality of work was seen as important support 
work for trade union groups in bargaining for New Technology- 
Agreements and the alternative implementation of new 
technologies in the work context. The LNTN provided 
general advice and services to the other networks concerned 
to, apply--new technolosyxto their products. and services. For 
LNTN the emphasis was on the-application. of new technology 
rather than-invention/innovation of hardware. products were 
in the form of computer software packages. Thus product 
development and innovation was focused on computer software 
and the development of socially-useful computer programs 
(Interview-Sheen 1985). 
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c). Day-to-day operations. ,, 
The LNTN was a company limited by guarantee. The Network 
was-funded by Technet Ltd. of the GLEB, but in 1985/1986 was 
expected to achieve an average of thirty per . cent. funding 
from, external sources. For LNTN this took the form of EEC 
funding for. new technology training-for women and ethnic 
minorities. -The-Network Council had nineteen members at the 
time of interviewing comprising representatives from 
community groups, trade unions and colleges. The Chair 
person-was, Anthony Hoskyns who had been involved in I. T. E. C. 
and was described as an 'entrepreneur with politics' 
(Interview-Hales 1984). a person-who was skilful at.. drumming 
up support for the Network and setting in business, but who 
also was sympathetic-to the-role of LNTN as. a . 
community-level resource centre. The Council'was the 
decision-making body for the-Network and responsible, for 
overall policy. There was-a, core staff of twenty-five 
people which included nine engineers. a site-manager, a., 
production manager, -creche workers, consultancy-staff, two 
outreach workers and a co-ordinator.. Following the-pressure 
for tighter administration, five people had-been taken on.,, 
At this time monthly progress and review of project reports 
were fed to the GLEB and continued funding was dependent. -on 
the achievement of objectives and agreement on-project., 
development with-the contact person at Technet Ltd. 
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The Network was product-based and concerned .. to. achieve some 
balance between commercial concerns and non-commercial 
projects. In this way finance could be. raised-and ploughed 
back into the Network to subsidise the socially-useful 
content-of their operations; the open access and free use of 
facilities to local community groups. For-projects a strong 
emphasis was-on marketing and, project evaluation. before 
prototypes were supported. 
d) User involvement. - 
User involvement in-the Network on product development-was 
work-with'sincle inventors on particular projects which were 
referred to the Network. For example the. AMIC, a keyboard- 
for autistic children to use to learn music was referred to 
the Network from Clive Sinclair's programme. on Capital 
Radio. An inventor from the Blind Houseworkers Guild with a 
project for a , high sensitive-microphone for cot deaths was- 
also. referred indirectly. User involvement also took the 
form of support for the small co-operatives and other- 
enterprises housed on-the site. There was some emphasis on 
small-scale advice on technology problems to groups. that 
were. referred'to the Network either from the-local boroughs 
or from the other Networks. Links with the community-were 
- developed-through training programmes, -such as, -the women's 
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training course. The physical make-up of the building was 
important, it had a large exhibition/meeting area that was 
hired out to local groups and others for meetings. In this 
way. the Network established links with the Ethnic Minorities 
Unit. Grant Crisis in Camden and Electronics for Peace. The 
strategy for user involvement in the Network was reactive. 
the Network waited for people to contact them, rather than. 
pursuing a strong local outreach orientation 
(Interview-Sheen 1985). 
e), Access to technical resources. 
The links with the Polytechnics or Universities was based on 
working on particular projects. This was mainly with 
Imperial College who were joint partners with the Network on 
a project on diabetic care. The Network tended to employ 
its own engineering staff for research work on other- 
projects. In this way it was a centre of expertise in its 
own right rather than an interface between local groups and 
the higher education. institutions. 
The links with the OLEB were for finance and monitoring. If.. 
approached the Network was willing to assist with GLEB firms 
but at that time they had no real input. Any links that did 
exist reflected a fragmentary approach to individual 
projects, as in the work with the London Production Centre 
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mentioned below, rather than any clear overall strategy. 
The respondent also added that there were; -'No great links 
with GLC sector strategies either, there is adislocation 
between theory and practice, that is, the EPG sector 
analysis and strategy and the practical day-to-day 
management of the network' (Interview-Sheen 1985). 
f) Socially-useful products. 
The main areas of exemplary projects were in the field of 
-'expert systems'; knowledge based computer systems. It was 
envisaged that the computerisation of information on, for 
example, diabetic care and other medical areas could be of 
use to general practitioners in community health care - this 
project was in conjunction with St. Thomas' Hospital and the 
City University. 
Another area for the socially-useful application of new 
technology was in the link-up between small inexpensive 
computer systems used by community groups to facilitate the 
pooling of information. A project involving the development 
of cheap-computing networks for domestic and-community., 
use/schemes linked St Mary's College computing expertise 
with LNTN. 
At the London Production Centre, one of the GLEB"s 
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Technology Centres, LNTN was involved in work on control 
engineering for educational robots for a company set up as a 
spin-off from Imperial College. The work was helping to 
develop, LNTN's control engineering expertise, and was 
relevant to further development of educational robotic 
products. emphasising the human-centred approach to systems 
design. 
For LNTN the promotion of socially-useful applications of 
new technologies has centred around attempts to demystify 
these technologies by providing training and-allowing access. 
to interested groups. The nature of exemplary projects in 
the form of expert systems was largely research-based. The 
Networks were increasingly under pressure to gain external 
funding and this led to a tendency to emphasise the 
product-based-nature of the network as against the community 
level resource centre model. Thus the Network had the 
facilities but operated-in rather an ad hoe way to the 
community as it did not have a developed political context. 
In 1986 the Network became involved in litigation with the 
GLEB over reduced funding and finally closed in 1987. 
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6.5 TRANSNET. 
Transnet was the latest network to be established. 
Discussions began in July 1984 and the Network became 
operational in January 1985, it was housed in the offices 
behind the GLEB in Avonmouth Street. In addition to office 
space, shared with the Intermediate-Technology Development 
Group (ITDG), Trananet had access to the London Energy 
Centre workshops located on the ground-floor of the 
building. Due to the comparatively late start for the 
Network in terms of the time-scale of this research project, 
the interview with the Co-ordinator; Colin MacDonald, took 
place only three months after the Network had become 
operational. For the other Networks, a period of at least 
six months had elapsed before interviews were carried out. 
a) Background. 
Transnet differed from the other Networks in two ways; 
first, it had developed directly out of a. -campaign against 
the closure of the London Transport (LT) Bus Repair Works at 
Aldenham and Chiswick, and second, it was largely 
policy-oriented. Its brief was employment support and 
research into transport policy issues. Much of its work was 
specialist information-and campaign support for trade unions 
and community groups involved in action against redundancies 
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and cuts in services in the public transport sector in. 
.. London. The founding of the Network as part of-the campaign 
against redundancies at the London Transport works meant. 
that Transnet began operations with -a firm focus on 
alternative production to bus repair and maintenance. The 
campaign. began because the London Transport Works at 
Aldenham was facing., closure. LT were concerned that the, 
large building which incurred high running costs was not 
being used cost-effectively. - 
Transnet developed links with 
the trade unions and the management to look at alternative 
uses for the space and equipment that would save the 
threatened. redundancies. One idea was to use the height of 
the building for lifting buses to give easier access for 
maintenance and. repairs. Working with the GLEB to restore 
economic viability to the Aldenham and-Chiswick works,. the, 
partly completed chassis and. tools for the Ward Chassis, a 
multi-purpose vehicle chassis was bought from the receivers 
of Ward Motors Ltd. This new product was aimed at small bus 
and coach manufacturers because of its low floor,. easy 
maintenance and low cost. Its manufacture would serve to 
retain jobs at London Transport Engineering... However, the, 
campaign foundered once London. Transport was no, longer'the 
responsibility of the GLC but, of central, government in-the 
form of London Regional Transport (LRT). Talks broke down. 
largely as a consequence of the, introduction of government. - 
legislation for LRT which prohibited-,, third-party manufacture 
in their, engineering works (Interview-MacDonald 1985). 
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b) Policy. 
Transnet focused on transport technologies. The aim of the 
Network was to encourage socially--useful and responsible 
planning and implementation of transport policy. In 
addition a quarter of their time was spent on the 
development Of. socially-useful technologies to fit this 
policy. for example, the Pedelec Stella. the electric 
bicycle developed in the LEEN workshops was an example of a 
product'that. fitted their remit. 
The consideration of the socially-usetul. potential of 
products was based on'their overall design in the context of 
a socially-conscious transport policy. The Network was 
concerned to address the problems of transport service 
provision for the disabled, low-income groups. and,. women; 
groups that were considered to have special needs. - For 
example, Transnet supported development of. the Mobility Bus; 
a crew-operated bus with modifications for wheelchairs that 
would increase public access for the. disabled'and-the ' 
elderly. . The 
Network rejected the-promotion of 
high-technology transport in preference for simplicity and 
effectiveness. The capital-intensive nature of-support for 
high technoloe' was beyond the Networks financial'capability 
and, more importantly, did not fulfil the social objectives 
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of employment retention and creation. 
The remit ' of. employment retention and creation was 
considered to be most-effectively. pursued"by campaigning, 
research work and the support for workers'plans. Thus, 
Transnet devoted the majority of their time to looking at 
ways to integrate transport policy ideas in a 
socially-useful way and launch an effective lobby for their 
implementation. 
c) Day-to-day operations. 
Like the other Networks. Transnet. was a company limited by 
guarantee with a membership or trade unions". transport 
pressure groups like Transport 2000. local authorities, 
academic institutions and the BLEB. The-membership was 
comparatively small. in relation to LEEN for example, so 
that all of the member nominees of Transnet were also 
Council members. The Council were the decision-making body 
for Network policy. project assessment and recommendations 
for project support. Permanent full-time staff managed the 
day-to-day operations. Transnet had a core staff of eight 
Pull-time and one part-time. and a-collective working 
structure. Two staff members were responsible for the 
co-ordination of administrative and development work.. Other 
staff had responsibility for specific-areas.. such as. public 
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transport. freight. employment support, new technology. and 
publicity. For example, research work on the development of 
a freight policy was based on the GLC sector strategy study 
of public. transport, but looked at in a more detailed and 
practical way to. include legislative requirements and 
constraints on railway sidings and waterside storage.; Where 
possible the Network drew support from academic 
institutions, and sometimes used paid consultants. - 
Transnet had been organised as a network which devoted 
three-quarters of its resources to campaigning and the 
promotion of socially-useful transport technolozies.,. - 
Product development accounted for the other quarter. 
The Network produced a quarterly newsletter describing their 
activities, encouraging community campaigns and reporting on 
changes to transport services in London.. 
In its first year the Network received funding of three 
hundred and fifty thousand pounds, of which nearly half was 
set aside for specific projects. Funding was from the GLC 
through Technet Ltd. of the GLEB and dependent on close 
monitoring of financial and project performance. This 
source of funding was severely cut by. the abolition of the 
GLC, but the Network benefited from the London Boroughs 
Gran-to scheme (LBGS) which gave it substantial support. In 
1986/7 it provided all of Transnet's revenue and project- 
: )LI S 
budget (Green 1987). 
For Colin MacDonald, the Co-ordinator of the Network, the 
question of continued funding was on the Network agenda in 
its very earliest stages (Interview MacDonald 1985). By and 
large, the nature of the funding that could be procured from 
various sources would delineate the future nature and 
approach of'the Network to transport issues. There were 
several possibilities that could be pursued, first, the 
Network'could'act as a support to small businesses which may 
generate revenue and thus ensure that work could continue in 
the public` transport sector; a manor employer in London. In 
this way the'Network could act as an, interface and campaign 
resource for a'suitable transport system acting as a public 
service, and concerned with individual and group transport 
needs. It was recognised that if the Network were to become 
self-financing then this would mean that it would have to 
accept products that were not socially-useful but which may 
generate income. The problem was seen as that a fair 
proportion of their work was policy-oriented, and that they 
did not have the'resources for effective product 
development. - 
MacDonald (Interview 1985) did not seethe Network 
developing as a consultancy service because they were 
limited to specific information and wore basically a 
community resource type organisation. One avenue that would 
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allow this type of development and ensure the continuation 
of projects with a socially-useful content was access to 
revenue from charitable trusts for specific projects for the 
blind-and disabled. At this stage this avenue had yet to be 
explored. 
d) User involvement. 
The Network was not involved in product design and 
development with user groups. Where possible. they assisted 
projects that were referred to-them from the-Economic Policy 
Group (EPO) at the GLC and the GLEE. For example, the 
Network supported projects that involved the movement of 
freight by water and so. were able to assist a firm engaged 
in moving sand and stone up the-Thames estuary to London, 
with commercial and business. advice and finance, in 
partnership with the Co-operative Bank, to purchase aaboat. 
User involvement more usually took the form of links with 
workplace and communitwnzroups on campaigns against job 
losses and service cuts. The Network were able to assist 
with alternative proposals for products and services., and 
with publicity and promotion of campaign work.,, For example, 
they were concerned to promote the concept-that buses with 
conductors are more attractive to . passengers. and 
therefore 
that additional-wage costs are recovered from increased 
A-an 
business activity. 
The development of participation in the Network was 
dependent on a lot of ground work and was a slow process. 
It involved building contacts through working with trade 
unions and/or community groups on. specific issues and the 
burden of proof was on the Network to demonstrate their 
ability to provide an effective. resource 
(Interview-MacDonald 1985). 
e) Access to technical resources. 
Transnet were. concerned to expand their contacts-with 
Polytechnics and Universities. It was-found that academic 
institutions were not as supportive as first envisaged in 
the proposals for the Networks, thus they needed more-- 
facilities and equipment than their own resources initially 
catered for. Nevertheless. some links were established. 
usually through specific projects. For example,. a small 
firm-using the LEEN. workshops worked with the Polytechnic of 
the South Bank on 'Hush-kits'; modifications to heavy goods 
vehicles to reduce noise. In this case.. product development 
was a result of legislative requirements imposed by the GLC 
for vehicles travelling through. London at night., Transnet 
also had links with the Polytechnic of Central London 
through membership ot, its Council. --this form of link was 
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very dependent on individual commitment rather than a 
considered policy by the Polytechnic. 
MacDonald (Interview 1985) felt that the links with the 
other Networks was fairly good. Transnet were able to advise 
Thames Technet on transport projects and LIN on, electric. { 
vehicles. With LEEN there was a good exchange of 
information. However there were no links between LNTN and 
Transnet. 
f) Socially-useful products. 
The design and development of alternative products that 
offer constructive alternatives to unemployment takes time 
to build up. For project development, the funding links 
with the BLEB and the GLC meant that usually projects were 
referred from these organisations or through individual 
London Boroughs. The projects would then be assessed-by the 
Council to see if they fitted the Network remit and could be 
considered. socially-useful in some way. MacDonald 
(Interview 1985) noted that this was often a difficult 
decision, on first reflection a project may display a number 
of advantages which are lost on closer examination. - 
This 
proved to be the case with a project for computing equipment. 
to aid routine for taxi drivers, at first the advantages to 
be gained were for passengers to more easily share taxi 
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journeys and fares. However, a more in-depth assessment 
revealed that this type of equipment could be used to 
deskill the taxi-driver. The Network were committed to the 
view that new technology should not be used to deskill or 
reduce employment. This was not the case for the Hush-kits 
project noted above. here local legislation stimulated the 
demand for an innovation that was found to be commercially 
and environmentally desirable. 
The remit of employment creation for the Network was felt to 
be more easily achieveable by campaigning against job losses 
and service cuts. Job creation was seen as a necessarily 
slow and long-term process. However, the Network could aid 
employment creation indirectly by the provision of business 
advice services, and by facilitating access to finance. In 
addition, the campaign-oriented base of the Network meant 
that they were less prepared for commercial developments 
than some of the other Networks. The initial commitment to 
social-use led them to downplay any marketing development 
for the Network, this was seen as largely irrelevant at the 
time. 
For new product development the commitment of large 
investments was seen as beyond the Network's scope, this was 
particularly true for new technology investments. However, 
the Network was concerned to support the development of 
low-level technologies, for example, a steel hull work boat. 
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This form of boat lasts longer and requires less 
maintenance than the fibre-glass models which are currently 
favoured by boat-builders. The market which stll exists for 
steel hull boats is filled by the Netherlands, but Transnet 
argued that this project could bring work and employment to 
the London area. Support for this project was linked to the 
campaign for a freight policy that looks toward rail and 
water rather than road transport. 
A further project was the development, of an Underground 
information presentation for the blind. This project was 
aimed at the social market; London Regional Transport and 
some local authorities. A further bonus would be if the 
product could be manufactured in London. 
Transnet were concerned that their promotion of 
socially-useful transport technologies and their campaigns 
for the better use of existing transport facilities, for 
example, the canal system, formed an integrated approach to 
transport policy. The network recognised the importance of 
looking at transport policy from the point of view of 
disadvantaged groups, particularly the disabled and elderly, 
and environmental concerns; for example, pollution and 
traffic congestion. 
The financial constraints imposed bw the abolition of the 
GLC meant that commercial considerations would have to be 
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given a hither priority by Transnet. Ideally, the social 
market was the area to address, however the financial 
constraints for this market segment meant that it had a 
comparatively low potential. for income generation. thus the 
Network were concerned to plan their development with a 
careful combination of both commercial and social 
objectives. MacDonald (Interview 1985) felt that the 
identification of the best way that this could be achieved 
would also provide the model for the future development and 
role of the Network. 
I 
6.6 THAMES TECHNET. 
The South East London Technolo¢y Network; Thames Technet, 
was an area-based Network located in South London serving 
the London Boroughs of Greenwich, Lewisham, Southwark, 
Lambeth and Bexley. The Network began life in 1983 and was 
based at Thames Polytechnic for its first year. It-took 
nearly twelve months to set the building in. Warren Lane. 
Woolwich refurbished and working- The building comprised 
office space, innovation workshops, a creche and a canteen. 
and was accessible to a range of. locally-based-user groups. 
The workshop facilities were designed to house a number of 
start-up. units for local enterprises. At the time of 
interviewing the Network had been operational in this 
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building for seven months. The interview was carried out 
with Julie Betteridse, the Co-ordinator of the Network. 
a) Background. 
The Network was formed in 1983 and had. particular links with 
the Mechanical Engineering and Continuing Education 
Departments of Thames Polytechnic.. The Director of the 
Polytechnic was keen to be seen as supportive , of the 
initiative and housed the Network for its first year. The 
initial. proposals for the Network were,. ýfirst, the equipment 
side to be organised as a community. facility,. and second, 
daily working arrangements to show how technology could be 
used to the benefit of the community. During this. period. 
activity in the Network concentrated. on fieldwork; the-basic 
groundwork of compiling lists of supporters, -. liaison with 
the local boroughs to establish links and ensure a two-way 
flow of information, and building contacts among the, 
community groups in the South-East London area. The, 
area-based Networks differed from the other three Networks 
previously described in that they did not have a particular 
product. focus. These Networks were more directly reliant on. 
the local community. The model of the-Networks as 
community-level resource centres was particularly applicable 
to, Thames 
. 
Technet. 
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b) Policy. 
Betteridge (Interview 1984) summarised the aim ofýThames 
Technet as to act-as a practical resource for individuals. 
groups, "co-operatives and other enterprises on the 
development of products and services that were relevant to 
the needs of the local community. A special emphasis was 
put on the encouragement among users of the Network, of a 
critical attitude to technology issues and the appropriate 
use of technological resources for community organisations. 
The focus on the accessibility of the technological 
resources in the Network was seen as the means by which 
local people could begin to use the equipment (comprising 
-mostly of simple machinery and welding gear) and, through 
informal training, to assess their views about the nature of 
technology and its relevance and use to their daily lives. 
The organisational structure of Thames Technet emphasised a 
strong community bias both on the Management Council and 
ieflLxHj +hti full-timo ötaff, who were divided into Technical 
and Community Teams. The Technical-Team comprised 
individuals with specialist skills who were responsible for 
the operation of the equipment in the workshops. The 
Community Team were responsible for liaison work with the 
local boroushs, the assessment of the resources-and needs of 
the area and the buildins of links with community and 
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voluntary organisations. This orientation evolved from the 
commitment among the Board of the Network to examine the 
cultural context of technological projects, that is, to 
ensure that projects reflected the needs and concerns of the 
community rather than more abstract notions of social-use 
embodied in physical products. This-was described in a 
recent article by Pam Linn, a member of the Board of Thames 
Technet since its inception; 
'Our intention was to engage in more egalitarian forms of 
production, as it is broadly conceived and, in the process. 
produce goods and services which took account of the 
culturally specific needs of consumers' (Linn 1988 p. 126). 
c) Day to day operations. 
In the same way as the other Networks. Thames Technet was a 
company limited by guarantee. It had a membership and 
representatives from the membership were elected onto the 
Board or Council. In this Network the Board comprised five 
representatives from community organisations including local 
trades councils, employment and race relations groups. In 
addition there were two representatives from local 
authorities and two from Thames Polytechnic. The Network 
Board met every six weeks and was largely concerned with 
Policy-making. Criteria for project assessment were 
developed which took account of the aims of the Network and 
project proposals had to be approved by the Management 
Committee and the Network Board of Directors. , 
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The day-to-day management of the Network was the 
responsibility of the full-time. staff. The Network. employed 
five full-time and two part-time staff, the latter were an 
accountant and a cleaner. They were in the process of 
advertising-two new posts in electronics and mechanics. 
Betteridge (Interview 1984) emphasised that the work in"the 
Network was organised on a collective basis, with weekly 
meetings to co-ordinate the day-to-day management., 
The full-time staff were divided Into, Community Teams-and 
Technical Teams. The educational and employment backgrounds 
of the staff in these teams reflected the technological. 
division of labour, that is. the community.. team was-made up 
of non-technically trained-people with backgrounds in social 
work.. teachinc. and personnel. Betteridze. (Interview-1984) 
noted that although the Network was committed to attempting 
to break down some of the divisions between technical and 
non-technical, there was a difficulty in recruiting staff 
with a mixture of skills; that. is. with both .a technical and 
social/economic interest-in technology issues. The 
reassessment,. of. the 'technical' " requires a. reassessment. of-. . 
gender divisions (the technical is, often. synonymous with 
male domination)"and the divisions of, labour. The-Network 
attempted to, address the problem of how to-overcome these 
divisions but acknowledged that they were reflected in their 
own Community and Technical Teams. Working arrangements 
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were made to attempt to breakdown some of these divisions, 
for example, they developed a policy of an open form of 
working with users. The Technical Team were encouraged to 
adopt a 'hands-off' approach to informal training in the 
workshops allowing users to operate the equipment themselves 
and only assisting on request. } 
The Network received funding of four hundred and fifty 
thousand from the BLEB. At the time of interviewing this 
was on a monthly basis for the Network as a whole rather 
than by project. These funding arrangements were to be 
maintained until"June'1986. After the abolition of the GLC 
the Network were assured through the GLEB that funding would 
be obtained from the Association of Local Authorities (ALA). 
However this funding would only cover the running costs of 
the Network, and money for projects would have to be found 
from other sources. To some extent this would mean a 
continuation of operations that were already practiced in 
the Network. Since its inception the Network had 
establishedlinks with local council Economic Development 
Units, and local'Co-operative Development Agencies (CDA) and 
acted as a facilitator to gain funds for projects and users 
of the Network. For example, the Network were able to 
assist, in liaison with the local council, on the provision 
of. grants and loans for users seeking to benefit from the 
MSC Enterprise Allowance Scheme. 
3 O'1 
Betteridge (Interview 1984) argued that the nature of the 
work in the Network, assistance to users and the outreach 
work that this involved incurred hidden costs which meant 
that it would not be possible for the Network to become 
wholly self-financing. It was impossible to evaluate their 
work on a short-term basis.. getting. money back from projects 
. through royalties or licensing arrangements requires a long 
lead time# although at"some point in the future if they were 
lucky with a few good projects then it., may be possible for 
the Network to become partly self-financing. Another 
possibility was the organisation of the Network on a 
consultancy basis, and to, sell-skills, - which may allow a 
balance between social and commercial projects to be 
achieved. 
d), User involvement. 
The workshop facilities were used to provide informal 
training in the-use of welding sear and other equipment. 
Facilities and enterprise unit space were free to small 
start-up enterprises. especially co-operatives, for the 
first three months. The Network policy was to ensure-that 
the facilities of the Network were a community resource. 
thus the space was used for meetings-of local groups-and 
there was also the capacity to house small enterprises. 
Thames Technet were concerned to act as a resource and 
3 c)ö 
catalyst for local enterprises which were initially housed 
and then helped with feasibility and development work 
leading to a business plan with which to approach the local 
council Economic Development Unit or Co-operative 
Development Agency. In this way the Network were able to 
directly assist with employment creation by helping 
enterprises to get started. Examples of the type of 
enterprise housed were a small business. involved in the 
adaptation and design of fashion clothes for disabled and 
outsize women. The Network were able to provide some 
funding which was matched with money from one of the local 
councils to allow this business to get off the ground, they 
were also able to provide the facilities necessary to stage 
a small fashion show. Blackwell Products, was a 
co-operative making a low-cost aerobic composter and other 
gardening and recycling products. After an initial period. 
in the Network this co-operative moved into its own premises 
but still used some-of the resources at the Networks for 
example, computerised mail order. Two catering businesses 
began life in the Thames Technet canteen. One of these 
businesses; Tropicana, was able to gain experience, benefit 
from user feedback. check pricing policies and advertising 
techniques for a four month period in the Network before 
developing a considered business plan with which to apply to 
Lewisham'Council for help with premises and funding. 
The creche in the Network was for users' children, in 
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addition the space was used for meetings on various issues 
includins-'opportunities for women. and_employment. and 
training for black women in Lewisham. 
e) Access to technical resources. 
Because or its beginnings in Thames Polytechnic and the 
commitment of the Director to the initiative. Thames Technet 
were in a good position regarding their links with the 
Polytechnic both from the commitment of time from academic 
staff.. technicians and researchers and with a, variety of 
student projects. For student projects the Network acted as 
a link between the Polytechnic and community groups to 
facilitate the exchange of project ideas. Although the 
exchange of resources with the Polytechnic was good and was 
particularly marked in electronics and mechanics, some of 
the time the Network had to pay for resources, this would 
usually take the form of accessing expertise by the. 
employment of a consultant from the Polytechnic., An effect 
of the cuts in the Polytechnic Department budgets was that 
it was important for them not to be seen to have excess 
capacity (Interview-Betteridae 1984). 
The links with the GLC and PPU were quite strong on a 
Personal level, this was useful to the Network as an 
information source and sometimes they were contacted by 
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people who had been referred by the GLC. The links with the 
other Networks were only cursory, the funding situation 
meant that the Network tended to be rather more inward 
looking. 
f) Socially-useful projects. 
The Network had a 'mixture of projects, only some of which 
were actual products in the form of hardware. Certain core 
projects had long-term aims, such as a project on vascular 
diseases and diagnostic techniques in collaberation with 
Thames Polytechnic. As part of this project the Network 
were involved, -with Dulwich Hospital, in the funding and 
vehicle side of a, mobile X-ray screening unit for the local 
community. 
The links with community organisations served to yield 
product and service ideas.. In response to the needs of the 
disabled. representatives of ' Greenwich. Action for the 
Disabled developed plans for creative play equipment for 
handicapped children and a quick, efficient wheelchair 
repair and modification service. 
The South London Scrap project sought to identify the scrap 
-"-availability in the area, this`was supported as a community 
project that could be converted into a product, or service. 
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The Toys Workshop' Venture was a community-based enterprise. 
brought together during its development stages via. Thames 
Technet, Greenwich Employment Development Unit. Greenwich. 
Lewisham and Bexley Toy Libraries and Spurn House 
Resettlement Unit. The aim of the enterprise was to provide 
a range of appropriately designed-and produced toys which 
would take into account the learning needs of both able and 
disabled bodied children. 
A pilot scheme for the assessment of the potential need for 
a local information data-base or resources directory for the 
exchange of equipment, such as, photocopiers and information 
among community groups in South London was underway with 
funding from the local borough councils. 
Another. project with Thames Polytechnic on mobile - 
bulk-handling equipment for unloading ships was directly 
product-based. The Network were able to assist with the 
funding of the first stage of the project. for product 
prototype development by a local company. for the next stage 
of production and manufacturing then the GLEB were 
approached for venture capital finance. Aid with product 
development was based on agreements between the producers 
and the Network on initial funding, loans and repayment 
conditions, and licensing or royalty arrangements. 
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For Thames Technet the focus was on socially-useful 
products that were directly community-based and had 
employment potential. The close relationship with the 
community allowed the identification of needs that were not 
necessarily met by the development of new products. 
6.7 THE LONDON INNOVATION NETWORK (LIN). 
The London Innovation Network (LIN) acted as an umbrella 
organisation for the Product and Employment Development 
Agency for North and East London (PEDNEL), the Design 
Development Unit (DDU) at Middlesex Polytechnic and the 
Comunity Construction Design (CCD) linked with North-East 
London Polytechnic, other organisations were created at 
later stages of the Network's development. In the first 
instance PEDNEL was the only organisation of the Network, it 
began life in 1983 in the buildings of North London 
Polytechnic. Its aim was to encourage local community and 
trade union participation in the Network, The DDU, with its 
commitment to socially-useful products via student projects, 
and the CCD were design and product oriented organisations. 
The amalgamation of these organisations became the LIN. 
Thus as a Network it attempted to combine area-based and 
technology-based activities. - 
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The LIN moved to refurbished buildings on the Holloway Road 
in 1984, there was office and workshop space geared'to 
prototype development and small-batch production. The 
interviewee was Mary Moore, the co-ordinator of the 
administrative side of the Network. Since the Network has 
developed quite substantially since interviewing took place 
the information is up-dated from secondary sources. 
a) Background. 
-In their initial stages the organisational development of 
the Networks were dependent on-the political and practical 
concerns of the staff. In PEDNEL the core-staff were 
largely political; that is, community and trade-union 
campaign-oriented with virtually no product base. In large 
part this resulted from the creation of the Network as an 
area-based'orzanisation in the same way as Thames Technet. 
The absence of a product focus in their development brief 
meant that more emphasis was put on community participation 
than products (Interview-Moore 1984). 
The re-organisation of the'Network; in 1984 led to LIN as an 
umbrella organisation and central resource for affiliated 
groups in North and East London. PEDNEL continued its 
outreach and community work. The -DDUwas established at 
Middlesex Polytechnic in May and based-in-the. Craft. Design 
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and Technology Department. Student projects were initiated 
to provide a design and product prototype development 
service to the Network. For the DDU and the CCD, linked to 
North-East London Polytechnic, product design was identified 
as a. key point of intervention in the innovation process and 
central to attempts to direct product development towards, 
social needs. Of particular importance was design 
flexibility so that products could be adapted and modified 
to meet particular needs. Thus from the time of its 
establishment, over a two year period the Network moved from 
being almost wholly community-based to being almost wholly. - 
product-based. 
b) Policy. 
After re-organisation the overall objective of the LIN 
became very clear. Technology transfer; the linkage of 
product ideas from academic institutions or other groups, in 
the community to local enterprises comprised the central 
thrust of LIN operations. Of prime importance was the 
. practical work involved in the identification of needs and 
the development of products and services aimed at the social 
market, and with direct job creation potential. This meant 
a policy of co-ordination with other agencies associated. 
with the Network or to local councils, such as Economic 
Development Units. -to secure adequate funding for prototype 
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and product development, through to manufacture, preferably 
b. v local enterprises; new start-ups or co-operatives. 
The emphasis on product design and the use of design to 
accommodate particular needs represented a commitment to. 
socially-useful products but also to the social process of 
design. LIN was keen to support projects from individuals 
and groups not usually associated with. the design process, 
for example, project ideas from women and ethnic minorities. 
Moore (Interview 1984i-argued that the practical example of 
this type of project was important to attempts to dispel the 
view that inventors are largly white and male (see, for 
example, the electronic aid. for the. deaf in GLEB 1985a). 
Educational provisions for craft, design and technology 
teaching were seen as a possible direction for the Network 
to take in its concern to positively involve the local 
community in the product design process. 
The, policy of practical technology transfer work was 
reflected by the developments at LIN after the time of the 
interview. Coleman and Amphlett, both-central figures in 
the Network, presented a paper to the Brighton Technology 
Conference in March 1987 which listed the series of 
autonomous and semi-autonomous agencies and units which 
together made up the Network: 
The London Innovation Network (LIN)-functions as the nucleus 
of this network, providing workshop, "office and overall 
management and financial services to projects and agencies. 
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as well as publicity and specialised project management, 
particularly in the field of patents. licensing and 
technology transfer. 
Community Construction Design (CCD) is an independent agency 
specialising in technology management and product 
development. It has a substantial track record in the 
fields of building and transport, and has provided senior 
management for the Network as a whole. CCD's experience in 
technology management, licensing and patenting has proved 
especially useful. and CCD personnel take overall 
responsibility for technology transfer within the Network. 
The Design Development Unit (DDU) located within Middlesex 
Polytechnic is a product development agency which works in 
close collaberation with the Craft. Design and Technology 
department. Trainee teachers gain useful experience working 
on the development of new products for the educational and 
medical markets. Some of the Networks most successful 
projects have originated there. 
LIN Marketing Group provides market research and promotional 
advice to all LIN projects, and makes its services available 
to, co-operatives, local businesses, local authorities, and 
other organisations associated with economic development. 
The unit has organised conferences and product launches, and 
currently maintains a watching brief on the London furniture 
industry for the BLEB. 
LIN Disability Unit (DU) was established in the summer of 
1986 as a focus for project work in this field. It has 
close links with the London College of Furniture's disabled 
design course, and many other agencies and groups servicing 
and representing disabled people. The unit has successfully 
completed a long term product development programme which 
has resulted in an award-winning design for seating systems 
for special schools. and is currently engaged on similar 
programmes of work. It is intended that the Unit will 
eventually become autonomous and'self-supportins 
financially. 
LIN Design Aid Service (DAS) was also established in the 
summer of 1986 and provides technical, design, marketing. 
and financial support for small companies, co-operatives, 
community organisations, schools and colleges, carers (home 
helps, mothers, nurses and so on) and trade unions. Many 
individual and groups working in these fields have sound 
product ideas which they are unable to either develop. or 
exploit for lack of knowledge, resources, or specialist- 
information. DAS makes an initial assessment of people's 
ideas and then seeks to either provide or identify 
appropriate resources or assistance to turn the idea into a 
manufacturable product. Success in this type of innovation 
is never high, but LIN's distinctive hands on approach has 
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already proved itself effective (Coleman and Amphlett 1987) 
c) Day-to-day operations. 
The search for a practical and effective way of fulfilling 
the Network brief led to a decentralised organisational 
structure for the LIN. The network of affiliated agencies 
and units meant that it was possible to incorporate a wide 
range of activities into the Network without creating a 
mound of bureaucracy. The LIN were concerned to act as a 
central resource that operated with a minimal organisational 
infrastructure located at the Holloway Road buildings. 
The Network Council included representatives from GLEB. 
North London Polytechnic, Middlesex Polytechnic, Islington 
Council, Hackney Council, and two PEDNEL Directors. The 
Council grew as representatives from the other organisations 
involved in the Network joined at a later stage. The 
Council was responsible for the general policy-making in the 
Network. project appraisal and resource allocation. 
The Network received funding of four hundred and fifty 
thousand from GLEB Technet Ltd.. and with careful accounting 
were adequately funded until September 1986. Thereafter 
they would need to approach the London Borouchs Grants 
Scheme-in the same way as the other Networks had to do after 
the abolition of the 0LC. 
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The Network employed thirteen core staff, this large 
administration base was necessary for their work as a 
central resource'to the different agencies. In the main the 
core-staff were concerned with processing product proposals 
and securing funding for product proposals emerging from 
their agencies. The Network had three full-time employees 
in the workshops and were able to draw on a pool of ten to 
twenty consultants when necessary. In the first two years 
from'approximately 400 project ideas, five were taken 
through to full production (Holdsworth 1988). 
At the stage of interviewing at the Network in late 1984, 
Moore (Interview. i984) acknowledged the problems of taking 
projects forward and monitoring project development 
adequately. The day-to-day realities of manufacturing 
decline were-tangible and visible, and the Network staff 
faced the problems of operating in a competitive market 
economy. Firstly, there was a need to develop marketing and 
entrepreneurial skills if enterprises were to survive the 
realities of a competitive market. The recruitment of staff 
with a mixture of technical or-business skills and an- 
ideological commitment to socially-useful product and 
service development` proved to be difficult. The educational 
and working backgrounds of the staff tended to be in the 
Youth work, ' caring' and teaching professions. - The Network 
had recruited two people with some marketing skills but in 
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general lacked hard-nosed business experience. 
A second problem was the availability of manufacturing 
opportunities. The Network did not have the resources to 
arrange manufacture, this would have incurred large costs in 
terms of premises, re-tooling and so on. Moore (Interview 
1984) noted that there were only 24 manufacturing 
co-operatives in London, mostly in labour-intensive areas. 
The development of links with the commercial manufacturing 
world meant addressing the problem of whether the networks' 
were subsidising the research and development work of the 
private sector. Employment creation in the London area 
suffered when the problem of manufacturing opportunities 
meant that it was necessary to approach companies 
established in other parts of the country; for example; the 
Whitfield Bench. a technology bench for the education 
furniture market that was developed by the DDU and LIN, 
could only be manufactured by a company outside London. 
d) User involvement. 
The projects that flooded into the LIN came from a variety 
of sources, but by and large were from white male individual 
inventors rather than trade unions or community 
organisations. - For Moore it was important not to just look 
at something as a socially-useful product, there was the 
fi, ý 
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need also to see where it came from. The context of project 
identification. formulation and eventual use was central to 
the socially-useful concept. The Network had the commitment 
but work was needed to. -find ways of making 
it happen. Moore 
was against the idea of the Network as a cheap reseach and. 
development resource between inventors and the commercial 
world (Interview 1984). 
As part of the commitment to a high level of user 
-involvement and supporting research the project 'Disability 
and the Domestic Environment' began as an investigative 
outreach programme in the autumn of 1984 (this work fed into 
the LIN Disability Unit formed in 1986). The aim of the 
project was to involve interested groups and build a picture 
of the needs of the disabled that would provide valuable 
background information for product development. The 
identification of gaps in existing aids and equipment 
availability. together with research into the problems of 
the disabled community, could then be used to initiate 
projects in the Network that would raise awareness of the 
needs of the disabled and begin to explore. channels through 
which they could be met. The contacts made with the groups 
revealed the need for a mobile repair service for aids for 
the disabled and the elderly. The project established by 
LIN provided an example of the type of"local authority 
service required if there were the commitment of resources 
to this area. 
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The LIN also made contact with-a group of physiotherapists 
working in Islington and teachers working for the Inner, 
London Education Authority (ILEA). ''Outreach work of this 
nature was more successful if meetings were arranged around 
specific projects or issues. Community involvement in the 
social process of design and innovation was not an-automatic 
process once the facilities had been created. To aid the 
Process there was general exhibition work in town-halls and 
libraries, and the Network put together a publicity pack 
that emphasised the resources available at the Network for 
community and workplace group support and confidence 
building around problem-solving and design. 
At a later stage of its development' 
. 
the' Network were able to 
offer technical and marketing support to local co-operatives 
and enterprises looking to develop new products. A future 
aim was the identification of successful' ways of funding the 
Process of technology transfer. -in its broadest sense, at 
the point of application, that is, on specific product 
development programmes tailored to meet the needs of 
individual enterprises and at the same-time supply 
identifiable social markets (Coleman and Amphlett 1987). 
During ita process of development the LIN built up a pool of 
expertise around product development and innovationof low 
and medium level technologies. The involvement of the seven 
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agencies in the Network provided an extensive source of 
contacts on individual inventors, research projects and 
product development agencies which the LIN were keen to make 
available, on a consultancy basis to similar agencies. 
projects and local authority departments working in the 
field of economic development, such as, local Economic 
Development Units and Enterprise Boards (Coleman and 
Amphlett 1987). 
e) Access to technical resources. 
The access to technical resources in the Polytechnics was 
initially a slow process. Moore (Interview 1984) described 
them as= 'large institutions that are not easily shifted'. 
their attitudes to the Network were built by. and dependent 
on, the personal commitment of-individuals. The 
breakthrough in this activity for the LIN was made by a 
policy of affiliation to agencies located within Polytechnic 
departments and based around student projects on a variety 
of areas including design, technology, marketing and 
business. LIN developed strong links with the City of 
London Polytechnic which led to ' the- creation of the Business 
Enterprise Unit. and with the Polytechnic of North London, 
through PEDNEL, another of "its agencies. PEDNEL was 
intoarated'into the Polytechnic as a specialist product 
development unit working with departments and individuals in 
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the Polytechnic and the local community. The Disability 
Unit which provided a specialised focus for project work in 
this area had a close link with the London College of 
Furniture disabled design course (Coleman and Amphlett 
1987). 
The DDU at Middlesex Polytechnic was involved in technology 
transfer as part of the LIN, and thereby made the resources 
in the Polytechnic available to individuals and industry. 
Products were developed in the Polytechnic and placed with 
manufacturers. The Whitfield Technology Bench was an 
example of this activity and eventually led to the 
Polytechnic developing educational furniture to 
manufacturers requirements (see Holdsworth 1988). 
Coleman and Amphlett (1987) in the, paper mentioned above 
describe another strategy followed by the Network that 
involved the launching of new initiatives through which 
technology transfer could take place from polytechnics into 
the industrial and commercial community. This work focused 
on the establishment of R and D companies operating within 
London Polytechnics. For example, City Science Ltd. a 
bio-technology company which grew out of a collaborative 
work-between-the City of London Polytechnic-and Flag Brewery 
Co-operative. LIN contributed to this initiative both in 
financial and advisory terms. The LIN were concerned to 
encourage Polytechnics to look beyand-their academic -, 
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concerns for effective and practical forms of application of 
their technical expertise. 
f). Socially-useful products. , 
The strategy developed for socially-useful product 
development by the LIN was to focus research in the fields 
of disability, education, transport and medicine. As with 
the disability project mentioned above product needs were 
identified by working with groups of end-users. End-äsers 
were also involved in testing and commenting-on ideas. 
designs and product prototypes, for example the disability 
project, discovered the lackof provision for particular 
domestic aids and housing modifications. The strategy-was 
evident in the development of the Whitfield Technology Bench 
where in a case-study'of-the development Holdsworth (1988) 
described working with Craft. Design and Technology teachers 
and local authority education departments on the product 
brief and design. The product was then tested by kitting 
out a school. In this way, Holdsworth (1988) noted that 
significant-and proven markets for the Networks products 
were identified as, part". of the development process,. this 
ensured the required interest from manufacturers who were 
made confident of sales and customer'satisfaction. 
BV extensive research work and user involvement the aim was 
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to achieve a balance with products between social-use and 
commercial marketabilty. Whilst social markets represented 
a respectable niche for agencies like the Network, these 
markets are already serviced by sometimes very large 
manufacturers, thus new product ideas needed a strong 
competitive edge. Employment creation via new product 
development was the area where the commitment to .' 
socially-useful' production met the necessity of'commercial 
and economic viability if enterprises were to survive. 
There was care to ensure that products met a special need 
but were also generally attractive to a wider market. "For 
example, Playbox was designed to alleviate the problems of 
inadequate storage`epace"in creches and nurseries. The 
wooden box unfolded and unpacked to become an assortment of 
different play shapes and equipment. Work began on the box 
in November 1984 and it was hoped that this product. along 
with other wood-based designs would be sufficient to 
establish a small woodworking co-operative in the London 
area. 
The Network also supported individual designers and 
inventors whose ideas fell within its socially-useful brief, 
especially when other sources of support were not readily 
available. The initial response from the LIN was a free 
'design surgery' which-offered advice on product ideas. If 
the potential of the project appeared favourable then 
Support would be given for a feasibility study and market 
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assessment. If the results of this were encouraging then 
funding was sought for its design, development and 
prototyping, through to pilot batch production and product 
launch. In return for this support. LIN took an 
intellectual property stake in the product or technology 
under development (Coleman and Amphlett 1987). 
Some examples of LIN products are described below: 
A plug-in micro-computer interface for the Sinclair Spectrum 
was developed in collaboration with Haringey Enterprise 
Board and the originator. LIN were able to ensure the 
transformation of the idea into a saleable product which led 
to the establishment of a small business supported by the 
Enterprise Board. 
The 'Neater Eater's a device designed to assist people with 
diseases resulting in muscle tremor was developed by an 
individual inventor, LIN, and developed in collaboration 
with Imperial College London, the National Hospital for 
Nervous Diseases, and the Challey Heritage. Commercial 
manufacture was launched through a new business start-up. 
The Wheelchair Mini-Gym is an exercising machine for weight 
training and rehabilitation to be manufactured by Hoskins 
Ltd. or Birmingham under licence. 
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The Cloudesley Chair is an adaptable seating system unit 
that caters fox the needs of children with disabilities by 
the provision of a correct seating posture to facilitate 
their participation in school activities. This product was 
developed by LIN and Kanwal Sharma with the collaboration of 
the London College of Furniture and the Training Workshop 
Resource Unit. Extensive field trials took place with 
potential users in two special schools, and an agreement was 
negotiated for the Chair to be manufactured and distributed 
under licence by Taylor and Son (Orthopaedic) Ltd., of 
Walsall (Coleman and Amphlett 1987). 
6.8 COMPARABLE ORGANISATIONS. 
At this stage it is worth mentioning two organisations that 
were similar to the London Technology Networks; Sheffield 
Centre for Product Development and Technological Resources 
(SCEPTRE) in Sheffield and the Unit for the Development of 
Alternative, Products (UDAP) in Coventry. Interviews were 
carried out with Jim Shutt from SCEPTRE and Bill Brook from 
UDAP in 1984. The collection of comparative data from these. 
organisations was as an aid to understanding for some of the 
issues that emerged from the Technology Networks. The 
information collected from these organisations-is used in 
Chapter Seven. - 
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SCEPTRE; an organisation similar to the technology networks 
in London, was established by Sheffield City Council, 
Employment Department as a resource centre and interface 
between Sheffield City Polytechnic and the local community. 
The focus of the centre was on-product development and the 
provision of technical advice and support to local 
enterprises, especially co-operatives and community based 
organisations. 
SCEPTRE acted to support local enterprises throughout the 
process of, start-up by the provision of technical support 
for product development, premises in the"form of sheltered 
workshops and marketing and organisational development 
support. Particular attention has been paid to marketing 
where the links with the Polytechnic's Economics and 
Business Studies Departments have proved invaluable. 
In a similar way-to the London-Technology Networks, --it was 
found that access to the resources within the-Polytechnic, 
both expertise and facilities involved a lengthy period of 
negotiation and were very dependent on individual commitment 
and the political orientation of the department. Where 
expertise was required, the staff at SCEPTRE aimed to, tap 
specialist activity that was complementary to the expertise 
within the Unit. The product ideas that.. emerged from 
Polytechnic departments tended to be rather. crude 
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- prototypes. SCEPTRE used their own resources for applied 
engineering to create something more tangible from these 
Prototypes that was geared toward the market and user needs 
and capable of manufacture. 
An example of the type of product development that this 
organisation aimed for was the Advanced Humidifier System. 
This product emerged out of a joint venture between the 
Polytechnic, tenants organisations and a local co-operative 
established by some of the workforce after the closure of 
their firm manufacturing machine tools. The local authority 
housing department, under pressure from tenants to act-on 
problems of condensation in its housing stock provided an 
initial market. 
The Unit for the Development of Alternative Products (UDAP).. 
mentioned in 6.2 had a different background to SCEPTRE. it 
was first established in 1981 with sixty thousand pound 
funding from the Cadbury Trust to work on. some of the 
product proposals that emerged from the Lucas Plan. It was 
located in the Engineering Department of Lanchester 
Polytechnic and had developed a good working relationship. 
with this department on student projects. 
When the WMCC took office in 1981 it supported UDAP in. a bid. 
to foster the manufacture of alternative products in the 
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West Midlands. This allowed the Lucas work to continue. 
mostly in the area of electric vehicles, together with 
activities geared to the processing of project ideas from 
the local community. UDAP used product ideas to initiate 
student projects; for example, in the Engineering Department 
when specialist engineering expertise was required. For 
marketing and business planning support for local 
enterprises and co-operatives, links were made with the 
Business' Studies and Graphics Departments of the. 
Polytechnic and student projects working with client 
enterprises were initiated. - 
UDAP was also involved in work with some third world 
countries on particular projects. For example, they used 
their workshop facilities to develop a brick-making machine 
for Zimbabwe and worked with the Eritrean Relief 
Organisation on problems of energy-sources. In addition, 
there have been some attempts to establish links between 
local enterprises and Third World countries requiring 
products. UDAP were seeking funding from the EEC Social 
Fund for a project that would involve a local engineering 
firm-in the design and refurbishment, with second-hand 
machinery, of a workshop built in a shipping container for 
use in India. The refurbishment of second-hand machinery 
that is reliable, serviceable and with easy access to spare 
parts is a particular need for developing countries who tend 
to, experience service and spare part problems with existing 
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machine tools. 
Both SCEPTRE and UDAP were operating in the same field as 
the Technology Networks. though tended to be more directly 
product-based. However they shared some of the same 
problems which will be discussed in Chapter Seven. 
6.9 TECHNOLOGY NETWORKS - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 
This description of the technology networks and their 
activities highlights the range of alternative developments 
both in organisation and focus that emerged during the 
policy implementation process. At the outset, it was 
envisaged that the technology networks would provide the 
facilities for technology transfer. -Prom academic 
institutions-to the community, and provide-a conducive 
environment for the exercise of the tacit knowledge of 
community and workplace groups. What would emerge would be 
a socially-directed innovation process that was based on the 
close links between producers and users.. 
The objectives of the promotion of socially-useful 
technologies, user involvement in product development and 
employment creation were addressed by the networks in 
different ways. 
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For LEEN'it was found that the prime consideration for 
energy Issues-was the provision of information and advice on 
energy efficiency and conservation measures plus some 
technical work. Employment creation could best be obtained 
by campaigning to change policy on energy issues that would 
lead to the political and financial commitment to implement 
the socially-useful technologies that already exist. 
For LNTN the exploration of the socially useful applications 
of new technologies. particularly in the area of computing, 
and the development of prototype alternative applications 
was the main focus. Open access to the network's resources, 
equal opportunities in training programmes, were important 
to the aim of the demystfication of new technology. 
Employment creation was in the form of nurturing small start 
up enterprises. 
For Transnet, the integration of a socially-concious 
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transport policy with the socially-useful technologies meant 
that campaigning work was the largest area of activity. As 
in the case of LEEN, employment creation could beat be 
achieved by information directed toward changing attitudes. 
The above networks were centred around products and issues. 
The area networks developed differently because of their 
links with the community, the emphasis was particularly on 
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the identification of appropriate technologies for use by 
local. groups and local enterprises. Thames Technet was 
perhaps the most closely involved with community-based 
projects, and was concerned to promote socially-useful 
technologies by encouraging a critical attitude to 
technological development. The nurturing of small start-up 
enterprises housed in the network was seen as important to 
the creation of employment. 
LIN exhibited the characteristics of both'an area and 
product-based network. The central focus-for this network 
was on design and the transfer of design products from 
academic institutions to local enterprises. The problems of 
manufacture and markets that were encountered in 
facilitating this process are discussed more fully in 
Chapter Seven. 
The technology networks acted as catalysts for the transfer 
of knowledge and ideas into employment creating projects 
with especial emphasis on. the prototype and product 
development stage of the innovation process. 
However, by 1987, particularly as a result of the abolition 
of the GLC and subsequent funding problems, the Networks 
were facing difficulties and were dependent on the limited 
resources of-the London Boroughs Grants Scheme for their 
continued survival. In 1986 Thames Technet and Transnet 
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were reduced to token-staff only. After", survivine for some 
months on a monthly funding basis which prohibited any real 
planning for project development-Thames Technet closed. The 
premises were handed over to the Business Innovation Centre. 
Both LNTN and LEEN closed in 1987 after facing funding 
difficulties, the remainding LIN, perhaps the. most well 
known of the Networks through magazine-and television 
coverage, closed in March 1988 as a result of GLEB's 
inability to keep up the lease on the, -Holloway Road 
workshops. Nonetheless. because of the nature of LIN's 
organisation. Holdsworth a key figure in the DDU remained 
optimistic, he noted that; 'In April 1987 LIN were faced 
with a funding crisis that meant staff redundancies, however 
the majority of the development agencies remained in one 
form or another, and these actively continue to develop 
projects by establishing project pools of charitable and 
industrial finance against an initial division of 
intellectual property rights' (Holdsworth 1988).. If this 
comment is not already out-of-date then the possibility of 
continued development of agencies associated with the LIN 
remains. At, the time of writing, of the, Networks which 
formed the case-study. only Transnet remains-in operation. 
Despite their short life, what emerged strongly from the_ 
technology networks was their catalytic role in linking 
inventors with funding agencies; and linking products to 
manufacturers. Their operations spanned four years, in 
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which time much work was initiated and developed on avenues 
for socially-useful product development, investigations into 
the needs of end-users and the potential of social markets. 
This experiment in product development of social-use. 
environmentally safe and good design; that is, products 
which closely reflect user needs, comprised an alternative 
solution to technological and social problems. 
In Chapter Seven an evaluation is made of the experiment in 
terms of the networks experience of user involvement in 
product design, technology transfer between the Networks and 
the Polytechnics, and socially-useful product development. 
The evaluation is in the Networks own terms and looks toward 
a clearer understanding of the policy implementation process 
rather than any assessment using objective standards of 
success. and failure. To proceed in that direction was 
deemed inappropriate in this context given the short time 
scale of the Networks operations and the difficulties of 
tangible measurement of outcomes from social organisations 
like the Networks. Thus in the next chapter policy 
implementation is located in the background of the 
historical, economic and political context of the policy 
formation and other' secondary data is drawn on as an 
explanation-building aid for the technology policy process. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CASE-STUDIES: ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The case-studies of the Technology Networks are the basis of 
this study of the implementation of a technology policy 
based on social need. The findings illustrate the 
differences between the Networks and their approaches to 
user involvement in product design, technology transfer 
between the Networks and the Polytechnics, and 
socially-useful product development. 
In the Methodology (see Chapter Four), the view of policy as 
tentative theory about the nature of social processes and 
the workings of social institutions was put forward by 
Malone (1975). 
The research hypothesis was: 
User involvement in the selection. design specifications and 
development of products, together with access to technical 
resources are the key components of a socially-useful 
technology policy. 
Exploration and evaluation of the research findings rests on 
whether the Technology Networks achieved the objectives set 
out in the initial policy statement: 
3'3'1 
a) user involvement in product design, 
b) technology transfer between the polytechnics, networks 
and the community. 
c) innovation of socially-useful products. 
In this chapter the technology network policy is explored in 
the Networks own terms. that is. were the GLC and the 
technology networks able to achieve the objectives of their 
own policy formation. 
In 7.2 the research findings are discussed in relation to 
the day to day operations of the Networks. The models which 
emerged from the policy implementation. process variously 
emphasised a technology or a community-based perspective. 
and a campaigning or a practical socially-useful product 
development perspective to technology policy. In 7.3 the 
interim policy outcomes are presented. Following this the 
chapter is divided into sections of user involvement, 
technology transfer and socially-useful products. 
This ; chapteroffers a locally-based analysis of the research 
findings, that is. consideration is'made o- the agencies 
directly involved in the policy process. The comparative 
data collected from. Sheffield and the West Midlands is 
compared to the findings from the Network study. This 
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enables a distinction to be made between general problems of 
the technology policy approach and those that were specific 
to the GLC/GLEB initiative. In addition, the discussion 
incorporates other alternative technology initiatives where 
some similarity of issues and problems are apparent. 
7.2 Models of the Technology Networks. " 
The central tenet of participation in a socially-useful 
product design/development process suggests a wholly 
product-oriented approach for the alternative technology 
policy. However, the findings presented in the case-studies 
suggest that this was not necessarily seen as the best means 
of approaching the Technology Network brief. The day-to-day 
operations of the Networks exhibited the realities and 
contradictions inherent in their working as social 
'institutions for product design/development. 
The problem in the Network brief was that-of the 'cart 
before the horse'. In various ways the Networks found that 
socially-useful product development was dependent on user 
participation. The access of a different range of social 
groups of users and producers to the early stages of the 
product design process maybe a valuable exercise in itself 
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but not without its problems, the largest being-how to 
actually achieve that participation. The question emerges 
as to which comes first, community participation; a 
political strategy, or product development; a practical 
strategy which contains its own difficulties in terms of the 
economic and political problems of manufacture and markets. 
Mike Hales, a member of the Economic Policy Group at the GLC 
identified four models for the Technology Networks which 
Illustrated the problem of the mix between political and 
practical elements of the strategy: 
1. Trade union/community support - back up research to 
political campaigning by workplace groups and community 
groups. This model was exemplified by CAITS, which became 
known as a centre of expertise for workers' plans and 
socially-useful production. 
2. Utopian campaigning or. technological agitprop - the 
Networks as the technical means of satisfying social needs 
through the development of socially-useful products to 
prototype. The aim, to use exemplary projects as the basis 
for campaigning and promotion for alternatives to the 
present direction of technological chance. This model could 
be-applied to UDAP in Coventry which emphasised practical 
product development through student projects. 
3. Job creation by technology transfer - alternative 
commodities for viable commercial development in start-up or 
failing enterprises. 
4. Restructuring for Labour - analysis of the local economy 
and, plannine for socially-useful investment. Here the local 
state is seen as a 'force of capital' which gives a funding 
led character to initiatives. 
(Quoted in Holdsworth 1988). 
The proposals for, the Networks (see 6.2) contained both 
Political and practical elements, and the existins 
organisationsi_CAITS and UDAP.. otfered, practical examples of 
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the approach. The mixture of a practical 'technical' 
approach and a political approach was largely dependent on 
the political and ideological orientation of the 
individuals concerned. with running the Networks. The 
product-based and area-based character of their briefs 
compounded the differences. Thus, conflicts inherent in the 
strategy between these elements and the aim of developing a 
focus for the individual Networks was particularly apparent 
in the early stages of development. For example, LEEN began 
operations as an umbrella funding organisation, and as 
already noted in the previous chapter, for many of the 
alternative energy organisations their interest was in 
social and technological change and energy policy issues, 
rather than 'new products', thus the product concept was 
sometimes unclear. It was only at a later stage that a 
focus which more easily fits Models 1 and 4. but which 
contained practical product elements also was developed. 
The LIN began life as PEDNEL, an almost entirely political 
organisation similar to Model 1, after re-organisation it 
became more focused on the practical elements of the 
strategy exemplified by Model 3. 'LNTN also most closely 
resembled model 3 in its day-to-day operations but contained 
elements of Model 2 for its 'human-centred' approach to new. 
technology. and Model 1 in its educational programmes. 
Transnet was concerned to maintain a campaign focus with 
analysis for socially-useful investment and mostly resembles 
Models I . and 
4. Thames Technet most closely resembled the. 
community level resource centre of Model 1, the conflict 
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between the political and practical elements of the strategy 
was reflected in their Community and Technical teams. 
What this typology suggests is that the technology policy 
was approached by the Networks in a number of different 
ways. It was not the case of a straightforward 
implementation of the policy proposals for the Technology 
Networks. Why this was the case will be more fully explored 
in the following sections. The use of Hales' models to 
identify the variety of orientations exhibited in the 
Networks indicates that they cannot be simply lumped 
together and discussed as representative of a unified 
strategy. The main elements in the propositions were dealt 
with quite differently as the staff in the Networks 
attempted to put a technology policy based on social need 
into practice. It must be remembered that this was in the. 
context of increasing political pressure on the GLC itself 
(see Chapter Three). 
It would be an oversimplification to argue that because the 
Networks were unable to put the policy straightforwardly 
into practice that the policy was flawed. Whilst this may 
be the case, what is more helpful is to explore how the 
Networks implemented the main elements of the strategy given. 
that user participation and the spare capacity in the 
Polytechnics existed in the beginning as idealised concepts 
only, 
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7.3 INTERIM POLICY OUTCOMES. 
Policy outcomes differed substantially between the Networks, 
and from the policy propositions. By policy outcomes I 
refer to the major findings from the policy implementation 
process. Before summarising these findings in a series of 
statements, a note of caution is required. It must be 
remembered that the Networks all faced funding crises 
following the abolition of the GLC, and this affected their 
role as social institutions. All were under pressure to 
adopt a more commercial approach to product development and 
consultancy activities, with the ultimate aim of becoming 
self=sufficient organisations. In effect, funding 
difficulties led to'their closure, with the exception of 
Transnet, as indicated in Chapter Six. 
Policy outcomes are referred to as interim. first because 
they refer to the findings from the period of this research 
project. Second. because if the GLC had not been-abolished 
the Networks may, have developed differently and to a longer 
time-scale. Potential policy outcomes, had this been the 
case, can only be open to conjecture. 
I 
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Summary of Outcomes: 
The political/practical elements in the Networks were 
prioritised in accordance with the product or community 
brief and the perceptions and aims of social-use. as 
identified by the individuals centrally involved in their 
organisation. 
Participation required a pro-active approach built around 
specific issues or localities and was a slow process. 
particularly around the articulation of social needs. 
User' involvement spanned, a spectrum of activities from 
membership organisations. campaigning to product 
development. 
Product ideas more usually emerged from white. male 
inventors than from any other croup. Product development 
remained the preserve of student projects and technically 
skilled people. 
The notion of spare capacity within Polytechnic departments 
was misconceived. Polytechnic links were more easily forced 
around particular projects or through agencies located in 
Polytechnic departments themselves. The commitment of 
interested individuals was an important pre-requisite. 
There was a difficulty with recruitment of personnel with 
the correct mixture of skills; marketing and entrepreneurial 
skills together with community/voluntary work experience and 
a commitment to the idea of socially-useful production. 
The employment creation brief'-meant that products needed to 
display both social-use and commercially viable 
characteristics. Difficulties were compounded by a lack of 
manufacturing opportunities and public sector markets. 
Production for the social market required a social 
organisation of the innovation process which built on the 
relationship between producer and end-user. Whilst the 
Networks could provide this mechanism, markets were limited 
by the cut-backs in public spending. The mechanism did not 
exist whereby purchasing power was directly related to need. 
The nature of the competitive market mechanism constrains 
the-possibility of creating and developing products in'an 
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alternative way. 
Short-term. political priorities of the GLC were in conflict 
with the longer-term process of innovation. 
Need-led innovation is a political problem.. There is not a 
problem with the-technology, but rather with the commitment 
of resources for implementation. 
A lack of clarity surrounds the concept of social-use. Its 
narrow definition as product-based obscures its political 
elements which include education and training, campaigning 
and hands-on use of technological equipment. Deference to 
scientific and technical expertise, the exclusive nature of 
technical skill, the realities of the power relations which 
surround technology in everyday life - all diminish the 
possibilities for a genuinely participative approach to 
innovation. 
It is important to note what the Networks did achieve, as 
well as what they did not. In the initial stage of their 
development, the concept of a 'technology network' was 
unclear. The Networks had to build their own political 
constituencies. In addition, user involvement and links 
with the Polytechnics required a lot of groundwork and were 
in no way automatic processes. Through the policy 
Implementation process the best way to approach the idea of 
a socially-useful technology policy began to emerge. Links 
were made with the Polytechnics, often around specific 
projects, and through active outreach work, some 
participation and user involvement in the Networks was 
achieved.. Product development was particularly evident 
within LEEN and LIN. 
More important, however, was the identification of the 
central elements necessary to a socially-useful technology 
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Policy. 
The Networks developed in different ways.. but taken together 
the findings suggest that campaign work, education and 
training in the use of equipment. access to information and 
the promotion of discussion around technology issues were 
key requirements for*a genuinely participative approach to 
technology policy. These forms of cultural and 
technological programmes were necessary to the objective of 
user involvement in product design and development. 
In sum, the creation of the facilities for user involvement 
in product development by themselves. and technology 
transfer of socially-useful products from academia to local 
enterprises were not found to be the most important factors 
for an alternative approach to innovation. These elements 
. comprise components, rather than are the basis of, a 
socially-useful technology policy. In the following 
sections, why this was found to be the case is discussed. 
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7.4 USER INVOLVEMENT IN PRODUCT DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT. 
The social organisation of the product design process, 
whereby producers and users had the facilities to work 
together, was a key element of the GLC technology policy. 
The Networks represented the creation of an alternative 
mechanism to the 'market' for a more direct relationship 
between producers and-users= an important pre-requisite for 
an alternative approach to innovation. The major focus for 
the Networks was the design and development of 
socially-useful products, together with exemplary projects 
which extended technological opportunities to otherwise 
disadvantaged groups, for example, training in new 
technology for women and ethnic minorities. 
The IEC Report (dLC 1982) described in 6.2 outlined the 
brief for the Technology Networks. One aim was the, 
involvement of representatives from the scientific 
community, locally-based workplace groups, representatives 
of the local community and other voluntary groups concerned 
with the development of socially-useful technologyo in their 
management and day-to-day operations (GLC 1982 p. 3). The 
Network staff were to make appropriate contact for people in 
the community to make use of the facilities of the 
Polytechnics and universities for their own research and 
development needs. The aim was to discover ways of 
organising the design process so that socially-useful- 
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products could be developed. 
As a proposition. user involvement in product development is 
based on the belief that people who use technologies and are 
affected by design decisions should be involved in making 
those decisions. This is a concern which has been reflected 
in debates-on technology issues for much of the 1970s. (see 
2.7). In a similar way to the concept of participation, the 
notion of user involvement lacks clarity. It can refer to 
exercises designed merely to elicit users opinions about 
product development, for example,. in the way of market 
research techniques. Or at the other end of the spectrum, 
it can refer to product design and development by users 
themselves. The latter involves a transfer of power from 
the 'expert' to the lay-person, and necessitates the 
provision of workshop facilities for product development. 
Whilst workshop facilities were made available for user 
involvement in product development, the nature and extent of 
this involvement varied among the Networks. 
The Technology Networks were based on the ideas of 
production for social need characterised by the Lucas Plan 
(see 5.4). Social needs identified by discussions with 
community groups were linked with the, skills. equipment and 
resources at Lucas Aerospace. In this example, -users were 
not actually involved in product development; that remained 
the preserve of the skilled workers at Lucas Industries. 
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What was-different was the access to varying degrees of 
influence-for a range of workers and social groups to the 
design/development stage of the innovation process. 
What is important about an attempt to evaluate the extent 
of user involvement in product development achieved by the 
Networks is the recognition of the varying decrees and forms 
that it can take. 
A brief resume of the forms of-user involvement pursued by 
the Networks indicates the different ways that-this' 
objective was put into practice. The energy'network, LEEN, 
gave priority to the promotion of energy efficiency measures 
and services. They worked with-local authorities. tenants 
groups and voluntary organisations involved in energy 
issues. The Network staff sought to'-compile information of 
particular relevance to tenant groups and, in this way, 
build alliances around. energy efficiency needs. This was 
achieved-by. a deliberate strategy of seeking to recruit 
community organisations and trade union branches into their 
membership. Their strategy for participation by users' 
tended to be pro-active and centred around specific issues 
and"specific.. localities such as a local authority housing 
estates. User involvement in product-design and development 
was indirect in that ideas for products, such as the 
user-friendly heating controller, emerged from discussions 
with organisations-involved-in energy issues. Otherwise_. 
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product ideas were initiated by sole inventors. In the case 
of Pedelec and Airlec. or people already employed in the 
Network.. The concern was to develop products with a 
social-use potential, identified through discussions with 
tenants and energy groups, 'that was matched by strong 
indicators of commercial viability. 
LNTN were involved in education and training programmes in 
new technology, for example, microelectronics training 
courses for women. User involvement in the Network also 
took the form of support for the small co-operatives and 
other enterprises housed on the site. On product 
development they tended, to work with single inventors 
referred to the. Network from other agencies. or they worked 
on particular projects in collaboration with university 
departments. The strategy for user involvement-in the 
Network was reactive in that they waited for-people to 
contact them, rather than pursuing a strong local outreach 
orientation. 
TRANSNET. were concerned to represent the transport needs of 
the disabled, 
-low-income groups, women and other 
disadvantaged groups.. They emphasised the political 
campaigning element of the Network strategy and were not 
directly involved in product design and development with 
user groups. Where possible, they assisted projects that 
were referred to them from the EPa. User' involvement more, 
%S(: ) 
usually took the form of links with workplace and community 
groups on campaigns against'job losses and service cuts, 
publicity and promotion of campaign work. This was a slow 
process and involved building contacts. through working with 
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trade unions-and /or community groups on specific issues and 
the burden-of proof was on the Network to demonstrate their 
ability: to provide an, effective-resource. 
THAMES TECHNET sought to act as a practical resource for 
individuals, groups, co-operatives and other enterprises on 
the development of products and'services relevant to the 
needs of the local community.. The Network. emphasised the 
accessibility of its technical resources for use by the 
local community. To this end a Community Team pursued a 
strong local outreach-strategy. 
LIN emphasised the,, close. relationship between producers and 
users on-product development with projects such as 
'Disability and the Domestic Environment'. This was an 
investigative outreach-programme designedito involve 
interested groups in drawing a picture of the needs-of the 
disabled. The-ldentiflcation"of gaps in existing aids and 
equipment availability,, together with research into the 
Problems of the disabled community, could then be used to 
initiate prodects.. in the Network. -Product needs were 
identified by working with groups of users. End-users were 
also involved-in testing and commenting on ideas, designs 
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and product prototypes. The products themselves were 
designed and developed by people with the appropriate 
expertise. The Network was keen to support projects from 
individuals and groups not usually associated with the 
design process, for example, project ideas from women and 
ethnic minorities, but found that project proposals were by 
and large from white male inventors rather than from women. 
community organisations or other groups. 
This resume indicates the spectrum of user involvement from 
organisational membership, participation in campaigning. 
educational programmes to informal training and use of 
machinery. discussion of needs and hands-on development of 
products. LIN most clearly attempted the latter but found 
that product development was the preserve of existing 
inventors and student projects in the polytechnics. In 
effect. products were developed by people skilled in the use 
of technology. 
In a recent article'Linn (1988); a key figure in Thames 
Technet, argued that the inability of the technology 
strategy to effectively open up the product 
design/development process to users was the result of the 
GLEB 'product-focused technicist-view' of social change 
which was not genuinely built on the needs of local people. 
What was'required was an understanding of the social and 
cultural factors which shape technological artefacts in the 
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context of existing power relations of race, sender and 
class. It was crucial to base a genuinely alternative 
approach to innovation on the realities of our technological 
environment. She argued that; 
'local people have little access to technology, or to the 
power that accompanies conventional technical knowledge and 
productive facilities' (p. 126). 
For Thames Technet the focus was: 
"not a design-led vision of social change, -but an attempt to 
change technological working relations by minimizing 
exclusive expertise. valuing non-certificated experience and 
making productive resources available to. a wider range of 
people' (p. 134). 
To-some extent the problem with user involvement emer&es 
from the political/practical dichotomy discussed in the 
previous section. For users to be involved in product 
design/development then what is required is a slow process 
of building links, informal training in the workshops and 
the opportunity for a 'hands-on' participation. This 
requires a transfer of power from the 'expert' to the 
lay-person in an attempt to influence technological working 
relationships., However, the practical emphasis on product 
development and the political. preesure for'the Technology 
Networks to demonstrate the workability of the alternative 
approach, with actual products, to a large extent# precluded 
the approach that was called for by Thames Technet. Indeed, 
in her article Linn suggests that the GLEB were actively 
against the community approach, in that funding for projects 
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was more readily available for product-based rather than 
community-based projects. This was not suprising, given the 
political pressure on the BLEB to demonstrate to ratepayers 
the 'value for money' of their approach to technology 
policy. However, it does draw attention to the important 
truth that the resources were unavailable for the 
development of a genuinely participative approach to 
Innovation. 
From the users perspective the product-oriented-approach is 
compounded by the nature, of skill and expertise. Design can 
be perceived as a-'solution-focused"., activity (Walker 19$6) 
that is based on the identification of a problem. - The, 
difficulty with the encouragement of user involvement in 
product design is the-ability of non-designers to generate 
new possibilities. Product design involves technical 
knowledge-but, just as importantly. is also based on 
experience and observation. Ideas for chances and 
improvements to products and processes are unlikely to 
emerge from-lay persons, without some technical experience in 
Particular product areas. The remoteness of technology from 
everyday life in the sense of the lack of participation in 
technological development that is engendered by the 
privatisation and specialisation of the innovation process, 
together with the increasing technical complexity of many 
toohnolorivo results in a tendency to reinforce attitudes of 
deference to technical and design-expertise. 
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Deference to expertise is socially and culturally familiar 
to our'society, user involvement in product design is not. 
Thus to achieve some measure of participation the Networks 
had to'adopt pro-active strategies and'strong outreach 
programmes. Given that it is unusual for users to be able 
to pinpoint the nature of their dissatisfaction, an emphasis 
was put on the establishment of -links with community 
organisations"that could begin discussions on the nature of. 
their particular product needs. This wae"also a point taken 
up by Linn (1988), in the article mentioned above. She 
questionned'the notion of'popular planning as an effective 
and culturally familiar activity, arguing that since we live 
in a-privatised and individualised times-, how is it possible 
to find a context within which popular participation does 
not look culturally strange, and is accessible and credible 
as a way of winning something. Second, popular planning 
dent's political or interpersonal conflict. Third, on a more 
practical note, participatory structures assume that 
working-class people have the time and energy to become 
involved in local authority and municipal experiments. 
The problems that Linn points to in terms of popular 
planning are those that were experienced both in the Popular 
Planning Unit and the Technology Networks. Groups that did 
become involved'in the technology networks tended to be 
the already involved in technology issues. Otherwise, the 
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people most likely to approach the Networks were single 
inventors rather than groups of users or producers. In part 
this can be explained by the fact that the context of the 
local authority is qualitatively different from the 
experience at Lucas Aerospace (which was influential in the 
establishment of the Networks) where alternative plans for 
socially-useful products integrated the skills of manual and 
professional workers, in a context of struggle against 
management plans for rationalisation and redundancy. The 
Networks were required to build their own focus and 
political constituencies. It was envisaged that through a 
process of popular planning and workplace planning product 
ideas would emerge from groups of workers threatened with 
plant closure via GLEB. or community groups contacted by the 
GLC's Popular Planning Unit. The GLC's Popular Planning 
Unit was established to stimulate local debate on specific 
needs and problems in general; this was patchy and did not 
lead to much involvement in the GLEB innovation programme. 
Indeed this is not suprising and supports Cockburn's (1977) 
point that middle-class, more affluent groups with a history 
of participation in resident associations and other local 
and issue based organisations are more likely to take up 
opportunities for participation in planning than more 
working class groups (see 5'5). ' This was a finding from the 
Popular Planning Unitat the GLC and led to the policy of 
building on existing initiatives rather than the promotion 
of popular planning in general (see 5.8). This strategy was 
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also evolved in the Networks. whereby LEEN and Transnet 
sought to build on existing campaigns and form alliances 
with groups already operating in the field of transport and 
energy. 
While direct community participation in the innovation 
process has been patchy, the GLC's various. consultative 
exercises and the 'local plans' developed with the help of 
the Popular Planning Unit have at least'provided an input 
into the GLC/GLEB decision-making system. Obviously. it 
takes a long time to build links and the danger with the 
product-oriented Networks particularly was that products 
would be based around existing technical capability rather 
than user needs. 
7.5 TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. 
A broad definition of 'technology transfer' is 'the 
institutional or geographical movement of product or process 
technologies from one sphere of economic activity to others' 
(Marshall 1987).. Liff (1985) defines technology transfer as 
'a form of innovation which does not require the firm 
applying the new technology to undertake original research 
and development works (p. 5). 'Technology transfer' may 
encompass a number of differing practical approaches. --In 
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terms of the GLC approach, it refers to the transfer of 
-- -ideas and productsýProm academic institutions to local 
enterprises via the Technology Networks, - It was envisaged 
that higher education institutions would collaborate with 
the Networks on the identification of product needs and the 
support of projects at the prototype and product development 
stages. Specifically, it was seen that: 
'the Networks would encourage undergraduate and 
post-graduate projects on product ranges that would be 
useful to the communities around them' (GLC 1982 P. 3). 
In this way academic theoretical design and technical skills 
could be matched with'the 'tacit' knowledge of workplace and 
community groups (see 6.2). The product prototypes would 
then be produced and manufactured by GLEB supported 
enterprises and co-operatives. 
In practice, this process was not straightforward. The idea 
that the'Networks could link into the spare capacity within 
Polytechnic departments was misconceived. In part this can 
be attributed to the funding crises facing Polytechnics. ' 
The Pressure for academic staff was to win paid research" 
contracts, thus many were reluctant-or unable"to'eive unpaid 
time. The emphasis on Polytechnic/industry links and the 
self-sufficency heralded as the way forward for Polytechnics 
meant that extra-curricula' activities were'required to bring 
in funding from outside sources, for example, training 
courses for industry. Consequently, the Polytechnics tended 
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to look towards the GLEB as a possible source of funding for 
'research'', rather than as a partner in developing ambitious 
new social projects. It was found by all of the Networks 
that links were very dependent on contacts, personalities 
and individual commitment. 
Institutional' commitment to the Technology Network was in no 
way automatic. Links were forged more easily by working on 
a particular problem that was relevant both to the 
polytechnic and the networks, rather than more generally on 
a day-to-day level.. For-LNTN links-were established with 
Imperial College through work on a joint project on-diabetic 
care. Rather than rely on linkages the'Network tended to 
employ its own-'experts', thus establishing itself as a 
Centre-of expertise in its own right rather than as an 
interface between local groups and the higher education 
institutions. The same policy was adopted-by Transnet, 
links were established with the Polytechnic of-the South 
Bank on particular projects. An upshot of the difficulties 
of access to technical resources, in"the Polytechnics was 
that the Networks needed more facilities and equipment-than 
their own resources initially catered for. Thames Technet 
had a different experience with Thames=Polytechnic largely 
because it began its life within the Polytechnic itself and 
received support from the Director. They found that 
commitment of time from academic statt, technicians and 
researchers was good, and a number of student proiects were 
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initiated. However, on occasion the-pressure on the 
Polytechnic not to be seen to have excess capacity meant 
that time from academics had to be paid for on a consultancy 
basis. The LIN were perhaps most successful in establishing 
links with the Polytechnics and initiating student projects 
as a-result of their policy of affiliated agencies actually 
located in Polytechnic departments and based around student 
projects, such as the DDU at Middlesex Polytechnic and the 
CCD at North-East London Polytechnic. For LIN partnership 
arrangements with polytechnic departments was seen as 
mutually beneficial, in return for access. to polytechnic 
resources they provided a source of challenging 'real life' 
research projects for students of design, technology , 
marketing and business (Coleman and Amphlett 1987). Again 
this'resulted from the commitment of individuals, rather 
than emanating from the institutions themselves. The LIN 
were concerned to encourage Polytechnics to-look beyond 
academic concerns for effective forms of application of 
their technical., expertise and development. One strategy was 
the establishment of, R and D. companies operating. within the,; 
Polytechnic (Coleman and Amphlett 1987)" 1 The LIN would then 
assist the final stage of technology transfer by seeking new 
enterprises or co-operatives to, manufacture the products. 
This, strategy was more attractive to Polytechnics because it 
matched their concern to, establish more effective links with 
industry. and the community in a"commercial, rather than 
voluntary sense. 
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Technology transfer from the DDU and CCD and projects 
developed in the Networks to local enterprises presented 
certain problems. First. there was the need for Network 
staff to develop marketing and entrepreneurial skills if new 
and assisted enterprises were to survive in a competitive - 
market. The survival rate of new small firms developing new 
products in the current economic climate cannot be seen as 
encouraging. A difficulty for the Networks was the 
recruitment of staff with a mixture of marketing and 
entrepreneurial skills together with a commitment to 
socially -useful ' products. 'In general, the staff of the 
networks were from academic and technical backgrounds - 
with only a small number of personnel recruited with 
non-technical backgrounds or business experience. In 
addition, the emphasis that emerged on campaigning as part 
of the networks' brief necessitated a bias toward political 
mobilisation around technology issues. Whilst Thames 
Technet attempted to address this problem, the difficulty of 
finding people with skills in both technical areas and 
community mobilisation was recognised. 
A second problem was the availability of' manufacturing 
opportunities. The GLEE and the'Networks did not have the 
resources to undertake manufacturing in terms of equipment, 
tooling and premises. The LIN found that there were only 24 
manufacturing co-operatives in London, mostly in 
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labour-intensive areas. This raised two issues; the 
development of links with the commercial manufacturing world 
meant addressing the problem of whether the Networks were 
subsidising Rand D work for the private sector. The 
Networks were, established in a concerted attempt to link the 
technological resources of local colleges . 
and. polytechnics 
to meet the strategic social, economic-and employment needs 
of the community. As such they represented a clear 
alternative to the practices adopted-in Science Parks, where 
academic expertise is channelled to meet commercial 
requirements (see 3.3). However. the problem of 
manufacturing opportunities meant that the Networks were 
forced to operate more like Science Parks. Employment 
creation suffered when the problem of manufacturing 
opportunities meant that=it-was necessary to approach 
companies.. established outside London. 
This-above point is most clearly illustrated by a case-study 
of the Whitfield Technology Bench by the Co-ordinator of the 
DDU (see Holdsworth 1988). _ The 
DDU identified a market for 
a technology bench through involvement with Craft. Design 
and Technology teaching. -, Further discussions with f 
teachers/users and LEA's revealed that existing engineering 
and woodworking shops were inappropriate for technology 
teaching. The production of-a small batch of technology 
benches was undertaken. in the LIN workshops. A school was 
then kitted out with the Bench. This allowed feedback from 
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users to identify any design modifications and acted as a 
demonstration unit for potential manufacturers. For 
production and marketing of the Bench the base concept was 
to find a manufacturer in London who could produce the 
product whilst paying a royalty per unit sold. The first 
priority was to find a manufacturing company involved in the 
GLEB Furniture Sector Strategy or a company within the GLC 
area capable of providing a complete manufacturing facility 
in-house, with a sales operation that could expand into the 
educational market. After a period of visiting 
manufacturers, it became apparent that to obtain the best 
deal it was going to be necessary to manufacture the Bench 
outside the London area. At this point Holdsworth notes 
that the possibility for the GLEB or LIN to establish a 
remote sales and production facility to produce and market 
this and other furniture products was considered. However, 
this would have been a costly exercise, and funding for this 
approach was never accessible. In addition. it went against 
the GLEB and LIN philosophy, they saw themselves as aides to 
the production process, and not producers per se. In terms 
of the best deal for the product a manufacturer in Worcester 
was chosen with a track record in the field of educational 
furniture. Shortly after the completion of negotiations. 
the company was taken over by one of the larger educational 
furniture manufacturers who decided to add the Bench to 
their product ranse, manufactured under licence with LIN in 
receipt of royalties. Whilst the royalties received from 
3co3ý 
the Bench would feed back into the DDU and the LIN, and thus 
subsidise other projects more directly relevant to the 
people of London. This case-study illustrates most directly 
the key problems of the 'technology transfer' approach; 
manufacturing and employment creation. 
7.6 SOCIALLY-USEFUL PRODUCTS. 
Socially-useful production . as a political strate&y 
for 
technological development was strongly influenced by the 
Lucas Plan (see 5.4) and the socialist ideal of usefulness 
over profit. It provided a means to relate technology 
directly to social need through products such as aids for 
the disabled. Second, it represented a vision of an 
alternative and prefigurative paradigm that could present a 
different role for technology in society. The 
pre-figurative element was a strong factor in the GLC 
approach to popular planning, workers' plans and 
socially-useful products (see 5.2). Of prime importance was 
the, ability to find a way to exert some influence on the 
direction of technological advance and the benefits that 
flow from it. To do this it was necessary to produce both a 
-critique of the current shape and aims of existing 
technology together with examples of alternatives that could 
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-lead-to social and technological chance. 
This alternative technological paradigm was fostered by the 
GLEB's Technology Networks initiative with the potential use 
of resources; materials. energy, capital and labour to meet 
social needs in a more effective way than they are currently 
catered for. -The ability to transcend existing forms of 
thinking about technology by building on the tacit knowledge 
and experience of workplace and community groups, what 
M. Cooley. the Director of the Technology Division at the 
GLEB termed the "re-integration of hand and brain' was seen 
as the way to stimulate more socially relevant and 
technically sensible ideas. The. Technology Networks were 
established to provide the facilities for this alternative 
approach to technology and innovation. 
Before considering how the Networks approached the idea of 
socially-useful production it is necessary to try and 
clarify the concept. In an article on the BLEB. Newman 
(1986) argues that; 
'In order to have an unambiguous meaning the concept of 
"- socially-useful production-is-best reserved to cover those 
products which would not be. produced under"a capitalist 
market system because they require state involvement in 
research, development, distribution and purchase'(p. 63).. 
What this implies is an alternative economic system to the 
'market' for the production and distribution of moods within 
the public sector. It calls for the public sector to be the 
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stimulus for technological and economic chance. - This 
definition of socially-useful products is a narrow one, but 
does identify the central elements of the socially-useful 
approach, as applied to the public sector. 
It is necessary to attempt a definition because otherwise 
the concept can become an all-encompassing one. Rustin 
(1986). In a review article points to the ambiguities 
surrounding, the concept of socially-useful production in the 
London Industrial Strategy (GLC, 1985). He argues that: 
'First, the use of capital and especially labour resources 
in contrast to their disuse through redundancy and factory 
closure - show that creating useful work would cost little 
and less than maintaining the unemployed. This argument 
alone is almost sufficient justification for many kinds of 
public involvement. 
Second. Socially-useful production is contrasted with, 
privately useful, this signifies a preference for those 
goods which are actually used in common, for example. 
launderettes as opposed to domestic washing machines. 
Third, a distinction is made between goods and services 
allocated by public or political decision and those 
allocated by the market, a general preference is for public 
over private spending. 
Four, Socially-useful products will be consciously chosen as 
such by workers, for their known use-value, in contrast to 
production in-. response to impersonal market forces or 
exchange values. 
Finally. sometimes socially-useful is simply taken to be 
what everyone can agree it is. As such it represents an 
evocation of an invisible collective. initially the common 
culture of a particular community or workers' group'. 
These ambiguities indicate a general notion of 
socially-useful as the re-introduction of capital and labour 
resources into the economy through public sector political 
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processes. . Goods, aimed at collective service provision, in 
effect, take the form of what can be commonly agreed to be 
socially-useful. As one commentator remarked, 'it is - 
perhaps easier to agree on what is not socially-useful 
rather than what is' (Brooke - Interview 1985). 
For the Networks the major problem was-how to find a way of 
promoting the ideal of socially-useful production with 
real-life exemplary products, whilst at the same time 
attempting to create employment amidst the realities of 
operating within a competitive market system. -Certainly, 
the aim of producing products for the disabled and 
influencing-the'allocation of public spending away from 
armaments to medical equipment is attractive. But, to 
create employment through this process requires an increase 
in public spending, precisely what is, missinz in Thatcherite 
Britain. 
An alternative approach was to balance the social-use and 
commercial attractiveness of products developed in the 
Networks. Some of the projects taken up in product form by 
the Networks were ideas from sole inventors. ' A problem for 
inventors may be access to finance for product development. 
Few investors are keen to provide risk capital for 
longer-term ventures; the time-scale from idea through 
prototype development to manufacturable product can prove 
tob long. Until investment is considered to be necessary or 
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profitable, technologies will not be developed. In 
consequence,, potentially new ideas and markets may be 
ignored,, and more generally, the concern with commercial 
viability may result in the neglect of projects which have 
high social value potential. 
Investment in_projects in their early stages of development 
was seen by the GLEB, as a necessary area to addresss If 
intervention in the innovation process was to be 
strategically effective. In this way the GLEB could support 
selected technologies which were considered appropriate and 
desirable. The GLEB via the Technology Networks were able 
to stimulate the development of some selected innovative 
products by supporting the work of individual inventors, for 
example, Airlec and Pedelec in the LEEN workshops. This 
area of innovative activity, product development to 
Prototype. does not incur huge, costs so that it was seen as 
appropriate for assistance given the financial constraints 
on-local authority spending on economic development. 
However, although products were developed to, marketable 
Product stage, industrial partners and private investors 
were not easy to find for the stage of moving to full-scale 
Production. The GLEB did not have the resources to invest 
in full-sale production and manufacturing. The original 
idea was that such products would prove attractive to 
commercial interests, that is, once developed to 
manutacturable stage. the product would be taken up by the 
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conventional market mechanism with possibly the original 
company itself being taken over by a larger one, exactly 
what happened with the Whitfield Technology Bench, but 
unfortunately to the detriment of job creation in London. 
In addition to the problems of manufacture, there is the 
problematic nature of the innovation process itself- 
Innovation-is necessarily long-term; in some, cases the 
time-lapse between an invention and its eventual application 
can be years depending on factors such as market demand and 
financial investment. The creation of the Technology 
Networks within the political framework of a-local authority 
meant that the short-term political priorities of 
demonstrating the effectiveness' of the strategyo in 
practical terms. that is, with actual products' was in 
conflict with the longer-term process of. innovation. ' Thus 
in many cases the choice of product-development-in the 
Networks was conditioned by what could be produced in the 
short-term. ' For example. - the energy network; LEEN9 in its 
'Jobs for Warmth' programme developed a number of short-term 
innovations that could be balanced by long-term projects 
such as CHP. This points to the problem of the short time 
scale of the experiment (Mole and Elliott 1987). 
The emphasis on the technical aspects'of innovation support 
led, initially. to a focus on product development. However, 
the stimulation and development of product innovations has 
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proved to involve a number of problems, and is slow. There 
was no shortage. of ideas, the computer product bank created 
by ITDG held-a list of new product lines but it was not easy 
to find people to develop the ideas. despite the technical 
resources of the Network workshops. or to finance the 
projects., Although the GLEN were able to take up some of 
the ideas-the. time-scales involved in developing a-prototype 
product from an idea were long and in conflict with the aim 
of immediate job creation. 
The commitment of financial resources to product development 
proved to be a major problem for the Networks. For example, 
the 'Jobs from Warmth' campaign grew out of the concern 
about the. high. cost and poor operation of the heating 
systems in council owned flats. Technical options. were 
reviewed including the idea of using a medium-sized heat 
pump. to supply district heating networks, CAITS took a 
leading role in this activity. The plan was to find a local 
manufacturing enterprise that would expand to produce such 
units for-several housing estates; however the project was 
halted due. to insufficient local council finance. The main 
point to be gained from this example is that given LEEN 's 
technical resources, there was no real problem with the 
technology but rather the problem lay. with the political 
commitment of resources for implementation. The development 
Of socially-useful products involves political processes 
aimed at the establishment-of forms of exchange that are 
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based on social accounting; that is, perceived economic 
importance is secondary to the fulfilment of a social need. 
The socially-useful design and development of products in 
the Technology Networks exemplified the possibility of 
alternative directions for technological development but was 
increasingly marginalised as the GLEB faced the realities of 
the need for commercially-successful products if the aim of 
employment creation and employment retention were to be 
realised. 
Need-led innovation is thus a political rather than a 
technological problem. The recognition of this led to the 
development of the other side of the'Network strategy= 
campaigning for increased public' spending to meet local 
needs. For LEEN this involved energy advice and support 
work, with an emphasis on relatively simple energy 
conservation measures. The argument. was that Jobs could be- 
created more rapidly and needs met more effectively by 
campaigning for the provision of advice and support on 
energy efficiency and, where possible. providing help as an 
exemplar, to reinforce the campaign. In the longer term new 
products would emerge from this process if they were 
considered necessary, for"example, energy efficiency 
monitoring equipment. ' Transnet also adopted this approach 
with the promotion of a socially-useful transport policy. 
This strategy exhibits an approach which is more 
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design-oriented and 'market-led'. Intervention begins with 
the problem area, -and technical needs and solutions are 
defined more clearly. Working in this way LEEN achieved 
some success in building alliances wth local community 
groups and local councils to provide user feedback about 
needs. The identification of needs and the provision of 
advice and monitoring services led-to the development of a- 
number of new product ideas that were considered for' 
production at the London Production Centre. one of the GLEB 
Technology Centres, and provided a strong 'lobbying' 
platform for-more resources.. 
But in general, these attempts to introduce innovation 
initiatives highlight the problem. not of developing new 
technologies. but rather of the implementation or 
technologies that: already exist. Production for social 
needs is apolitical problem-, because it requires increased 
public spending in the area of collective service provision= 
this is effectively limited by the current economic 
environment. The recognition of this meant looking at the 
possibility of the development of socially-useful products 
aimed at individual purchase and consumption via. the private 
market mechanism. One strategy to overcome this problem was 
to acknowledge the realities of the market mechanism and 
produce products aimed at individual purchase and 
consumption. people choose to buy them for their use value. 
Sharples (1986), posed the dilemma; if products are produced 
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at a price that covers coat then the socal value is not 
relevant, if it does not then does that mean that the local 
authority adopts the position of subsidising manufacture and 
jobs. Clearly, the GLC were not in a position to. resource 
the latter strategy. 
An area that was identified as more relevant to the Network 
approach was the social market. Coleman (1987) clarified" 
LIN"s"position in an article on investment in the social 
market. The social market, or-, areas of collective service 
provision, could be developed as a potentially profitable 
market for new, products. This market was seen to consist of 
very specific needs for small volume carefullY'desi¢ned 
products. A different approach to the social organisation 
of the innovation process would be required for these" 
products; with the end user closely involved and, the market 
need therefore clearly defined. He argued: 
'Getting the product right is the key to marketing 
socially-useful products, and a design process that brings 
manufacturer and user together is the beat way to ensure 
that the product is right' (Coleman 1987 p. 5)" 
Whilst the Technology Networks were able to provide the 
facilities for an alternative social organisation of the 
innovation process, product development was more dependent 
on external factors. It was hoped that orders for, for 
example. aids for the disabled, would be forthcoming via the 
provisions offered by the Department of Health and Social 
Security for people. with special needs, or via local council 
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purchasing. However the cutbacks in local and national 
welfare provisions made it much harder to obtain this sort 
of backing. Nevertheless, the design-led strategy based on 
the close connection between producers and users could give 
products the competitive edge they. would need to break into 
these markets. 
Of, all the Networks established, IJIN was the most concerned 
to address the problems of manufacture, marketing and the 
commercial. viabilty of socially-useful products. This 
required are-orientation of their approach because the 
initial basis for the"creation of the networks as facilities 
for technical support for product development aimed at the 
public sector led to a lack of attention to the marketing of 
products. The rhetoric of 'alternatives to-. the private 
market mechanism' allowed attention to finance and 
distribution to be neglected. To an extent this can be 
accounted for. particularly in the area of marketing, by the 
difficulty of staff recruitment in an-area where there is- 
not a ready pool of people with the right types of skill to 
achieve-a balance between social use characteristics of the 
product and commercial marketability. 
The difficulties of product development encountered in the 
Networks illustrates how political and economic factors 
influence the selection and development of technological 
traJectories: The dominant priorities for investment in R 
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and D, and market demand factors, are likely to preclude the 
possibility of introducing alternative technical solutions 
to user problems. For a product idea or invention to 
become an innovation. technology-push must match with 
market-pull or be supported by some form of need-pull, for 
example. government need. Product design occupies a central 
place in the innovation process, thus the push-me-pull-you 
relationship-between technological capability and the market 
is central to innovative activity. The commercial viability 
of socially-useful-products remains a , problem for the 
networks, for the'nature of the wider competitive market 
environment constrains the' possibility of creating and- 
developing products in an alternative way. 
In terms of socially-useful products. the Networks were 
faced with a daunting task. A task which o-x-Y t LVV4 
effectively met head on. For the other Networks. 'the` 
social-use of projects was not narrowly defined to refer to 
artefacts. The campaienin$ arm of activities was a strong 
factor in their approach. For-Thames Technet. challenges to 
existing assumptions about technology and expertise were an 
important element of their' strategy. Finally. for LNTN. the 
educational aide of activities was pursued, These. different 
approaches are discussed more fully in the next section. 
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7.7 UDAP AND SCEPTRE. 
The interesting question which emerges from the policy 
outcomes is why the policy implementation process emerged in 
the way that it did. In this section the data collected 
from UDAP in the West Midlands (see 3.8 and 6.2) and SCEPTRE 
(see 3.7) is compared with the findings from the Network 
study. UDAP and SCEPTRE are organisations with similar aims 
to the Networks. An important difference is the wholly 
product-focused approach of these organisations. Their 
experience was qualitatively different to that of the 
Networks in some areas, and these differences help to make 
the Networks policy outcomes more understandable. 
Interviews were carried out with dim Shutt of SCEPTRE and 
Bill Brooke of UDAP in 1984. 
Both organisations were strongly influenced by the Lucas 
Plan initiative for socially-useful product development. 
UDAP was established in 1981 within the Engineering 
Department of Lanchester Polytechnic in Coventry. As a 
practical based organisation. it'emphasised work on product 
Prototypes by engineering students doing project work as 
Part of their degree courses. The Co-ordinator of SCEPTRE 
in Sheffield. Jim Shutt. worked at UDAP before moving to 
Sheffield to establish SCEPTRE. Thus SCEPTRE was strongly 
influenced by UDAP as a working model. It too emphasised 
practical product-based activities. - For these 
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organisations, user involvement took the form of working 
with client enterprises on product development. These were 
enterprises and co-operatives that were referred to the 
Units by the West Midland County Council and Sheffield City 
Council. In this way these organisations had closer 
connections to the local authority'. Whilst the Networks 
were supposed to feed into the GLC and GLEB 'sector 
strategies'. there was a problem with liaison. Sector 
Planning by the GLC failed to provide a direction to the 
Technology Network activities. '- 
UDAP and SCEPTRE also had a different experience with 
Polytechnic links. UDAP was supported by Lanchester 
Polytechnic from the beginning of its existence. Its 
location within the Engineering Department meant that the 
maintenance of close working relationships with lecturers 
and students did not pose too much 'of a problem. The 
extension of their activities to include marketing meant 
forging links with the Business Studies' Department in the 
Polytechnic. This took time to build, the process of 
'winning over individuals' was the same that was experienced 
with the Technology Networks (Interview-Brooke 1984). 
In Sheffield, SCEPTRE's links with the polytechnic were' 
strongly affected by the City Council's links with the 
Polytechnic. "-These institutions were close geographically 
and some Councillors were also on the Board of Governors of 
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the Polytechnic. At the same time, the Polytechnic was keen 
to respond to the growing local and national pressure to be' 
more community-oriented. Links with SCEPTRE gave the 
Polytechnic a higher profile in the local community. 
However, the response from individual departments varied 
according to the personalities and the politics of the 
department itself (Interview-Shutt 1984). 
For UDAP and SCEPTRE the recruitment of personnel did not 
present the same problems found by*the Technology Networks. 
The product focus meant that their need was for 
technically-skilled staff. At SCEPTRE. a separate marketing 
unit was established in the Business Studies and Economics 
Department. At UDAP Brooke was employed to develop the 
marketing side of their activities. He felt that, the 
problem with-staff recruitment for marketing was because of 
the orientation of marketing education: degree courses were 
focused on the marketing operations of large companies. thus 
a ready pool of appropriately qualified people did not exist 
(Interview-Brooke 1984). 
The employment creation brief for these organisations was 
also clearer than for the Networks. This was because the 
Units were-respondin$ to demand from local enterprises and 
co-operatives, via the local authority, 'for technical and 
marketing expertise. In this way, the potential 
manufacturer of *the product was already identified. One 
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example, the Advanced Humidifier S'atem developed by 
SCEPTRE, was the result of a joint venture between the 
Polytechnic. tenants' organisations and a local 
co-operative, established by some of the workforce after the 
closure of a large firm which manufactured machine tools. 
The local authority housing department, under pressure from 
tenants to act on problems of condensation in its housing 
stock. provided an initial market. Here, the local 
authority acted strategically. In a pump-priming role for 
the co-operative (Interview-Shutt 1984). SCEPTRE worked 
closely with the co-operative on product development. UDAP 
also were concerned to work with enterprises, on products, 
rather than develop products internally. "' and then find a 
manufacturer for them. 
The Units developed criteria for the assessment of the 
social-use potential of products. A priority for SCEPTRE 
was potential employment creation following market, research 
to establish a market need for the product. For-employment 
to result the product needed to be able to compete in the 
market. For, UDAP. the establishment of a need and a market 
for products was-the primary focus. A working definition of 
socially-useful was non-existent, therefore, they found it 
easier to identify'what was not socially-useful. A more 
useful approach to social-use was 'is the product wanted' 
(Interview-Brooke 1981).. Thus UDAP and SCEPTRE established- 
a pragmatic approach to socially-useful product development. 
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An approach mirrored b' LEEN and LIN in London. 
The-product-based nature of UDAP and SCEPTRE, together with 
the stronger liaison with the local authority and stronger 
links with the Polytechnics, meant that these institutions 
were not faced with building their own constituencies in the 
same way as the Networks were. They acted primarily as 
technical and business resource centres. The product base 
also meant that these Units were more seared to the problems 
of manufacture and markets from the outset of their '. 
operations. The role of the local authority as purchaser of 
some goods exemplified the potential of the public sector 
market for this approach. This was particularly evident in 
Sheffeld, which benefited from a more homogeneous political 
culture than either London or the West Midlands. 
Why were the experiences of UDAP and SCEPTRE qualitatively 
different from the Technology Networks? The product focus 
has already been mentioned. Another area was the lack of 
emphasis on user involvement: UDAP and SCEPTRE worked with 
client enterprises and concentrated efforts more on student 
projects. The Networks had to adopt a pro-active approach 
to participation, and the difficulties of liaison with the 
BLEB and the Popular' Planning Unit at the GLC compounded the 
problem of building a cohesive political base. The 
geographical nature of the London area also meant that the 
Networks did not benefit from linkages based on close 
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Proximity to neighbouring institutions, like the GLEB and 
the QLC. The technology-based and area-based brief for the 
Technology Networks meant that their activities were 
potentially more focused on specific issues, the problem was 
to create a specific market for them. In addition, the 
Political elements, of a socially-useful technology Policy 
were more central to their approach. 
7.8 OTHER ALTERNATIVE INITIATIVES. 
In this section the Science Shop experiment in France. the 
West German experience of sociallY-useful production and the 
Utopia Project in Scandinavia are discussed. These 
alternative initiatives highlight some of the findings of 
the Network study. Of particular importance, it draws 
attention to the fact that the policy initiative by the 
OLC/GLEE for socially-useful product development, was 
affected by the wider social and cultural patterns of 
technolo¢ical chance in society. A point emphasised. by 
Thames Technet. 
The Problems that have been encountered in experiments 
designed to link academic institutions with the community 
have to some extent been shared by the Science Shop movement 
in France. The aims of these institutions were: 
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'to provide a means for members of the public to seek 
answers to scientific and technical questions arising from 
their daily lives. and. for scientists and engineers to apply. 
their knowledge, training and skills to topics of social 
concern' (Science 1984). 
The problems which emerged from these experiments are 
documented in an article by John Stewart (1988) who was 
involved in the Science Shop movement in France. He argued 
that the premise on which Science Shops were based, that is, 
to provide answers to questions posed by the public, was not 
straightforward. The process of the translation of a 'lay' 
question into scientific terms posed problems, often due to 
the inability of the. client to know what to ask and what 
science had to offer. In addition, the interdisciplinary 
nature of many problems required the breakdown of barriers 
between scientists, technologists and lay persons. There 
was always the danger of a 'technical fix' attitude to 
social problems. In terms of community participation, 
Stewart described the problems: 
'More damaging, I feel, was the lack of support for the 
Science Shop idea from the public in general and our 
'clients' in particular. Meetings of the Science Shop 
collective were open to all and were generally held out of 
work hours, but apart from a short period in the wake of the 
initial enthusiasm, attendance by non-scientists was'quite 
exceptional. Worse, clients were usually not even 
interested in the treatment of their own cases' (Stewart 
1988 P. 60). 
The difficulties of community participation experienced by 
the Networks was shared by the Science Shope in France. The 
lack of knowledge about scientific and technical expertise 
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among lay persons was an important point made by Stewart. 
This resulted in an inability to 'recognise what the science 
Shops had to offer. An attitude which would make these 
organisations appear largely irrelevant to everyday 
experiences of technology. Linn (1988) made this 
observation in relation to the Technology Networkso she 
argued that they were culturally unfamiliar institutions, -so 
that the difficulties of community participation in their 
activities was not suprisina. The recognition of this 
supports the argument that for a socially-useful technology 
policy to be of benefit the political# social and cultural 
experience of technology are areas that need. to be 
addressed. 
In West Germany. some attempt has been made to address the 
cultural and political aspects of socially-useful 
Production.. This has concentrated on marketing and 
retailing rather than product development. Experiments like 
Mehringhof (Carter 1985) are geared toward alternative 
marketing initiatives whereby socially-useful products, such 
as Nicaraguan coffee, are aimed at a politically-conscious 
market segment. Carter (1985) states: 
'more than price, it is political sympathies which determine 
consumer choice on this alternative market'. 
This suggests that'attention to publicitY. £marketing and the 
distribution of products by the Networks at an earlier stage 
of their development may have given them-a higher profile in 
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the community,. thereby easing the problems of participation. 
The campaigning activities of LEEN and Transnet reflected 
this approach. -For example, much of LEEN's work was aimed 
at 'marketing' socially-useful information on energy-related 
issues. 
An important finding from the Network study was the variety, 
of. activities that could be encompassed by the concept of 
user involvement. Product design and development remained 
the Preserve of technically skilled people. Whilst this may 
not-be suprising, it does have important implications for, 
the ability of lay-persons to articulate-their-needs for 
alternative products. User involvement in product design 
and development was found to be very dependent on 'hands-on' 
use of technical equipment within a specific political 
context in the Lucas experience (see 5.4) and also in a 
Scandinavian initiative; the Utoj7sa Project. Discussion of 
these initiatives indicates that the concept of user 
Involvement-in actual product design was not easily 
transferable to a community context advocated in the Network 
idea. For-the Lucas workers 'social-use' gave the rallying 
cry to their, campaign. Product development was built on the 
specific skills of the workforce and on the technical 
resources available within Lucas Industries. Within the 
Utopia Project (Howard 1985) efforts to develop new 
technology grew out of a dissatisfaction among trade 
unionists with, the limitations on skill development and work 
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organisation embedded in text and image processing 
technology (the social relations of technological 
development were discussed in Chapter Two). 
The Utopia project involved a homogeneous group of skilled 
workers belonging to the Nordic Graphics Workers' Union, and 
computer and social scientists from research institutions in 
Sweden and Denmark. The group developed a participative and 
skill-based design method for product development. 
Information on printing activities and work organisation was 
gathered at the local level. Social values, such as, skill. 
quality of, work organisation and quality of product were 
then translated into computer hardware and software for the 
printing industry. 
Throughout the project, a . process of 'design by doing' was 
emphasised. It was found that the best method for 
discovering print workers' demands for new technology was by 
giving them direct access to its use. A computer 
workstation programmed with a few sample lay-out functions 
allowed participants to refine their'ideas and needs for 
alternative specifications for the hardware, software and 
for work organisation (Howard 1985). 
The Utopia Project was an attempt bw workers to design their 
own text and image processing technology. However, despite 
the high degree of user involvement in the project, the 
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- problem of the manufacture and the market for the technology 
remained. To get the technology into manufacture it was 
necessary to compromise on some of the design 
specifications. The Utopia recommendations for 
user-friendly software were incorporated into the system by 
the manufacturer. The ideas concerning work organisation 
and training were dependent on negotiations between 
employers and unions. 
The initiatives which have displayed a high degree of user 
involvement in product design and development have involved 
skilled workers in a specific locality around a specific 
issue. The Technology Network approach to user involvement 
underestimated the importance of, first, 'design by doing' 
for the articulation of need for product development. 
Second. the technical skill required in order to know what 
technology can do and how it can be relevant to social 
needs. 
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7.9 'CONCLUSION. 
The analysis of the Techno1o y'Network approach has 
indicated that there were certain problems with the basic 
premises on which the policy was based. 
user"involvement in the selection, design specifications and 
development of products, together with access to technical 
resources were not'found to be the main elements for a 
socially-useful technology policy based in the context of a 
local authority. 
The policy formation, which drew in large part from the 
Lucas Plan initiative. did not take into account the 
Qualitatively different context in which the Technology 
Networks were located. Before the practical elements of the 
strategy could be developed it was necessary to build an 
appropriate political base for the initiative. Clearly, the 
commitment of resources to this'side of activities entailed 
more Political risk than the commitment of resources to the,, 
development of products. At this point, however. the policy 
began to fall between two stools. If user involvement, the 
articulation of-needs and a , close relationship between user 
and producer were to be achieved then substantial work on 
the political side of the approach was necessary. 
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Otherwise, the wholly product-based practical element of the 
strategy was in danger of reflecting the needs of the 
Networks for actual products, coupled with the problems of 
manufacture and markets-which-that involved. The element of 
user involvement which distinguished this-socially-useful 
approach to technology policy from other more traditional 
methods of product development was in danger of being 
marginalised. The notion of an alternative approach to 
innovation remaining mere-political rhetoric. 
This was the dilemma faced by the Networks - how was it 
possible to move from a political exercise to'the 
presentation of real economic°and technological 
alternatives. The intuitive appeal of the idea of a 
socially-useful technology policy is strong but the question 
remains of-whether-policy initiatives were based on social, 
economic and technological realities. -Certainly, the idea 
of-user involvement. in product design-and`development, and 
technology transfer of socially-useful products to local 
enterprises was ill-conceived. The economic environment 
limits the potential for the production°of alternative 
technologies in alternative ways. The Technology Network 
initiative demonstrated the power'of market forces for 
innovative activity. 'It drew attention to the need to 
address the relationship between purchasing power and social 
needs. Further, it demonstrated how the national economic 
and political context affects the position of the local 
3488 
authority as an agent of technological change. 
What did emerge from the Technology-Network initiative were 
elements of a pre-figurative strategy for technological 
development and change. The study indicated the 
possibilities of varying models of a socially-useful 
technology policy: community-based. campaign-based and 
practical product-based approaches. The key areas for a 
local authority attempting to develop a genuinely 
participative approach to technological-innovation have been 
identified. First, information about alternative 
technologies, what technologies can and cannot do, are 
important to initiatives designed to affect the future 
direction. of technological chance. Second, access to 
technical facilities and training are important 
Prerequisites to participation in the innovation process. 
It is only by working with products that the ability to" 
generate and articulate needs for alternative product 
development can be realised. Third, whilst the remoteness 
1 or technology from everyday life. and the contradictions 
inherent in technological development. continue. to appear as 
practical problems. then the political and cultural issues 
of technological change will remain obscured. A"change of 
product within. -an: unchanged technological 
environment cannot 
be the basis of a socially-useful technology policy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCERNS. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The research has focused on the role of technological 
innovation in a process of social and political chance 
envisaged by the left-wing Greater London Council when it 
took office in 1981. The Technology Networks study showed 
how issues of the control, development and the social 
shaping of technology were addressed at the local level. At 
this point in the discussion the aim is to address the 
central question (see Chapter Four) raised by the Lucas Plan 
initiative and taken up by the GLC, of why certain 
technologies are developed whilst others are not even though 
there may be a social need for them. 
The findings from the Technology Network study revealed two 
major insights into this important question. First, the 
innovation process is a political, as well as a practical 
activity. The allocation of resources to socially-useful 
product development. the articulation of social needs, 
attention to demand factors within social markets all 
involve political processes. Without a match between these 
factors and the supply-side elements embodied in the. 
Networks then the practical aims of product development and 
manufacture incur problems. Second, the realities of our 
technological environment diminish the possibilities for a 
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genuinely participative approach to innovation. The 
facilities for a 'popular' social organisation of the 
innovation process remain under-utilised without the support 
of education and training programmesp campaign work. and the 
promotion of discussion and awareness of technology issues; 
all key components of an 'alternative' technological culture 
or paradigm. 
In Chapter One the concept of technological paradigm (Doss 
1982) was used to explain the emergence of dominant routes 
of technological development. Specific areas of 
high-technology. and its attendant association, in 
ideological terms with technological progressiveness. serve 
to exclude and limit technological development in areas. 
considered 'alternative'. Powerful economic. political-and 
institutional factors shape technological development. This 
challenges the idea of a technological determinism and 
illustrates the political nature of innovative activity. In 
addition. it suggests that there is a direct relationship 
between local authority technology policy and questions of 
innovation and power - not-the least in the most effective 
exercise of power, the prevention of the very existence, 
articulation or consideration of alternatives (Lukes 1974, 
MacKenzie 1987). 
Noble (1983) argues that the question of power is not an 
economic or technical problem but rather a political and 
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social one. The political commitment to change does not 
necessarily lead to change, the missing ingredient is power. 
And indeed local authority power is limited. But does this 
provide an adequate explanation as to why alternative 
strategies for technology remain only rhetorical and 
experimental? The unequal distribution of economic and political 
power in, society may be- an intuitively appealing explanation, ' but 
it requires further examination. There is a-need to'clarifY the 
relationship between power in society and alternative technological. 
devel'opment', 
-otherwise this: explanation can , only 
lead to_art Impasse 
in-informing practical action for technological. change 
(Bruce', and Mole 1987), 
The tendency is to get stuck in the circular argument tunt- 
the ability to shape technology is power-dependent 
(see 
Chapter One) and so changing society is necessary to change 
technology; but society cannot be changed without changes 
in 
technology (see Chapter Two). 
In this chapter the question of whY certain technologies are 
developed whilst others are not is raised in an attempt 
to 
understand and unravel the relationship between technology 
and power in society. In 8.2 attention is paid to the 
external constraints on local authority policy discussed 
in 
Chapter Three. The aim is to understand how this affected 
its potential as an agent of technological change. In 
8.3 
the theoretical insights into the innovation process 
discussed in Chapter one are related to the GLC initiative. 
In 8.4 the insights into the social construction of 
technology discussed in Chapter Two are considered in an 
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attempt to assess their practical use. In 8.5 some 
conclusions are made. If the relationship between 
technology and power in society can be made more 
-understandable, then points of intervention in the 
innovation process can be identified. which have specific 
relevance to the role of a local authority in technology 
Policy. 
8.2 THE LOCAL AUTHORITY AS AN AGENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE. 
The socially-useful technology policy formulated by the 
GLC 
was a political programme dependent on national level 
= re-allocation of resources to public sector service 
provision. A programme that was in stark contrast with 
the 
major priorities of the Thatcher Government during the 
1980e; the control of public spending and the concern 
to 
replace municipal provision with market provision 
(Young 
1986). Attempts to control public spending 
by the central 
Conservative Government led to a series of legislative 
changess including rate-capping, and finally 
the abolition 
of the GLC itself, along with the other metropolitan 
". _ authorities in 1986 (see 3.9). Financial curbs and 
legislative changes were envisaged as the route to a more 
limited 'role for local government -a role which explicitly 
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ruled out redistributive policies at the local level 
(Bramler 1984). 
Conversely. the Labour Left saw the GLC as an arena of 
Socialist advance. As a radical Labour Left administration. 
the GLC were keen to present a socialist alternative to 
Thatcherism and the free market economy. To be achieved by 
a demonstration of the importance of public sector 
institutions at the local levels to the economy as a whole 
(see 3.5). ' Thus, the technology and the economic policies 
of the radical councils need to be seen against a background 
of increasing chance and tension between the-centre and the 
locality. 
In the face of opposition from the centre, the local 
authority possesses only limited economic and political 
Dower (see 3.2). Indeed the discussion of local authority 
initiatives (see 3.10) suggested that they do not have the 
resources to effectively intervene in the-local economy. 
Rather their strength lies in their role as employers, 
purchasers and providers of goods (Boddy 1984. 
Bennington 
1985). It would be easy to conclude that the 
GLC 
demonstrated. in embryo. what may be possible within a 
socialist society, but that they were constrained 
economically and politically by the Thatcher 
Government. 
Whilst this is evidently the case, particularly 
in relation 
to funding pressures on the initiatives, 
is this the whole 
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story? How would the policies have fared if there had been 
national support? This can only be open to conjecture, but 
here the benefit of historical hindsight does exist. The 
Labour Party 1986 Charter for Local Enterprise (NEC 1986) 
(see 5.2) included proposals for a national network of Local 
Enterprise Boards. However. the issues of political 
constraint are also likely to be faced by Labour Party 
initiatives at the national-level. One major example was 
the 1974 Labour Programme for Industry and the National' 
Enterprise Board. The left-wing of the Labour Party 
prescribed a democratic base for industrial policy which 
included a National Enterprise Board'with substantial 
Powers, planning agreements and increased 
industrial 
democracy. The difficulties of implementation of the 
strategy were discussed in 5.3. The likelihood"is 
that a 
national initiative by the Labour party would meet the same 
type of political and economic opposition 
in the 19808. 
As an agent of technological change the very nature 
of local 
government, in the national context of the 
19808, limits its 
potential. Even with national support o' 
Government. political and economic constraints persist. 
Not 
the least, in the fact that much of British industry 
is 
foreign-owned (Guardian 4.8.88). The aiscuge wns 'L" 
Chapters Five and Seven, indicate the difficulties 
with the 
approach. It could be argued that the policy 
itself was 
based on an idealised view of the local economy and 
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manufacturing industry. As'an economic strategy, innovation 
is based on the development of quality products at an 
appropriate price (see 8.3). Given the absence of national 
support for the socially-useful elements of the policy, what 
was-primarily a political programme became an ill-fated 
economic strategy operating within the competitive market 
system. 
The alternative economic and technological policies of the 
GLC were constrained politically and' economically. They 
were also constrained culturally. The GLC policy formation 
drew on the Labour Party Programme of 1974 and was 
influenced extensively by worker and community planning 
initiatives, 
of which the Lucas Plan represented a 
particular exemplar (see Chapter Five). However, the 
popular' approach may be seen as contradictory to the 
-individualistic 'enterprise' culture of the 1980s. Within 
this context, participation in economic planning and 
alternative technology initiatives is culturally unfamiliar 
(see Linn 1988). 
The perspective of pre-figurative politics played a 
large 
role in the GLC strategy (see 5.2). It was pre-figurative 
'in that some elements of the strategy were not expected to 
be effective in their own terms but. to pre-figure some 
future goal or socialist solution. The Network study 
indicated the political and practical factors that need to 
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be addressed if a local authority were to develop a role as 
an agent of technological change. Socially-useful product 
development and a close relationship between technology and 
social need ought to be a participatory, on-going activity. 
However, what exists is a technological environment that is 
increasingly specialised and privatised. For a local 
authority to begin to develop a role in technological 
change, then practical product development requires 
education and training facilities - an area where the local 
authority can exert an influence. 
8.3 THE INNOVATION PROCESS. 
The GLC policy found-itself unable to match- technology-Push 
with demand-pull, the key elements for commercially 
successful innovative activity (Freeman 1982). In. the 
previous section it was argued that political and economic 
factors in the national context constrained the development 
of an alternative technology policy by the GLC. The 
problems of manufacture and markets which emerged in the 
case-study pointed to the power inherent in existing 
Political and economic institutions to direct the innovation 
process. This supports the argument put forward in Chapter 
One that Powerful economic'and institutional factors channel 
the direction of innovative activity and technological 
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change. for example. through the allocation of resources to 
research and development in certain areas and not others, 
and the conservatism of economic institutions in their 
support of 'alternative' technologies. The question which 
emerges is how these powerful-elements become embodied 
within the innovation process so that-the dominant 
technological paradigm becomes difficult to resist. 
In Chapter One. the theoretical concern to explain 
innovative activity was considered from an economic 
perspective. The concepts of 'technology-push' and 
'demand-pull' discussed referred to the crucial factors for 
successful innovative activity. Technical chance comprises 
a series of innovative steps arising from indicators 
signalled through the interaction between market needs and 
technical possibility. Successful innovations were those 
that matched technology with the market. consumer/user 
requirements were understood and adequate resources were 
available for R and D and the launch of innovations. For 
the GLC strategy the emphasis on production-(see 5.1) meant 
that the strategy was essentially supply-side or 
technology-push. The ability of 'a local authority to 
influence the market and the economic environment was seen 
as minimal. Robin Murray (1985), the Chief Economic Adviser 
to the GLC acknowledged this limitation when he wrote: 
'In intervening in the market economy, what we aim to do is 
to, atrengthenýthe. sociall. v-useful forces.. however bound they 
may finally be by the conditions, of profitability. That in 
3a14R 
why we speak of operating in and against the market'.. 
Thus, the 
. appropriate and-only feasible option for local 
authorities as agents of technological change was to . - 
challenge the market from within. The effectiveness of 
social needs as the basis for the stimulation of innovative 
activity was found to be marginal in a competitive market 
economy. The BLEB were unable to influence demand factors 
from the public sector so that the mechanism did not exist 
whereby minority interests without economic and political 
resources could influence the innovation process. The 
reliance on technology-push factors in the form of. the 
creation of the Technology Networks underestimated the 
significance of demand factors for the successful 
implementation of . 
the' strategy. crucial for an invention to 
become an innovation. Demand factors include the 
articulation of social needs, markets and opportunities for' 
manufacture. The latter being dependent on the existence of 
adequate demand. 
The Network study demonstrated the power of market forces 
for innovative activity., The lack of public sector or 
social markets was matched by the lack of a mechanism 
whereby purchasing power was; directly related to social 
need. A major finding of the study was that if technology 
and need were to be more directly related, then the relation 
between purchasing power and needs must be addressed. The 
0 
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importance of demand factors in the form of Government 
support for the initiative was exemplified by the finding 
that there was not a problem with the technology but rather 
with the commitment of resouces for implementation (see 
6.3). 
Need-led innovation, therefore. was found to be a political 
Problem which required the articulation of social needs and 
Popular demand for a re-allocation of resources at the 
national level. ' This supports Noble's (1983) contention 
that the problem of power in relation to technological 
alternatives is not an economic or technical one but a 
Political and social' one. If the political commitment to 
alternative technologies existed at the national, and 
international level, then the economic commitment to°the 
development of these technologies would follow.. However. 
this commitment did not exist, and we are led back to the 
Problem of Power. 
-A- understanding of the specific events within the 
innovation process raises the problem of power, but also 
indicates areas of'possible' intervention. The discussion of 
how innovation occurs presented in Chapter One centred on 
the events within the innovation process between the 
recognition of demand by producers and the end-result; the 
appearance of a new product. 
Demand-pull theories point to the recognition of a need as 
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the main stimulus to innovation but as the critique 
indicated the existence of social needs does not necessarily 
lead to their satisfaction (see 1.10).. Market needs are 
economically-backed demands, therefore are significant in a 
competitive market system. Their economic significance 
comprises the connection between technological innovation 
and the market. 
A problem voiced by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) (see 1.5). 
especially in relation to radical innovations was that 
potential needs and demands are limitless and could refer to 
almost' anything. Thus it is difficult to conceive of how 
these potential needs and demands trigger innovative 
activity at a given point in time. The supply of ideas 
depends on the state of knowledge at particular moments-in 
time and ideas may not correspond with needs (Bruce 1984). 
The mechanism by which manufacturers and needs are drawn 
together is the market mechanism. Although markets are no, 
more than mechanisms for selecting between products and 
methods of production. and are not systems of production in 
themselves. they embody powerful cultural assumptions. - 
The 
market is a culturally and socially-conditioned milieu which 
reflects-the dominant cultural bias toward 'progressiveness' 
and technological sophistication (see 1.9). For examples it 
is-easier to locate. and. less expensive to buy a microwave 
oven than. a fossil fuelled oven or Raeburn. 
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In addition, there-is the problem raised by Dosi"(1982), and 
which the Networks were faced with in terms of 
socially-useful products - how to express a need for a 
product that does not already exist. This involves a 
creative leap that is beyond the ability of most lay-persons 
(Doss 1982). As an aside, this point also captures the 
important truth that products get made in the first instance 
as a result of designers-and producers creative ideas about 
what People need and want. Innovative activity that does 
not have a direct relationship with the market remains 
difficult to explain. The market not only presents the 
range of goods on offer, but this range of goods is 
necessary to further product development. It is through the 
identification of the inadequacy of a particular artifact to 
fulfill a particular need which stimulates re-innovation or 
the re-adaptation of products. Thus product development is 
often an incremental process. -, Demand, factors cannot affect 
a technology until it has been invented, but then become 
crucial to Innovation. New innovations may be stimulated by 
the users perception of the inadequaces of the existing 
technical solution on offer., -, Ray (1985) developed criteria 
for successful innovative activity. He argued that new 
innovations need to complement surrounding technologies, 
correspond with user needs, have some advantage over 
competing technologies and be offered at an appropriate 
Price. This presents problems for alternative technologies 
because if the range on offer is unable to reach the market, 
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it becomes problematical' to conceive how it is possible to 
stimulate demand and further product development for these 
technologies. 
In terms of alternative technologies needs are meaningful 
when there is some form of concrete possibility of 
realisation, thus needs are related to the choices-0 n offer. 
This--raises the question of how'is it possible to secure 
the articulation of need without a range of choices being 
already. available? What are the-mechanisms for offering 
alternative technological solutions to problems? Once 
alternative technologies=are developed, how is it possible 
to offer these to groups who do not have the economic 
. respurces to pay for them?. All of these problems were faced 
by the Networks and represent crucial issues for an 
initiative which attempts to strengthen the socially-useful 
forces from within the marketplace. 
Ray's"(1985) criteria. mentioned above. is particu1arly- 
telling in the notion that new innovations must complement 
existing technologies. The evolutionary nature of much 
technological activity (see 1.6) suggests a process of' 
technological convergence. Firms exhibit a trajectory of 
product development which is closely tied to 
economically-defined needs-expressed through the market. 
The selection of goads an offer tends to fall into similar 
" . 
trajectories of development as'companies seek to imitate 
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market leaders. Technology builds on technology in an 
incremental process, thus product design, re-design and 
re-adaptation comprise. a large part of innovative activity 
once a trajectory has been developed. Once the 
technological capability exists then demand has an 
'inducement' effect. on surrounding technologies and 
technological systems (Hughes 1983, Rosenberg 1976). The 
strong cultural bias within the marketplace effects 
technology at the level of the firm. Coombs et al. (1987) 
note that each firm will not only adopt technological 
solutions and approaches which are going to remain stable 
for short periods of time, but which are also similar to 
those adopted by other firms operating in the same 
technology. Thus-technological trajectories (Nelson and 
Winter 1977) become common to most firms operating within an 
industrial sector. The notion of dominant design (Abernathy 
and Utterback 1975) also supports the argument for a 
technological convergence. The implication is that 
enterprises are constrained in the technological options 
open-to them. The aim of maximising profits tends to 
produce certain relatively stable lines of development. New 
technological regimes and trajectories emerge from threats 
and opportunities for competitiveness within the 
marketplace. The important point to note-is that this is an 
on-going and dynamic process# open to change, but change 
within a 'cultural brief' and outlook or dominant 
technological paradigm (Dosi 1982). 
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In Chapter One it was argued that support for science and 
technology was planned and controlled through research 
funding, the result of decision-making at the earliest 
stages of technological development (see 1.8). It was 
argued that this decision-making was based on the criteria 
of economic growth and ideological and prestige factors. 
This 'cultural brief' excludes alternative routes of 
development. Thus the dominant technological paradigm 
becomes difficult to shift. For alternative initiatives 
points of intervention need to be identified within the 
dominant technological paradigm. Areas which can build on 
existing technology and information so that users and 
consumers can begin to exert"some. influence on the future 
array of technologies on offer in the marketplace. What is 
implied is that this is an incremental process that is not 
necessarily achieved by an over-emphasis on products or the 
practical arm of innovative activity. Of equal importance 
is the presentation of a political and social challenge to 
conventional approaches and beliefs about both innovation 
and the role of the market in matching technology to needs. 
The political commitment to addressing issues of 
technological change by the GLC led to a short-lived 
alternative strategy for technology. In the final analysis, 
the experimental project in product design and. development 
met the realities of innovative activity in a competitive 
market economy. The Network study findings indicated that 
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an-approach which began to address the issues of the unequal 
distribution of technical skill, 'technical information and 
the social organisation of the innovation process was a 
means of re-introducing some elements of power into user and 
consumer choice. 
8.4 THE SOCIAL ORGANISATION OF THE INNOVATION PROCESS. 
The socially-useful technology policy developed by the GLC 
appeared to present the possibility of relating technology 
directly to social need through product design and 
development. The exemplary nature of this activity could 
then be used to demonstrate an alternative and 
pre-Figurative paradigm for technology in society. The 
policy initiative was based on a critique of the neutrality 
of science and technology. Technology was found to be 
inherently political; designed to open certain options and 
close others (Winner 1979). Technologies embodied the 
social. relations of their design and development (see 2.5). 
The sociological argument presented in Chapter Two yielded 
the proposition that technology is potentially 
multi-directional. Design lies between technology-push and 
market-pull (Walker 1986). Design plays a central role in 
the innovation process. The technical solutions that emerge 
in relation to user problems exhibit a number of. Potential 
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design configurations that are dependent on, the priority 
given to certain criteria. for example, different designs 
which emerge if priority is given to cost or alternatively 
to materials. This suggests a possibility exists to 
influence product design and the direction of technological 
change. The practical application of this insight by the 
GLC in their technology policy met the problem of power in 
society (see 8.3). - 
The micro-level studies (see 2.4) of technological 
development introduced the concepts of 'actors' (Callon 
1980) and 'social groups' (Pinch and Bijker 1984). It was 
argued that technical development is potentially 
multi-directional. and that the end-product; the 
technological artefact embodies the compromises between 
powerful interest groups able to influence technology at an 
early stage of its development. However, the concentration 
on*product development processes does-not address the issues 
of power. For example, the exclusion of certain groups from 
the decision-making process (Russell and Williams 1987). 
. 
the setting, of technological agendas-(MacKenzie 1987. Lukes 
1974), the understanding of the political and economic 
context of the initiative, that is, how is the stage set to 
suggest the solution to the problem of>technology. The 
nature of the local authority, and the analysis of-local 
economic development by the GLC was the setting within which 
the Networks were based. All of these factors need to be 
Lk- o'1 
taken into account so that the specific constraints and 
Possibilities for change at different levels are recognised. 
To, influence the innovation process at the national level 
was precluded for the initiative, but within certain 
constraints some ability was found by the Networks to begin 
to influence the innovation process at the local level. 
Sociological arguments question the immanent logic of 
technological development. . 
The dominant technological 
paradigms are not fixed, rather they act as a resource to be 
used (MacKenzie and Wajcman (1985). The question which 
emerges is how to gain practical access to that resource. 
The findings from the Network study suggest the importance 
of recognising how innovation occurs, and within that to 
develop facilities for an alternative social organisation of 
the innovation process which uses information, hands-on use 
of technical equipment, education and training to lay the 
base for people to beginhink of alternative designs for 
products and processes. The ability to develop alternative 
technologies requires an understanding of existing 
technological-, development. This means addressing the wider 
context of technology in society. Not only the context of 
product design and development but the context of use and 
implementation of the technology. In addition, the 
environment in which technologies operate and the social and 
cultural assumptions and implications which surround 
technological development. This involves a recognition of 
Lk4Z: >B 
technology as a social and cultural activity. Otherwise the 
spectrum of user involvement in product development involves 
only a change of procedure within an unchanged balance of 
power. As such it is unlikely to influence technological 
development. 
The Networks study found that a socially-useful technology 
policy needed to be seen as a cultural and social policy. 
It was not enough to concentrate only on product 
development. The separation of technological practice from 
its social context leads to a narrow definition of 
technological development as new or improved products. 
This reflects the economic perspective of the innovation 
process defined as the process by which new products are 
conceived, developed and launched (Roy 1986). Concentration 
on this aspect of technological development obscures the 
, 
importance of how technoloty operates in the real world. 
The world of an unequal distribution of power and resources 
in society. The ability of the Networks to encourage the 
participation of users into a process of technological 
discussion around existing product development comprises the 
basis of a participative approach to the innovation process. 
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8.5 CONCLUSIONS. 
The question of why certain technologies are developed 
whilst others are not even though there may be a need for 
them is directly related to political processes and issues 
of power in society. The nature of the relationship between 
power and technology raises certain issues about the 
innovation process and the-existence of technological 
alternatives. The specialised and increasingly privatised 
nature of the innovation process in competitive market 
economies precludes access to information about 
technological developments. The unequal distribution of 
decision-making at the very earliest stages of technological 
development ensures a differential access to the product 
design and development process. The deference to scientific 
and technical expertise, the exclusive nature of technical 
skill, and the realities of the social relations of class, 
gender and race in everyday life all diminish the 
possibilities for a genuinely participative approach to 
innovation. ' The argument that the ability to shape 
technology is power-dependent, so that social and political 
change is a pre-requisite to influencing the direction of 
technological change is important for the success of 
alternative initiatives for technology. However, the nature 
of our technological environment itself embodies social and 
political relations thus change in society requires change 
in technology also. This suggests a two-pronged'approach to. 
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technology which incorporates political and practical 
elements within a strategy. For a local authority the 
ability to affect technological development at the national 
level is minimal. In addition, its ability to affect 
innovative activities within local manufacturing industries 
is constrained. Given these constraints the possibility of 
practical action appears overly problematic. However, this 
discussion has identified certain areas, specifically 
education, training and access to information, that are 
possible fora local authority to address. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS. 
9.1 INTRODUCTION. 
The discussion of the Technology Network initiative ended 
with a rather pessimistic view of the role of a local 
authority as an agent of technological chance. To conclude 
on this note would be to uphold a technological determinist 
position; the immanent logic of technological development 
remains somehow autonomous and outside of societal control. 
Technological determinism presents the technology selection 
process as 'objective' and neutral, rather than political 
and always the result-of decision-making at the very 
earliest stages of technological. development. The 
literature surveyed in Chapters One and Two and the events 
that surrounded the GLC technology initiative show quite 
clearly the complex interrelationships between technology 
and society. The conclusions of the research suggest that a 
socially-directed technology policy needs to address the 
social orgänisation of the-innovation process, the content 
of the technology itself and the political and cultural 
beliefs and attitudes about the role of technology in 
soolety. 
Theoretically innovations are influenced-by user needs and 
economic demand, but also may be 'induced' by a variety of 
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economic, social and political factors. The GLC attempted 
to base a technology policy on social and political 
processes. The exploration of the issues raised by the 
Network study. indicates some avenues that a local authority 
could effectively-begin to pursue in order to intervene in- 
the innovation process. The conclusions of the study and 
the end-result of-the research, suggest certain-priorities 
for resource allocation by local authorities concerned to 
achieve socially-directed technology policy objectives. 
9.2 CONCLUSIONS. 
1. The radical policy initiatives represented a creative 
departure from traditional assumptions about the role of the 
local authority in economic and technological development. 
Innrelation='to technology, two main points may be made. 
First, the local authority is in a good position to 
recognise unmet needs, often their collective provision is 
included in their statutory duties, for example, heating 
needs of council tenants, aids for the disabled and so on. 
Second, the recognition of the unequal distribution of 
decision-making at the very earliest stages of technological 
development which ensures a differential access to the 
product design and development process was seen as an 
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important area to address. 
The attempt to influence the social organisation of the 
innovation process and to embody socially-useful choices 
into product design with the establishment of the Technology 
Networks raises important questions for technology policy. 
It draws attention to the need to discuss and integrate the 
potential social impacts of technological development into 
the design stage of technology policy. And, in this way to 
ensure that the gap between technological innovation and the 
implementation and use of technologies within their social 
context is recognised and addressed during the formulation 
stage of a technology policy. 
2. " The deference to scientific and technical expertise, 
the exclusive nature of technical skill, and the realities 
of the social relations of class, gender and race in 
everyday life all diminish the possibilities for a genuinely 
participative approach to innovation. This suggests the 
need for a two-pronged approach to technology issues which 
incorporates political and practical elements within a 
strategy. The concentration upon practical technological 
activity is a key area for the development of alternative 
technologies. But practical activity requires a context 
within on-going political processes. Training programmes in 
technologicallawareness and the creation of facilities for 
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working with technology and generating alternative 
solutions; 'design by doing', is an area that can be 
addressed by local authorities and one which would benefit 
from additional resource allocation. The Technology 
Networks were a good example of the potential for this 
approach. Findings from the research indicated a clear need 
to support both practical training and the more general 
process of creating space for discussion around technology 
issues. Whether practicäl awareness or conceptual/social 
understanding of the issues is the necessary pre-requisite 
to a socially-directed technology policy is debateable. But 
it is a debate that requires an on-going commitment to the 
integration of both political and practical activities. 
Socially-directed innovation requires a hegemonic strategy 
that influences attitudes-to technology,, and promotes a 
popular technological awareness. Practical exemplary 
projects have a role as a focus for political mobilisation. 
The coupling of technology with effective demand is crucial, 
in this case effective demand is political' power (Mole and 
Elliott 1987). 
3. The Technology Network initiative' raised"the question 
of user involvement in, product design and development. A 
lack of clarity surrounds this concept, exemplified by the 
variety of forms-which emerged from. the process"of 
encouraging participation in the Networks. "" The managements 
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of user involvement emerges as an issue for investigation. 
For example, how is it possible to manage a transfer of 
power from the expert to the lay-person, crucial if 
participation is to be achieved. The Technology Networks 
underestimated the importance of design by doing, the 
distribution of technical skill and the ability of 
non-designers to generate new possibilities. The nature of 
technological skill and design expertise means that not all 
users would be capable of design work. The end-result of a 
lack of clear thinking about the role of the user in the 
innovation process is user activity which tends to be ad 
hoc. 
In general. the role of the user in the innovation process 
is non-existent. A further difficulty is a lack of 
knowledge about scientific and technical expertise. 
Therefore certain training activities. Information and 
access to technical resources are necessary as a basis from 
which to draw on user potential. For a local authority 
attempting an initiative based on user involvement what is 
required is some evaluation of the form of user involvement 
necessary to a socially-directed innovation process. Here 
the cultural approach to technology issues is important 
if 
allied to a political framework. The. danser is to look to 
users as the lynch-pin to alternative technological 
activity. Users are as stuck as everyone else when it comes 
to the identification of needs for alternatives, needs are 
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related to existing roods on offer. - The recognition of a 
need tends to be an incremental process based in the 
dominant technological culture. Needs'become meaningful 
when there is some concrete possibility of their 
realisation. that is. they are firmly related to the choices 
on offer. The articulation of future needs requires a 
qualitatively different approach than commenting on the 
inadequacies or otherwise of existing product design. What 
is required is a creative leap of the imagination, which is 
not everyone's forte. Therefore, points of intervention 
need to be identified within the dominant technological 
paradigm, for example, using information on existing 
technologies as the base from which to begin to exert some 
influence on-the future array of goods in the marketplace. 
This incremental process is not necessarily achieved by-an 
overemphasis on product development. The emphasis on 
campaigning which emerged from the Network study indicates 
that this is an area where the local authority can exert an 
influence. 
4. The Technology Networks created the facilities for an 
alternative organisation of the innovation process. product 
development was more dependent on external factors. The 
social organisation of the, innovation process around the 
concept of social-use drew attention to its political 
elements which include education and training, campaigning 
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and hands-on use of technological equipment. Technology is 
social, thus a programme for alternative products needs to 
institute a programme of social chance. For a local 
authority priorities for resource allocation should focus on 
design and technology education which raises the issues of 
what does a social technology look like, what does a 
feminist technology look like and so on. Technological 
discussion as an on-going practical activity could then form 
the base of a popular alternative technological hegemony) 
erucial to political demand for technological change. 
9.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. 
The policy outcomes discussed in Chapter Seven are the key 
to the needs of future research. Three main areas emerge. 
First, technology and culture issues. Second, practical 
product development issues# and third. comparative analysis 
of local authority developments in technology policy. 
The social shaping of technology literature reviewed in 
Chapter Two yields a fuller understanding of the 
relationship between technolosV and society with its focus 
on the content of technology itself. An area which had boon 
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neglected until comparatively recently. This research has 
benefited from these theoretical developments because they 
drew attention to the importance of addressing the content 
of technology issues and the social relations of the 
innovation process. Equally, however, the research has 
drawn attention to the lack of information about the nature 
of popular technological culture, crucial to initiatives 
designed to encourage user involvement in the innovation 
Process. What is required is further research into 
conceptions of technology in the context of the user, to 
include images of technology, users opinions of product 
design and investigation into beliefs surrounding the 
possibility of alternative technological solutions to 
problems and the ability of users to influence technological 
change. 
On a more practical product development level, managerial 
and social marketing issues are important areas to address 
if a more strategic analysis and theoretical framework for 
the effective management of alternative product development 
is to emerge. The management of innovation literature 
related to alternative technological developments may yield 
important insights. 
Local authority developments in technology policy remains an 
interesting area. Both UDAP in Coventry and SCEPTRE in 
, 
Sheffield still exist, and the majority of local authorities 
.f 
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are now involved in product innovation issues via Science 
Parks, Innovation Centres and so on. The influence of the 
GLC approach on these initiatives, and comparisons between 
technology strategies developed by qualitatively different 
agencies situated at either end of the political spectrum 
would be important to any further analysis on the role of 
the local authority as an agent of technological change. 
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APPENDIX ONE. 
Interview Schedule. 
1. Name of Respondent. 
2. Position. 
3. Gender. 
4. ASe. 
5-Background Experience. 
6. User Involvement. 
a) how was this defined? 
b) who was involved in project/product design and 
development? 
c) what participatory techniques were employed by the 
Network? 
d) in what form were user needs incorporated into product 
design/development? 
e) how were user needs articulated? 
f) what were the main problems encountered in thf _ 
encouragement of user involvement? 
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7. Access to technical resources. 
a) how were these defined? 
b) what facilities did this involve? 
c) how was access negotiated for users? 
d) what were the links between the Network and Polytechnics, 
how did they emerge? 
e) how necessary was this link for technology transfer from 
the Polytechnics to the community? 
f) what were the main problems encountered? 
8. Social-use. 
a) how was this defined? 
b) how were projects assessed in terms of this. definition? 
c) where did project/product ideas originate? 
d) how did the project/product relate to need? 
e) how were needs articulated and identified, and by whom? 
f) who was involved in product design/development? 
g) what was the nature of projects/products in the Network? 
h) how would the product be manufactured? 
i) how would the product be marketed or distributed? 
what were the main problems encountered in the 
design/development of socially-useful products? 
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